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48Personal Identity, Responsibility and TimeIn Heather Dyke (ed.), Time and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 161--178. 2003.Peer Reviewed.
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Mc Taggart's paradox revisitedIn L. Nathan Oaklander & Quentin Smith (eds.), The New Theory of Time, Yale Up. pp. 211-213. 1994.
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74The Importance of Time (edited book)Kluwer. 2001.The Philosophy of Time Society grew out of a National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminar on the Philosophy of Time offered by George Schlesinger in 1991. The members of that seminar wanted to promote interest in the philosophy of time and Jon N. Turgerson offered to become the first Director of the society with the initial costs underwritten by the Drake University Center for the Humanities. Thus, the Philosophy of Time Society (PTS) was formed in 1993. Its goal is to promote the study …Read more
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24Delmas Lewis on Persons and ResponsibilityPhilosophy Research Archives 13 181-187. 1987.Delmas Lewis has argued that the tenseless view of time is committed to a view of personal identity according to which no one can be held morally responsible for their actions. His argument, if valid, is a serious objection to the tenseless view. The purpose of this paper is to defend the detenser by pointing out the pitfalls in Lewis’ argument.
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51Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of ZagzebskiReligious Studies 31 (1). 1995.One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, "The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge," Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a four-dimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine foreknowledge and …Read more
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78Particulars, positional qualities, and individuationPhilosophy of Science 44 (3): 478-490. 1977.In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay--a bare particular--does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay--a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premis…Read more
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113Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousnessMind 96 (October): 525-29. 1987.In his recent book, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit propounds a version of the psychological criterion of personal identity.1 According to the variant he adopts, the numerical identity through time of persons consists in non-branching psychological continuity no matter how it is caused. One traditional objection to a view of this sort is that it is circular, since psychological continuity presupposes personal identity. Although Parfit frequently denies the importance of personal identity, he c…Read more
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12Mctaggart's Paradox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions: A Reply to SmithSouthern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3): 425-431. 1987.
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1Introduction: McTaggart's Paradox and the Tensed Theory of Time.”In L. Nathan Oaklander & Quentin Smith (eds.), The New Theory of Time, Yale Up. pp. 157--162. 1994.
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998Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to MetaphysicsRoutledge. 1995.First published in 1995. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company
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105Presentism, Ontology and Temporal ExperienceRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 50 73-90. 2002.In a recent article, ‘Tensed Time and Our Differential Experience of the Past and Future,’ William Lane Craig attempts to resuscitate A. N. Prior's ‘Thank Goodness’ argument against the B-theory by combining it with Plantinga's views about basic beliefs. In essence Craig's view is that since there is a universal experience and belief in the objectivity of tense and the reality of becoming, ‘this belief constitutes an intrinsic defeater-defeater which overwhelms the objections brought against it.…Read more
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138On the Experience of Tenseless TimeJournal of Philosophical Research 18 159-166. 1993.Defending the tenseless theory of time requires dealing adequately with the experience of temporal becoming. The issue centers on whether the defender of tenseless time can provide an adequate analysis of the presence of experience and the appropriateness of certain of our attitudes toward future and past events. By responding to a recent article, ‘Passage and the Presenee of Experience’, by H. Scott Hestevold, I shall attempt to show that adequate analysis of tenseless time is possible.
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191Mctaggart's paradox and Smith's tensed theory of timeSynthese 107 (2). 1996.Since McTaggart first proposed his paradox asserting the unreality of time, numerous philosophers have attempted to defend the tensed theory of time against it. Certainly, one of the most highly developed and original is that put forth by Quentin Smith. Through discussing McTaggart's positive conception of time as well as his negative attack on its reality, I hope to clarify the dispute between those who believe in the existence of the transitory temporal properties of pastness, presentness and …Read more
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539The new tenseless theory of time: A reply to SmithPhilosophical Studies 58 (3). 1990.Quentin Smith has argued (Philosophical Studies, 1987, pp. 371-392) that the token-reflexive and the date versions of the new tenseless theory of time are open to insurmountable difficulties. I argue that Smith's central arguments are irrelevant since they rest upon methodological assumptions accepted by the old tenseless theory, but rejected by the new tenseless theory
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9Delmas Lewis on Persons and Responsibility: A CritiquePhilosophy Research Archives 13 181-187. 1987.Delmas Lewis has argued that the tenseless view of time is committed to a view of personal identity according to which no one can be held morally responsible for their actions. His argument, if valid, is a serious objection to the tenseless view. The purpose of this paper is to defend the detenser by pointing out the pitfalls in Lewis’ argument.
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38Time and foreknowledge: A critique of Zagzebski: L. Nathan OaklanderReligious Studies 31 (1): 101-103. 1995.One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge , Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a fourdimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine foreknowledge and hu…Read more