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1Presentism: A CritiqueIn Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, With His Replies., Routledge. pp. 196-211. 2002.
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2Craig on the Experience of TenseIn The ontology of time, Prometheus Books. pp. 235-242. 2004.Peer Reviewed.
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2Is There a Difference Between Absolute and Relative spaceIn Guido Bonino & Rosaria Egidi (eds.), Fostering the Ontological Turn: Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987), Ontos Verlag. pp. 242-251. 2008.Peer Reviewed.
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1A-, B and R-theories of Time: A Debate.In Adrian Bardon (ed.), The Future of the Philosophy of Time, Routledge. pp. 1-24. 2011.
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Dolev's Metaphysical Anti-Realism: A Critique.In Debates in the Metaphysics of Time, Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 1-29. 2014.
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24Ingthorson, McTaggart's Paradox and the R. Theory of TimeIn Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle & Peter Ohrstrom (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time - Themes from Prior, Aalborg Universitetsforlag. 2018.Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox and the R-theory of Time L. Nathan Oaklander University of Michigan-Flint, USA [email protected] his provocative book, McTaggart’s Paradox, R.D. Ingthors- son argues that McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time rests on the principle of temporal parity according to which all times or events in time exist equally or co-exist in a sense that is compatible with their being successive. Moreover, since temporal parity is also an essential tenet of the B-theory,…Read more
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4Tempo e IdentitaArmando Editore. 2009.Translation of several chapters of L. Nathan Oaklander's contribution to Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York and London: Routledge, 2008.
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31Common Sense, Ontology and Time: A Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker's View of Temporal RealityManuscrito 39 (4): 117-156. forthcoming.ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to critically discuss Lynne Rudder's Baker BA-theory of time, and second to contrast it with the R-theory (after Russell). In the course of my discussion I will contrast three different methodological approaches regarding the relation between common sense and ontology; clarify Russell's authentic view in contrast to the B-theory which is McTaggart's misrepresentation of Russell, and consider how the R-theory can respond to objections Baker makes …Read more
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19Emotions and Judgment: A Critique of SolomonPhilosophy Research Archives 4 360-371. 1978.We can only determine what an emotion is if we first ask whether or not there are intrinsically emotional entities. To ask if there are intrinsically emotional entities is to ask if there are entities that are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of emotion-words. Recently, Robert Solomon has developed a view of the emotions according to which there are intrinsically emotional entities. Specifically, he claims that emotions are a kind of judgment. Our task in this pape…Read more
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The Ontology of C. D. Broad's "the Mind and its Place in Nature."Dissertation, The University of Iowa. 1973.
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286Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to CraigPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 156-163. 2008.
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46Does the Russellian Theory of Time Entail Fatalism?Modern Schoolman 59 (3): 206-212. 1982.Peer Reviewed.
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351Russell, negative facts, and ontologyPhilosophy of Science 47 (3): 434-455. 1980.Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true …Read more
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44C.D. Broad's ontology of mindOntos. 2006.Rather than attempt to trace the development of his thought throughout these fifty years this book considers his most representative work, namely, The Mind and ...
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181Personal Identity, Immortality, and the SoulPhilo 4 (2): 183-194. 2001.The soul has played many different roles in philosophy and religion. Two of the primary functions of the soul are the bearer of personal identity and the foundation of immortality. In this paper I shall consider different interpretations of what the soul has been taken to be and argue that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is both what we are and what continues after our bodily death.
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81Absolute Becoming and the Myth of PassagePhilo 7 (1): 36-46. 2004.In a recent paper, Steven Savitt attempts to demonstrate that there is an area of common ground between one classic proponent of temporal passage, C.D. Broad, and one classic opponent of passage, D.C. Williams. According to Savitt, Broad's notion of “absolute becoming” as the ordered occurrence of (simultaneity sets of) events, and Williams’ notion of “literal passage,” as the happening of events strung along the four-dimensional space-time manifold, are indistinguishable. Savitt recognizes that…Read more
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49Temporal Realism and the R-TheoryIn Guido Bonino, Greg Jesson & Javier Cumpa (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations, De Gruyter. pp. 123-140. 2014.
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40Jokic on the Tensed Existence of NaturePhilo 6 (2): 211-215. 2003.In “The Tensed or Tensless Existence of Nature” Alexsander Jokic attempts to defend a new version A. N. Prior’s “Thank Goodness It’sOver” argument against my response to it. Jokic argues that we can give a non-circular account of ceasing to exist that will vindicate the new reading, but I argue that his account to rescue Prior’s argument against my criticism fails.