Michael Heidelberger

The main claim of this talk is that mathematical physics and philosophy of physics are not different. This claim, so formulated, is obviously false because it is overstated; however, since no non-tautological statement is likely to be completely true, it is a meaningful question whether the overstated claim expresses some truth. I hope it does, or so I’ll argue. The argument consists of two parts: First I’ll recall some characteristic features of von Neumann’s work on mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics and will claim that von Neumann’s motivation and results are essentially philosophical in their nature; hence, to the extent von Neumann’s work exemplifies what is considered to be mathematical physics, mathematical physics appears as formally explicit philosophy of physics. The second argument is based on a rather trivial interpretation of what mathematical physics is. That interpretation implies that mathematical physics shares some key characteristic features with philosophy of physics which make the two almost indistinguishable.

It is widely held that the current debate on the mind-body problem in analytic philosophy began during the 1950s at two distinct sources: one in America, de- riving from Herbert Feigl's writings, and the other in Australia, related to writings by U. T. Place and J. J. C. Smart (Feigl [1958] 1967). Jaegwon Kim recently wrote that "it was the papers by Smart and Feigl that introduced the mind-body problem as a mainstream metaphysical Problematik of analytical philosophy, and launched the debate that has continued to this day" (Kim 1998, 1). Nonetheless, it is not at all obvious why these particular articles sparked a debate, nor why Feigl's work in particular came to play such a prominent part in it, nor how and to what extent Feigl's approach rests on the logical empiricism he endorsed

The physiologist and neo-Kantian philosopher Johannes von Kries (1853-1928) wrote one of the most philosophically important works on the foundation of probability after P.S. Laplace and before the First World War, his Principien der Wohrscheinlich-keitsrechnung (1886, repr. 1927). In this book, von Kries developed a highly original interpretation of probability, which maintains it to be both logical and objectively physical. After presenting his approach I shall pursue the influence it had on Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann. It seems that von Kries's approach had more potential than recognized in his time and that putting Waismann's and Wittgenstein's early work in a von Kries perspective is able to shed light on the notion of an elementary proposition.

Um die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts tritt die Sinnesphysiologie in eine neue Phase ein. Sie löst sich allmählich von der akademischen Philosophie und bildet sich zu einer professionellen experimentellen Disziplin aus. Trotzdem ist die Philosophie aber nicht völlig aus dem Spiel; es kommt vielmehr zu einem Wettstreit physiologischer Schulen innerhalb der Physiologie selbst um ihre impliziten philosophischen Anschauungen. Außerdem liefern sich die längst etablierte Disziplinen der Physik, Physiologie und Psychologie so etwas wie einen Machtkampf um das Anrecht, die Sinnesphysiologie als Teil ihres Gebiets ansehen zu können. Die einzelnen Wahrnehmungstheorien unterscheiden sich also sowohl durch die Rolle, die sie den einzelnen Wissenschaften bei der Erklärung der Wahrnehmung zuweisen, als auch durch die ihnen zugrundeliegenden philosophischen Anschauungen. (Vgl. Heidelberger 1993, 1997).

Der Weltbildbegriff, wie er sich im 19. Jahrhundert herausgebildet hat, bezeichnet die zusammenfassende Darstellung der Welt gemäß den Ergebnissen der Naturwissenschaften. Mehr oder weniger untergründig ist damit aber noch mehr mitgemeint: eine aus der Wissenschaft fließende Weltdeutung, die sich an die Stelle der überkommenen Sinnorientierungen und deren Instanzen setzt. Die wissenschaftliche Forschung des späten 19. Jahrhunderts sah sich diesem Ziel der Weltdeutung aus Wissenschaft zum Greifen nahe. Die Generation jener Zeit lebte im Bewußtsein, wie es der Berliner Philosophieprofessor Friedrich Paulsen 1902 ausdrückte, daß die exakte Forschung „uns den Boden unter den Füssen sichern und uns ein treues Weltbild geben“ werde. Man erhoffte sich „eine allseitige und vollständig gesicherte Weltanschauung und eine in notwendigen Gedanken befestigte Lebensweisheit.“.

The term “historical epistemology” can be read in two different ways: (1) as referring to a program of ‘historicizing’ epistemology, in the sense of a critique of traditional epistemology’s tendency to gloss over historical context, or (2) as a manifesto of ‘epistemologizing’ history, i.e. as a critique of radical historicist and relativist approaches. In this paper I will defend a position in this second sense. I show that one can account for the historical development and diversity of science without disavowing the relevance of a (normatively understood) epistemology and without denying the existence of human cognitive universals across historical and cultural differences. In support of my thesis, I draw on cognitive scientific research on causal and symbolic cognition, arguing that causal understanding constitutes a basic part of science, which, in the course of its development, becomes more and more superimposed by a culturally and historically variable symbolic superstructure

Naturphilosophie refers to the philosophy of nature prevalent especially in German phi- losophy, science and literary movements from around 1790 to about 1830. It pleaded for an organic and dynamic worldview as an alternative to the atomist and mechanist outlook of modern science. Against the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind which had given way to the mechanist materialism of the French Encyclopedists, Spinoza’s dual aspect theory of mind and matter as two modes of a single substance was favoured. The sources of this heterogene- ous movement lie in the philosophy of German idealism as well as in late classicism and Ro- manticism. The leading figure, Schelling, assimilated and stimulated the major trends and ideas through his work.