•  1
    Presentism: A Critique
    In Hallvard Lillehammer & Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, With His Replies., Routledge. pp. 196-211. 2002.
  •  2
    Craig on the Experience of Tense
    In The ontology of time, Prometheus Books. pp. 235-242. 2004.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  2
  •  24
    Ingthorson, McTaggart's Paradox and the R. Theory of Time
    In Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle & Peter Ohrstrom (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time - Themes from Prior, Aalborg Universitetsforlag. 2018.
    Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox and the R-theory of Time L. Nathan Oaklander University of Michigan-Flint, USA [email protected] his provocative book, McTaggart’s Paradox, R.D. Ingthors- son argues that McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time rests on the principle of temporal parity according to which all times or events in time exist equally or co-exist in a sense that is compatible with their being successive. Moreover, since temporal parity is also an essential tenet of the B-theory,…Read more
  •  4
    Tempo e Identita
    Armando Editore. 2009.
    Translation of several chapters of L. Nathan Oaklander's contribution to Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York and London: Routledge, 2008.
  •  21
    Solomon on The Passions
    with Richard Gull and Robert Solomon
    Noûs 12 (1): 78-81. 1978.
  •  11
    Things that Happen, J.E. Tiles. (review)
    Noûs 20 (1): 111-113. 1986.
  •  31
    ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to critically discuss Lynne Rudder's Baker BA-theory of time, and second to contrast it with the R-theory (after Russell). In the course of my discussion I will contrast three different methodological approaches regarding the relation between common sense and ontology; clarify Russell's authentic view in contrast to the B-theory which is McTaggart's misrepresentation of Russell, and consider how the R-theory can respond to objections Baker makes …Read more
  •  20
    The Best of Times
    The Philosophers' Magazine 79 44-49. 2017.
  •  19
    Emotions and Judgment: A Critique of Solomon
    with Richard Gull
    Philosophy Research Archives 4 360-371. 1978.
    We can only determine what an emotion is if we first ask whether or not there are intrinsically emotional entities. To ask if there are intrinsically emotional entities is to ask if there are entities that are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of emotion-words. Recently, Robert Solomon has developed a view of the emotions according to which there are intrinsically emotional entities. Specifically, he claims that emotions are a kind of judgment. Our task in this pape…Read more
  •  286
    Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 156-163. 2008.
  •  46
    Does the Russellian Theory of Time Entail Fatalism?
    Modern Schoolman 59 (3): 206-212. 1982.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  8
    Time and Space, Barry Dainton (review)
    Mind 112 (447): 509-513. 2003.
  •  351
    Russell, negative facts, and ontology
    with Silvano Miracchi
    Philosophy of Science 47 (3): 434-455. 1980.
    Russell's introduction of negative facts to account for the truth of "negative" sentences or beliefs rests on his collaboration with Wittgenstein in such efforts as the characterization of formal necessity, the theory of logical atomism, and the use of the Ideal Language. In examining their views we arrive at two conclusions. First, that the issue of negative facts is distinct from questions of meaning or intentionality; what a sentence or belief means or is about rather than what makes it true …Read more
  •  44
    Rather than attempt to trace the development of his thought throughout these fifty years this book considers his most representative work, namely, The Mind and ...
  •  181
    Personal Identity, Immortality, and the Soul
    Philo 4 (2): 183-194. 2001.
    The soul has played many different roles in philosophy and religion. Two of the primary functions of the soul are the bearer of personal identity and the foundation of immortality. In this paper I shall consider different interpretations of what the soul has been taken to be and argue that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is both what we are and what continues after our bodily death.
  •  81
    Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage
    Philo 7 (1): 36-46. 2004.
    In a recent paper, Steven Savitt attempts to demonstrate that there is an area of common ground between one classic proponent of temporal passage, C.D. Broad, and one classic opponent of passage, D.C. Williams. According to Savitt, Broad's notion of “absolute becoming” as the ordered occurrence of (simultaneity sets of) events, and Williams’ notion of “literal passage,” as the happening of events strung along the four-dimensional space-time manifold, are indistinguishable. Savitt recognizes that…Read more
  •  18
    Mctaggart S Paradox Defended
    Metaphysica 3 (1): 11-25. 2002.
    Peer Reviewed.
  •  49
    Temporal Realism and the R-Theory
    In Guido Bonino, Greg Jesson & Javier Cumpa (eds.), Defending Realism: Ontological and Epistemological Investigations, De Gruyter. pp. 123-140. 2014.
  •  40
    Jokic on the Tensed Existence of Nature
    Philo 6 (2): 211-215. 2003.
    In “The Tensed or Tensless Existence of Nature” Alexsander Jokic attempts to defend a new version A. N. Prior’s “Thank Goodness It’sOver” argument against my response to it. Jokic argues that we can give a non-circular account of ceasing to exist that will vindicate the new reading, but I argue that his account to rescue Prior’s argument against my criticism fails.