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1Presentism: A CritiqueIn Hallvard Lillehammer & G. Rodriguez Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, With His Replies.. pp. 196-211. 2002.
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2Craig on the Experience of TenseIn The ontology of time, Prometheus Books. pp. 235-242. 2004.Peer Reviewed.
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Is There a Difference Between Absolute and Relative spaceIn Guido Bonino & Rosaria Egidi (eds.), Fostering the Ontological Turn: Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987), Ontos Verlag. pp. 242-251. 2008.Peer Reviewed.
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1A-, B and R-theories of Time: A Debate.In Adrian Bardon (ed.), The Future of the Philosophy of Time.. pp. 1-24. 2012.
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Dolev's Metaphysical Anti-Realism: A Critique.In Debates in the Metaphysics of Time, Bloomsbury. pp. 1-29. 2014.
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23Ingthorson, McTaggart's Paradox and the R. Theory of TimeIn Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle & Peter Ohrstrom (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time - Themes from Prior, Aalborg Universitetsforlag. 2018.Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox and the R-theory of Time L. Nathan Oaklander University of Michigan-Flint, USA [email protected] his provocative book, McTaggart’s Paradox, R.D. Ingthors- son argues that McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time rests on the principle of temporal parity according to which all times or events in time exist equally or co-exist in a sense that is compatible with their being successive. Moreover, since temporal parity is also an essential tenet of the B-theory,…Read more
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4Tempo e IdentitaArmando Editore. 2009.Translation of several chapters of L. Nathan Oaklander's contribution to Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York and London: Routledge, 2008.
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30Common Sense, Ontology and Time: A Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker's View of Temporal RealityManuscrito 39 (4): 117-156. forthcoming.ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to critically discuss Lynne Rudder's Baker BA-theory of time, and second to contrast it with the R-theory (after Russell). In the course of my discussion I will contrast three different methodological approaches regarding the relation between common sense and ontology; clarify Russell's authentic view in contrast to the B-theory which is McTaggart's misrepresentation of Russell, and consider how the R-theory can respond to objections Baker makes …Read more
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16Emotions and Judgment: A Critique of SolomonPhilosophy Research Archives 4 360-371. 1978.We can only determine what an emotion is if we first ask whether or not there are intrinsically emotional entities. To ask if there are intrinsically emotional entities is to ask if there are entities that are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of emotion-words. Recently, Robert Solomon has developed a view of the emotions according to which there are intrinsically emotional entities. Specifically, he claims that emotions are a kind of judgment. Our task in this pape…Read more
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The Ontology of C. D. Broad's "the Mind and its Place in Nature."Dissertation, The University of Iowa. 1973.
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300Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to CraigPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 156-163. 2008.
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194Mctaggart's paradox and Smith's tensed theory of timeSynthese 107 (2). 1996.Since McTaggart first proposed his paradox asserting the unreality of time, numerous philosophers have attempted to defend the tensed theory of time against it. Certainly, one of the most highly developed and original is that put forth by Quentin Smith. Through discussing McTaggart's positive conception of time as well as his negative attack on its reality, I hope to clarify the dispute between those who believe in the existence of the transitory temporal properties of pastness, presentness and …Read more
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539The new tenseless theory of time: A reply to SmithPhilosophical Studies 58 (3). 1990.Quentin Smith has argued (Philosophical Studies, 1987, pp. 371-392) that the token-reflexive and the date versions of the new tenseless theory of time are open to insurmountable difficulties. I argue that Smith's central arguments are irrelevant since they rest upon methodological assumptions accepted by the old tenseless theory, but rejected by the new tenseless theory
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9Delmas Lewis on Persons and Responsibility: A CritiquePhilosophy Research Archives 13 181-187. 1987.Delmas Lewis has argued that the tenseless view of time is committed to a view of personal identity according to which no one can be held morally responsible for their actions. His argument, if valid, is a serious objection to the tenseless view. The purpose of this paper is to defend the detenser by pointing out the pitfalls in Lewis’ argument.
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38Time and foreknowledge: A critique of Zagzebski: L. Nathan OaklanderReligious Studies 31 (1): 101-103. 1995.One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge , Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a fourdimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine foreknowledge and hu…Read more
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24The The Ontological Turn: Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann, E.D. Klemke and M.S. Gram, (eds) (review)Philosophia 9 (3-4): 445-453. 1981.
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198Do We Really Need a New B-theory of Time?Topoi 34 (1): 1-14. 2015.It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say that the former holds both semantic atensionalism and ontological atensionalism, whereas the latter gives up semantic atensionalism and retains ontological atensionalism. It is typically assumed that the B-theorists have been induced by advances in the philosophy o…Read more