Daniele De De Santis

In this paper we will be discussing the “Platonism” of two former Göttingen students of Husserl, notably Jean Héring and Roman Ingarden. By “Platonism” we mean not simply an account of the diff erence between individuals and Forms. We mean a peculiar insight into what Ingarden explicitly designates as “the content of Ideas”. Our primary concern is to emphasize a major shift in Plato’s treatment of Forms: we will see Plato switching the focus of his investigation from the difference between the visible world of bodies and the invisible realm of Forms to the internal structure of the Forms themselves. We will then discuss Héring’s Bemerkungen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee and Ingarden’s Essentiale Fragen in order to explain the diff erence between the notions of individual essence, morphe, essentiality and Idea.

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 2, pp 221 - 256 In the following paper we will seek to understand what Edmund Husserl, in his second _Logical Investigation_, refers to as “idealism”, against the backdrop of Rudolf Hermann Lotze’s interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas in the third book of his _Logic_. This will raise not only the question of Husserl’s indebtedness to Lotze with respect to the _Ideenhlehre_ in terms of _Geltung_, but first and foremost that of the “Platonism” of the idealism defended in his first masterpiece.

The main goal of this article is to examine Edmund Husserl’s method of “eidetic variation”—that is, to examine the way this method is supposed to work in connection with the notion of “similarity” (Ähnlichkeit). Unlike most interpretations, it will be suggested that similarity represents the leading methodologicalprinciple of eidetic variation. We will argue, therefore, that, on the one hand, this method is rooted in the sphere of association and passivity while, on the otherhand, it is constituted by the transposition of a passive synthesis into an active operation. After having introduced and discussed a twofold notion of phantasy(as “localized phantasy” and as “pure phantasy”) as well as a twofold concept of eidos (as “hen epi pollon” and as “pure eidos”), the extent to which for Husserl there cannot be any eidetic variation without a monadology will be shown.