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9Delmas Lewis on Persons and Responsibility: A CritiquePhilosophy Research Archives 13 181-187. 1987.Delmas Lewis has argued that the tenseless view of time is committed to a view of personal identity according to which no one can be held morally responsible for their actions. His argument, if valid, is a serious objection to the tenseless view. The purpose of this paper is to defend the detenser by pointing out the pitfalls in Lewis’ argument.
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24The The Ontological Turn: Studies in the Philosophy of Gustav Bergmann, E.D. Klemke and M.S. Gram, (eds) (review)Philosophia 9 (3-4): 445-453. 1981.
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198Do We Really Need a New B-theory of Time?Topoi 34 (1): 1-14. 2015.It is customary in current philosophy of time to distinguish between an A- (or tensed) and a B- (or tenseless) theory of time. It is also customary to distinguish between an old B-theory of time, and a new B-theory of time. We may say that the former holds both semantic atensionalism and ontological atensionalism, whereas the latter gives up semantic atensionalism and retains ontological atensionalism. It is typically assumed that the B-theorists have been induced by advances in the philosophy o…Read more
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13The philosophy of time (edited book)Routledge. 2008.What is the nature of temporal passage—the movement of events or moments of time from the future through the present into the past? Is the future and the past as real as the present, or is the present—or perhaps the present and the past—all that exists? What role, if any, does language play in giving us an insight into temporal reality? Is it possible to travel through time into distant regions of the future or the past? What accounts for the direction of time, the sense we have that we are movi…Read more
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52Mctaggart, Schlesinger, and the two-dimensional time hypothesisPhilosophical Quarterly 33 (133): 391-397. 1983.
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14The Disappearance of Time (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (3): 737-740. 1994.
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111Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?Journal of Philosophical Research 26 23-36. 2001.Clifford Williams has recently argued that the dispute between A- and B-theories, or tensed and tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the confusions between the two theories are cleared away there is no real metaphysical difference between them. The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams’s thesis. I argue that there are important metaphysical differences between the two theories and that, moreover, some of the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest that he is symp…Read more
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66Shoemaker on the duplication argument, survival, and what mattersAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 66 (2): 234-239. 1988.This Article does not have an abstract
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44Craig on McTaggart's Paradox and the problem of temporary intrinsicsAnalysis 59 (4): 314-318. 1999.
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Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society, 1995-2000 (edited book)Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2001.
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30On the Experience of Tenseless TimeJournal of Philosophical Research 18 159-166. 1993.Defending the tenseless theory of time requires dealing adequately with the experience of temporal becoming. The issue centers on whether the defender of tenseless time can provide an adequate analysis of the presence of experience and the appropriateness of certain of our attitudes toward future and past events. By responding to a recent article, ‘Passage and the Presenee of Experience’, by H. Scott Hestevold, I shall attempt to show that adequate analysis of tenseless time is possible.
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1Two Versions of the New Theory of B-LanguageIn The philosophy of time, Routledge. pp. 271-303. 2008.
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170The New Theory of Time (edited book)Yale Up. 1994.The Preface and the General Introduction to the book set the debate within the wider philosophical context and show why the subject of temporal becoming is a perennial concern of science, religion, language, logic, and the philosophy of ...
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233McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s PresentismPhilosophia 38 (2): 229-241. 2010.In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a ) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temp…Read more
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60Does the Russellian Theory of Time Entail Fatalism?Modern Schoolman 59 (3): 206-212. 1982.Peer Reviewed.
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343Russell, negative facts, and ontologyPhilosophy of Science 47 (3): 434-455. 1980.Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true …Read more
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44C.D. Broad's ontology of mindOntos. 2006.Rather than attempt to trace the development of his thought throughout these fifty years this book considers his most representative work, namely, The Mind and ...
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170Personal Identity, Immortality, and the SoulPhilo 4 (2): 183-194. 2001.The soul has played many different roles in philosophy and religion. Two of the primary functions of the soul are the bearer of personal identity and the foundation of immortality. In this paper I shall consider different interpretations of what the soul has been taken to be and argue that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is both what we are and what continues after our bodily death.
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79Absolute Becoming and the Myth of PassagePhilo 7 (1): 36-46. 2004.In a recent paper, Steven Savitt attempts to demonstrate that there is an area of common ground between one classic proponent of temporal passage, C.D. Broad, and one classic opponent of passage, D.C. Williams. According to Savitt, Broad's notion of “absolute becoming” as the ordered occurrence of (simultaneity sets of) events, and Williams’ notion of “literal passage,” as the happening of events strung along the four-dimensional space-time manifold, are indistinguishable. Savitt recognizes that…Read more
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44Temporal Realism and the R-TheoryIn Guido Bonino, Greg Jesson & Javier Cumpa (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations, De Gruyter. pp. 123-140. 2014.