Claus Beisbart

If cosmology is to obtain knowledge about the whole universe, it faces an underdetermination problem: Alternative space-time models are compatible with our evidence. The problem can be avoided though, if there are good reasons to adopt the Cosmological Principle (CP), because, assuming the principle, one can confine oneself to the small class of homogeneous and isotropic space-time models. The aim of this paper is to ask whether there are good reasons to adopt the Cosmological Principle in order to avoid underdetermination in cosmology. Various strategies to justify the CP are examined. For instance, arguments to the effect that the truth of the CP follows generically from a large set of initial conditions; an inference to the best explanation; and an inductive strategy are assessed. I conclude that a convincing justification of the CP has not yet been established, but this claim is contingent on a number of results that may have to be revised in the future.

Monte Carlo simulations arrive at their results by introducing randomness, sometimes derived from a physical randomizing device. Nonetheless, we argue, they open no new epistemic channels beyond that already employed by traditional simulations: the inference by ordinary argumentation of conclusions from assumptions built into the simulations. We show that Monte Carlo simulations cannot produce knowledge other than by inference, and that they resemble other computer simulations in the manner in which they derive their conclusions. Simple examples of Monte Carlo simulations are analysed to identify the underlying inferences.

If we are to constrain our place in the world, two principles are often appealed to in science. According to the Copernican Principle, we do not occupy a privileged position within the Universe. The Cosmological Principle, on the other hand, says that our observations would roughly be the same, if we were located at any other place in the Universe. In our paper we analyze these principles from a logical and philosophical point of view. We show how they are related, how they can be supported and what use is made of them. Our main results are: 1. There is a logical gap between both principles insofar as the Cosmological Principle is significantly stronger than the Copernican Principle. 2. A step that is often taken for establishing the Cosmological Principle on the base of the Copernican Principle and observations is not incontestable as it stands, but can be supplemented with a different argument. 3. The Cosmological Principle might be crucial for cosmology to the extent it is not supported by empirical evidence.

It is often claimed that scientists can obtain new knowledge about nature by running computer simulations. How is this possible? I answer this question by arguing that computer simulations are arguments. This view parallels Norton’s argument view about thought experiments. I show that computer simulations can be reconstructed as arguments that fully capture the epistemic power of the simulations. Assuming the extended mind hypothesis, I furthermore argue that running the computer simulation is to execute the reconstructing argument. I discuss some objections and reject the view that computer simulations produce knowledge because they are experiments. I conclude by comparing thought experiments and computer simulations, assuming that both are arguments.

Kant famously thought that mathematics contains synthetic a priori truths. In his book, Wille defends a version of the Kantian thesis on not-so-Kantian grounds. Wille calls his account neo-Kantian, because it makes sense of Kantian tenets by using a methodology that takes the linguistic and pragmatic turns seriously.Wille's work forms part of a larger project in which the statuses of mathematics and proof theory are investigated. The official purpose of the present book is to answer the question: what is mathematics. Wille sets himself the task of finding a definition that enables him to distinguish between mathematics and proof theory. His solution reads roughly as follows. Mathematics is about how to generate synthetic a priori knowledge by acting within some calculus. This definition does not seem to be a promising starting point, because in this way a very controversial claim becomes true by definition. However, Wille's strategy is to make sense of his definition during the course of his argument and to show that the definition is appropriate regarding research that is commonly taken to be mathematics.The second part of the book explains what ‘acting within some calculus’ amounts to. In Wille's view, mathematics should be characterized in …

With this Editorial, we’d like to inform our readers about some news concerning the editorship of the Journal for General Philosophy of Science:Since its foundation by Alwin Diemer, Lutz Geldsetzer and Gert König in 1970, JGPS was edited by the three founders until 2004. In 2005 and 2008, respectively, Helmut Pulte and Gregor Schiemann joined JGPS as new editors, while Lutz Geldsetzer and Gert König retired by the end of 2008. In 2013, Ulrich Krohs joined the editorial team and thereby restored the ‘trinity’ of the starting years of JGPS.Gregor Schiemann has decided to resign from his editorship with the end of 2014 and has assigned Claus Beisbart as his successor in consultation with the other editors and the publisher. Since 2012, Prof. Dr. Dr. Beisbart is working as a philosopher of science at the University of Bern. His areas of expertise include philosophy of physics, particularly of cosmology, epistemology of model building and simulation..

In den vergangenen Jahren hat die Europäische Union (EU) wiederholt versucht, ihre Institutionen zu reformieren. Als der Entwurf für eine Europäische Verfassung und später der Vertrag von Lissabon ausgehandelt wurden, betraf einer der meistdiskutiertesten Streitpunkte die Frage, nach welcher Entscheidungsregel der EU-Ministerrat abstimmen sollte. Diese Frage ist eine genuin normative Frage. Deshalb sollten auch politische Philosophen und Ethiker etwas zu dieser Frage beitragen können. Im folgenden wollen wir uns dieser Herausforderung stellen und alternative Entscheidungsregeln für den EU-Ministerrat bewerten. Dabei erweisen sich die Methoden der probablistische Modellierung und der Simulation sozialer Prozesse als unerlässlich.1 Damit wird deutlich, wie Simulationen auch innerhalb der angewandten politischen Philosophie als Methode eingesetzt werden können.

In physics, objects are often assigned vector characteristics such as a specific velocity. How can this be understood from a metaphysical point of view – is assigning an object a vector characteristic to attribute it an intrinsic property? As a short review of Newtonian, special relativistic and general relativistic physics shows, if we wish to assign some object a vector characteristic, we have to relate it to something – call it S. If S is to be different from the original object – and I argue for this assumption – then having the specific vector characteristic is not an intrinsic property under different readings of “intrinsic”. For instance, I argue that lonely objects with different orientations do not constitute metaphysically distinct possibilities. There are, however, difficulties in applying the loneliness test, and they concern the role of the space‐time.

The most promising accounts of ontic probability include the Spielraum conception of probabilities, which can be traced back to J. von Kries and H. Poincaré, and the best system account by D. Lewis. This paper aims at comparing both accounts and at combining them to obtain the best of both worlds. The extensions of both Spielraum and best system probabilities do not coincide because the former only apply to systems with a special dynamics. Conversely, Spielraum probabilities may not be part of the best system, e.g. if a broad class of random devices is not often used. Spielraum probabilities have the potential to provide illuminating explanations of frequencies with which outcomes of trials on gambling devices arise. They ultimately fail to account for such frequencies though because they are compatible with frequencies that grossly differ from the values of the respective probabilities. I thus follow recent proposals by M. Strevens and M. Abrams and strengthen the definition of Spielraum probabilities by adding a further condition that restricts some actual frequencies. The resulting account remains limited in scope, but stands objections raised against it in the recent literature: it is neither circular nor based upon arbitrary choices of a measure or of physical variables. Nor does it lack any explanatory power.

What do we mean to say when we call some person a good business manager? And where do the criteria flow from by which we judge people good business managers? I answer these questions by drawing on von Wright's distinction between several varieties of goodness. We can then discriminate between instrumental, technical and moral senses of the expression “to be a good business manager”. The first two senses presume that business managers have a characteristic task or that they engage in typical activities. It is natural to specify this task and these activities by appealing to goods and to the good of a business. These goods may then be identified as goods for people. Insofar as the welfare of people is of moral value, we obtain a morally loaded account of business management. I argue against this account and plead for a more sober understanding of economic goods and of the good of a business. The latter can be understood in analogy to the good of an individual person, but is largely determined by the goals of the founders and owners. Economic goods are things that are wanted by some people and thus exchanged on markets. If this is so, then there is no direct conceptual path from instrumentally or technically good business managers to morality even though there are certain affinities. To conclude, I trace the consequences for our understanding of business ethics.