Uwe A. Meixner

In the first part, the paper describes in detail the classical conception of intentionality which was expounded in its most sophisticated form by Edmund Husserl. This conception is today largely eclipsed in the philosophy of mind by the functionalist and by the representationalist account of intentionality, the former adopted by Daniel Dennett and David Chalmers, the latter by John Searle and Fred Dretske. The very considerable differences between the classical and the modern conceptions are pointed out, and it is argued that the classical conception is more satisfactory than the two modern ones, not only regarding phenomenal adequacy, but also on the grounds of epistemological considerations. In the second part, the paper argues that classical intentionality is not naturalizable, that is, physicalizable. Since classical intentionality exists (in the experiences that display it), the non-naturalizability of classical intentionality implies psychophysical dualism.

The paper expounds the sense in which Husserl was not a psychophysical dualist – but also the sense in which he was a psychophysical dualist after all. On the one hand, it takes into account Husserl’s critical statements regarding “dualism,” on the other hand it closely considers Husserl’s understanding of the intentionality of phenomenal experiences. It is shown that Husserl’s writings contain several argumentations that can be interpreted as arguments for psychophysical dualism . It is argued that Husserl’s dualism – the result of phenomenological insights, though not called “dualism” by Husserl himself – is to a high degree defensible and can hold its own in the confrontation with physicalism

Der Kausalbegriff gehört zu den, gerade in der Gegenwart, am häufigsten in Anspruch genommenen philosophischen Begriffen. In Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, der Philosophie des Geistes, in der Handlungstheorie und der Sprachphilosophie taucht er immer wieder in zentraler Funktion auf. Für die Philosophie ist die Deutung des Kausalbegriffs daher von größter Bedeutung. Das vorliegende Buch ist ein Leitfaden zum Kausalbegriff. In seinem ersten Teil wird eine detaillierte Explikation dieses Begriffs geboten, die auf eine neuartige Fassung der nomologischen Regularitätstheorie und die Formulierung einer Logik der Kausalität hinausläuft. Im zweiten Teil wird diese Explikation in einer umfassenden kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit der Literatur zu den verschiedenen Themen, die sich mit dem Kausalbegriff verbinden, weiter begründet und verteidigt. Dabei ergibt sich ein umfassendes Panorama des gegenwärtigen Standes der kausalitätstheoretischen philosophischen Diskussion - mit teilweise weit zurückreichenden Perspektiven in die Vergangenheit. Zur Sprache kommen u. a. die folgenden Themen: probabilistische und Sine-qua-non-Kausalität, kausale Überdeterminierung und Präemption, die Probleme der kausalen Notwendigkeit und des kausalen Vorrangs, Physikalisierung der Kausalität, Retrokausalität, die Deutungen des Ereignisbegriffs und Agens- versus Ereigniskausalität.

One of the perennial questions of philosophy concerns the simple statements which say that an object is so and so or that such and such objects are so and so related: simple predicative statements. Do such statements have an ontological basis, and if so, what is that basis? The answer to this question determines—or in any case, is expressive of—a specific fundamental outlook on the world. In the course of the history of Western philosophy, various philosophers have given various answers to the question of predication. This essay presents the main, crucial answers: the paradigms and theories of predication of the Sophists (and of all later radical relativists), of Plato, of Aristotle, of the Aristotelian-minded non-nominalists, of Leibniz, and of Frege. In addition, the essay follows (to some extent) the most influential—the Aristotelian or mereological—paradigm of predication in its continuity and modification through the many centuries of its reign. However, the essay is not content to adopt the merely historical point of view; it also poses the question of adequacy. Prior to Frege, there was no philosophically adequate theory of predication, and the essay points out the shortcomings (besides aspects that can be viewed as advantages) of each pre-Fregean predication theory considered in it. Frege, in the nineteenth century, brought the philosophy of predication on the right track, but his own theory of predication has its own deficits. The essay ends with the presentation of a theory of predication that the author himself considers adequate.

Until quite recently, mind-body dualism has been regarded with deep suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. This has largely been due to the widespread identification of dualism in general with one particular version of it: the interactionist substance dualism of Réné Descartes. This traditional form of dualism has, ever since its first formulation in the seventeenth century, attracted numerous philosophical objections and is now almost universally rejected in scientific circles as empirically inadequate. During the last few years, however, renewed attention has begun to be paid to the dualistic point of view, as a result of increasing discontent with the prevailing materialism and reductionism of contemporary scientific and philosophical thought. Awareness has grown that dualism need not be restricted to its traditional form and that other varieties of dualism are not subject to the difficulties commonly raised against Descartes' own version of it. Interest in these alternative versions of dualism is growing fast today, because it seems that they are capable of capturing deep-seated philosophical intuitions, while also being fully consistent with the methodological assumptions and empirical findings of modern scientific work on the human mind and brain. The object of this book is to provide philosophers, scientists, their students, and the wider general public with an up-to-date overview of current developments in dualistic conceptions of the mind in contemporary philosophy and science.

Uwe Meixners Essay stellt in gedrängter Form die Hauptgedanken seines 1997 publizierten großen systematischen Entwurfes “Ereignis und Substanz” vor, der neben einer Ontologie im engeren Sinn auch eine Bewusstseinstheorie, eine philosophische Gotteslehre und eine Theodizee beinhaltet. Im vorliegenden Beitrag erläutert er seinen Begriff von Substanz, der eng mit seiner Sicht von Kausalität zusammenhängt und vertritt dabei den radikalen Standpunkt, dass Ereigniskausalität auf Agenskausalität, die von transzendenten Substanzen als Realisationssubjekten getragen werde, reduziert werden könne. Dieser monadische Ansatz wird dann zu einem “eingeschränkten metaphysischen Pluralismus” weiterentwickelt, dessen zentrale These darin besteht, dass das Wirklichmachen – in Meixners Worten die “Realitätsmitteilung an die Welt” – bei einer einzigen Zentralsubstanz liege. Eine Idee, die vor allem aus der Perspektive der modernen japanischen und der chinesischen Philosophie auf Interesse gestoßen ist.

Es wird gezeigt, daß sich Parmenides' Argument gegen Veränderung und Vielheit aus den Fragmenten seines Lehrgedichts so rekonstruieren läßt, daß es entweder formal korrekt wird, oder aber seine Prämisse,,Seiendes ist, Nichtseiendes ist nicht" evidentermaßen richtig ist. Beides zugleich ist nicht zu haben. Es wird plausibel gemacht, daß die Rekonstruktionen in Parmenides' Sinn sind. Betrachtet man sein Argument als formal korrekt, so stellt es, wenn wir das Zeugnis der Erfahrung akzeptieren, eine redactio ad absurdum der auch heute noch vielfach vertretenen Position des Aktualismus „Es gibt nur Aktuales" dar. Parmenides freilich faßte es im Gegenteil als reductio ad absurdum der kognitiven Relevanz der Erfahmng auf.

I argue (1) that it is not philosophically significant whether causation is linguistically represented by a predicate or by a sentence connective; (2) that there is no philosophically significant distinction between event- and states-of-affairs-causation; (3) that there is indeed a philosophically significant distinction between agent- and event-causation, and that event-causation must be regarded as an analog of agent-causation. Developing this point, I argue that event-causation's being in the image of agent-causation requires, mainly, (a) that the cause is temporally prior to the effect, (b) that the cause necessitates (is sufficient with necessity) for the effect. Causal necessity is explained as a derivative of nomological necessity, and finally, via a definition of the causal sentence connective, the logic of event-causation is shown to be a part of temporal modal logic.