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1Presentism: A CritiqueIn Hallvard Lillehammer & G. Rodriguez Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, With His Replies.. pp. 196-211. 2002.
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2Craig on the Experience of TenseIn The ontology of time, Prometheus Books. pp. 235-242. 2004.Peer Reviewed.
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Is There a Difference Between Absolute and Relative spaceIn Guido Bonino & Rosaria Egidi (eds.), Fostering the Ontological Turn: Gustav Bergmann (1906-1987), Ontos Verlag. pp. 242-251. 2008.Peer Reviewed.
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1A-, B and R-theories of Time: A Debate.In Adrian Bardon (ed.), The Future of the Philosophy of Time.. pp. 1-24. 2012.
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Dolev's Metaphysical Anti-Realism: A Critique.In Debates in the Metaphysics of Time, Bloomsbury. pp. 1-29. 2014.
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23Ingthorson, McTaggart's Paradox and the R. Theory of TimeIn Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle & Peter Ohrstrom (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Time - Themes from Prior, Aalborg Universitetsforlag. 2018.Ingthorsson, McTaggart’s Paradox and the R-theory of Time L. Nathan Oaklander University of Michigan-Flint, USA [email protected] his provocative book, McTaggart’s Paradox, R.D. Ingthors- son argues that McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time rests on the principle of temporal parity according to which all times or events in time exist equally or co-exist in a sense that is compatible with their being successive. Moreover, since temporal parity is also an essential tenet of the B-theory,…Read more
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4Tempo e IdentitaArmando Editore. 2009.Translation of several chapters of L. Nathan Oaklander's contribution to Time, Change and Freedom: An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York and London: Routledge, 2008.
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30Common Sense, Ontology and Time: A Critique of Lynne Rudder Baker's View of Temporal RealityManuscrito 39 (4): 117-156. forthcoming.ABSTRACT The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to critically discuss Lynne Rudder's Baker BA-theory of time, and second to contrast it with the R-theory (after Russell). In the course of my discussion I will contrast three different methodological approaches regarding the relation between common sense and ontology; clarify Russell's authentic view in contrast to the B-theory which is McTaggart's misrepresentation of Russell, and consider how the R-theory can respond to objections Baker makes …Read more
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16Emotions and Judgment: A Critique of SolomonPhilosophy Research Archives 4 360-371. 1978.We can only determine what an emotion is if we first ask whether or not there are intrinsically emotional entities. To ask if there are intrinsically emotional entities is to ask if there are entities that are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct application of emotion-words. Recently, Robert Solomon has developed a view of the emotions according to which there are intrinsically emotional entities. Specifically, he claims that emotions are a kind of judgment. Our task in this pape…Read more
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The Ontology of C. D. Broad's "the Mind and its Place in Nature."Dissertation, The University of Iowa. 1973.
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300Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to CraigPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1): 156-163. 2008.
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24Delmas Lewis on Persons and ResponsibilityPhilosophy Research Archives 13 181-187. 1987.Delmas Lewis has argued that the tenseless view of time is committed to a view of personal identity according to which no one can be held morally responsible for their actions. His argument, if valid, is a serious objection to the tenseless view. The purpose of this paper is to defend the detenser by pointing out the pitfalls in Lewis’ argument.
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51Time and Foreknowledge: A Critique of ZagzebskiReligious Studies 31 (1). 1995.One problem facing those who attempt to reconcile divine foreknowledge with human freedom is to explain how a temporal God can have knowledge of the future, if the future does not exist. In her recent book, "The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge," Linda Zagzebski attempts to provide an explanation by making use of a four-dimensional model in which the past, present and future exist. In this note I argue that the model Zagzebski offers to support the coplausibility of divine foreknowledge and …Read more
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78Particulars, positional qualities, and individuationPhilosophy of Science 44 (3): 478-490. 1977.In this paper I attempt to show that an argument offered by Bergmann and Hausman against positional qualities and for bare particulars as individuators is unsound. I proceed by giving two ontological assays of an ordinary thing and showing that the entity that individuates on one assay--a bare particular--does not provide deeper ontological ground of individuation than the entity that individuates on the other assay--a positional quality. Since the argument for particulars is based on the premis…Read more
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116Parfit, circularity, and the unity of consciousnessMind 96 (October): 525-29. 1987.In his recent book, Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit propounds a version of the psychological criterion of personal identity.1 According to the variant he adopts, the numerical identity through time of persons consists in non-branching psychological continuity no matter how it is caused. One traditional objection to a view of this sort is that it is circular, since psychological continuity presupposes personal identity. Although Parfit frequently denies the importance of personal identity, he c…Read more
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12Mctaggart's Paradox and the Infinite Regress of Temporal Attributions: A Reply to SmithSouthern Journal of Philosophy 25 (3): 425-431. 1987.
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1Introduction: McTaggart's Paradox and the Tensed Theory of Time.”In L. Nathan Oaklander & Quentin Smith (eds.), The New Theory of Time, Yale Up. pp. 157--162. 1994.