Christoph Baumberger

Summary. Does architecture allow for quotations in a precise and non-metaphorical sense? To answer this question, I formulate with Nelson Goodman for the clearest case, i.e. linguistic quotations, three indi-vidually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions and ask whether they can be satisfied by build-ings or their parts. On the one hand, I argue that in most cases which architectural theorists and critics describe as architectural quotations, what in fact is present is some kind of allusion. On the other hand, I suggest to weaken the conditions for architectural quotations in order to be able to describe cases as quo-tations which share more similarities with linguistic quotations than with linguistic allusions.

In non-philosophical discourse, “identity” is often used when the specific character of artefacts is described or evaluated. We argue that this usage of “identity” can be explicated as referring to the symbol properties of artefacts as they are conceptualized in the symbol theory of Goodman and Elgin. This explication is backed by an analysis of various uses of “identity”. The explicandum clearly differs from the concepts of numerical identity, qualitative identity and essence, but it has a range of similarities with the notion of self-concept used in psychology and practical philosophy. The proposed explication is used to analyse claims about identity-pluralism and identity-conflicts. Firstly, the explication allows us to distinguish various ways how the same artefact can have a plurality of identities. Secondly, more or less sharp conflicts within an identity or between identities of an artefact are distinguished. Thirdly, many phenomena called “identity-conflicts” are only apparently identity-conflicts and can be analysed as involving some other form of tension

Buildings are frequently described as ambiguous and, indeed, they often involve the ambivalence associated with ambiguous symbols. In this paper, I develop a theory of architectural ambiguity within the framework of a Goodmanian symbol theory. Based upon Israel Scheffler’s study of verbal and pictorial ambiguity, I present a theory of denotational ambiguity of buildings which distinguishes four types of ambiguity: elementary ambiguity, interpretation-ambiguity, multiple meaning and metaphor, which proves to be a special case of multiple meaning. Denotationally ambiguous buildings are exceptions, because buildings usually exemplify rather than denote. I therefore add a theory of exemplificational ambiguity. The crucial distinction between mere multiple exemplification and genuine exemplificational ambiguity leads to two versions of each of the first three types of ambiguity. The resulting extension of Goodman’s symbol theory is of interest beyond architecture.

The profession of the master builder has become differentiated in the course of the technological developments stemming from industrialization, separating into the professional disciplines of the architect (in the modern sense) and the structural engineer. Ever since, the question has been about the relationship between architect and structural engineer and the nature of their collaboration. Differing responses have been propagated in architectural theory and exemplified by building practice. In this essay, I distinguish between the models of the monologue by an architect or engineer, the soliloquy of the engineer-architect, and the dialogue between architect and engineer as equal partners. For the third model, upon which we will focus our attention, I characterize more precisely the method of collaboration and discuss two construction methods—shear wall-slab systems (also known as deep-beam/slab structures) and truss structures—that call for the method presented. Beginning with a clarification of the concept of tectonics, I conclude by examining whether, with regard to the discussed structures, one can speak of a “new tectonic culture.”.

Gebaute Zeichen zeigt am Beispiel der Architektur, wie auf der Grundlage der Arbeiten von Nelson Goodman eine leistungsfähige Symboltheorie entwickelt werden kann. Neben der bisher umfassendsten Rekonstruktion enthält das Buch wichtige Modifikationen und wesentliche Erweiterungen von Goodmans Theorie. Die resultierende Symboltheorie der Architektur bietet ein weit reicheres Instrumentarium zur Interpretation von Bauwerken als bestehende Architektursemiotiken. Zudem entgeht sie einer Reihe von Einwänden, welche gegen diese vorgebracht wurden. Vorbereitend wird gezeigt, inwiefern Bauwerke und ihre Teile als Symbole funktionieren können. Der Hauptteil behandelt die Symbolisierungsweisen von Bauwerken. Abschließend werden die Identitäts- und Persistenzkriterien für Bauwerke diskutiert.

Aesthetic cognitivism is best thought of as a conjunction of an epistemic and an aesthetic claim. The epistemic thesis is that artworks have cognitive functions, the aesthetic thesis that cognitive functions of artworks partly determine their artistic value. In this article, my first aim is to defend the epistemic thesis of aesthetic cognitivism. Since it seems undeniable that artworks have cognitive functions, yet less clear whether they have them as artworks, I will focus on cognitive functions that plausibly belong to the proper functions of artworks. My second aim is to sketch a suitable epistemological framework for aesthetic cognitivism. I will pursue my first aim by realizing my second aim and hence argue for the thesis that artworks have cognitive functions by sketching a suitable epistemological framework. In Section 1, I present reasons for conceiving of epistemology as a theory of understanding rather than a theory of knowledge. Art enters the stage only in Section 2, where I show that an epistemology of understanding can and should accommodate the cognitive functions aesthetic cognitivists claimed for artworks, hence providing a suitable epistemological framework. To argue in this way in favour of the claim that artworks have cognitive functions does not beg the question since my argument for an epistemology of understanding does not depend on my aim to defend the epistemic thesis of aesthetic cognitivism. In Section 3, I will answer some of the most pressing non-cognitivist objections within the proposed framework.

What does it mean to understand something? What types of understanding can be distinguished? Is understanding always provided by explanations? And how is it related to knowledge? Such questions have attracted considerable interest in epistemology recently. These discussions, however, have not yet engaged insights about explanations and theories developed in philosophy of science. Conversely, philosophers of science have debated the nature of explanations and theories, while dismissing understanding as a psychological by-product. In this book, epistemologists and philosophers of science together address basic questions about the nature of understanding, providing a new overview of the field. False theories, cognitive bias, transparency, coherency, and other important issues are discussed. Its 15 original chapters are essential reading for researchers and graduate students interested in the current debates about understanding.

Im Zusammenhang mit der Museumsarchitektur wie auch sonst in der Architekturtheorie und der Philosophie der Architektur werden die Ausdrücke »Funktion« und »funktional« sehr häufig verwendet, aber kaum je expliziert. In diesem Aufsatz schlage ich eine Explikation des architektonischen Funktionsbegriffs vor, um am Beispiel der Museumsarchitektur ein Framework für eine funktionale Analyse von Bauwerken zu entwickeln. Im Anschluss an meinen Explikationsvorschlag, der es erlaubt, verschiedene Funktionstypen zu unterscheiden, behandle ich die praktischen und die ästhetischen Funktionen von Museumsbauten. Abschließend weise ich auf weitere Funktionen hin und verorte das vorgeschlagene Framework in einer allgemeinen Architekturtheorie.

In den letzten Jahren ist verschiedentlich vorgeschlagen worden, die philosophischen Ansätze zur Architektur in einer eigenständigen Disziplin der Architekturphilosophie zu-sammenzufassen. Im vorliegenden Beitrag gebe ich eine allgemeine Charakterisierung der Architekturphilosophie, indem ich sie einerseits von der Architekturtheorie abgrenze und andererseits in der Philosophie verorte. Im ersten Teil diskutiere ich verschiedene Ideen, die Abgrenzung von der Architekturtheorie über autorbezogene oder über inhaltliche Kriterien zu leisten, und mache einen Vorschlag, der mit stärker formalen Kriterien operiert. Im zwei¬ten Teil wende ich mich der Architekturästhetik und der Architekturethik als den beiden bisher am besten etablierten Zweigen der Architekturphilosophie zu. Ich charakterisiere diese, indem ich eine Liste von Fragen vorschlage, mit denen sie sich jeweils beschäftigen, und diskutiere, ob die Architektur eine eigene Bereichsästhetik und Bereichsethik erfordert. Abschließend zeige ich, weshalb es sinnvoll ist, für die beiden Zweige eine eigenständige phi¬losophische Disziplin der Architekturphilosophie zu postulieren.