Uwe A. Meixner

The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the Libet-experiment. The necessary condition for the existence of free agency is that the physical macro-world is indeterministic to a degree that is relevant for living beings, that is, for their survival and well-being. From an evolutionary point of view, and on the basis of the facts of consciousness, it is more likely than not that this condition is in fact fulfilled.

Ontologically minimal truth law semantics are provided for various branches of formal logic (classical propositional logic, S5 modal propositional logic, intuitionistic propositional logic, classical elementary predicate logic, free logic, and elementary arithmetic). For all of them logical validity/truth is defined in an ontologically minimal way, that is, not via truth value assignments or interpretations. Semantical soundness and completeness are proved (in an ontologically minimal way) for a calculus of classical elementary predicate logic

With the emergence of modern physics a conflict became apparent between the Principle of Sufficient Cause and the Principle of Physical Causal Closure. Though these principles are not logically incompatible, they could no longer be considered to be both true; one of them had to be false. The present paper makes use of this seldom noticed conflict to argue on the basis of considerations of comparative rationality for the truth of causal statements that have at least some degree of philosophico-theological relevance and can be taken to indicate ( not prove) the existence of God. The paper’s comparatively modest aim is to establish belief in the existence of God as a rational metaphysical option, not as a rational obligation. In its final section, enriched causal considerations lead to an indication ( not proof) of God as that which guarantees the unified continuance of the physical world.

The paper presents a new version of the "Cosmological Argument" – considered to be an ontological argument, since it exclusively uses ontological concepts and principles. It employs famous results of modern physics, and distinguishes between event-causation and agent-causation. Due to these features, the argument manages to avoid the objection of infinite regress. It remains true, however, that the conclusion of the argument is too unspecific to be unambiguously considered an argument for the existence of God.

Der cartesische DuaUsmus besteht nicht in der Behauptung, daß die Person und ihr Körper voneinander verschieden sind, sondern in der stärkeren Behauptung, daß sie beide ohne den anderen existieren können. Können ist dabei in einem außerordentlich schwachen Sinn zu nehmen, nämlich im Sinne der analytischen Möglichkeit. Descartes' Argument für diese Behauptung in der 6. Meditation ist im Rahmen der modal-epistemischen Logik als logisch korrektes Argument präzisierbar; daneben auch sein mit dem ersteren verquicktes Argument dafür, daß es eine essentielle Eigenschaft von ihm sei, eine res cogitans zu sein, aber keine, eine res extensa zu sein. Das Problem der Annehmbarkeit der Prämissen reduziert sich auf die Frage, ob es analytisch möglich ist, daß eine Person existiert, ohne mit einem Körper verbunden zu sein. Im Sinne von Descartes' Personbegriff gilt dies, im Sinne unseres Personbegriffes jedoch nicht. Welcher von den beiden Personbegriffen vorzuziehen ist, ist eine offene Frage.

This book is intended as a comprehensive defense of psycho-physical dualism. It gives answers to the question of what dualism may consist in, and inquires into the broadly cultural motivation behind accepting dualism or its opponent physicalism. Arguments for dualism, among them strengthened versions of the famous classical arguments, are presented and defended against objections. Moreover, the various general objections to dualism are criticized in detail, for example, the allegation that dualism is of an anti-scientific nature. The book issues into developing the outlines of a dualistic theory of consciousness and agency. The theory outlined is not only compatible with science but actually connects with it. It offers a unified perspective on the phenomenon of conscious life and may serve as a basis for a general ethics regarding all conscious living beings.