Neven Sesardić

SummaryIn this article I am criticizing Davidson's claim that psychological description and explanation are impossible without a strong assumption of rationality of the subject. I am trying to dispute his thesis that presupposition of coherence between propositional attitudes must be treated as a constitutive principle of psychology which fundamentally differentiates this science from physics and precludes the existence of strict psycho‐physical laws. Philosophical and empirical arguments are brought forward tho show that Davidson overestimates the role of rationality considerations in psychology. There is no a priori reason why mental states should not be gradually included in a deterministic nomological net.RésuméDans cet article, je critique la thèse de Davidson selon laquelle la description et I'explication psychologiques sont impossibles si I'on ne fait pas I'hypothèse forte de la rationalité du sujet. Je conteste sa thése que la présuppositions d'une cohérence entre les attitudes propositionnelles doive être considérée comme un principe constitutif de la psychologie, principe qui la différencierait fondamentalement de la physique et interdirait I'existence de lois psycho‐physiques strictes. Des arguments philosophiques et empiriques sont produits pour montrer que Davidson surestime le rôle des considérations de rationalité en psychologie. II n'y a pas de raison a priori pour que des états mentaux ne soient pas graduellement introduits dans un réseau nomologique déterministe.ZusammenfassungIn diesem Artikel kritisiere ich Davidsons Behauptung, wonach psychologische Beschreibun‐gen und Erklärungen ohne starke Annahmen bezüglich der Rationalität des subjektes nicht mög‐lich sind. Ich versuche, die These zu widerlegen, der gemäss die Voraussetzung der Kohärenz zwischen propositionalen Haltungen als Konstitutives Prinzip der Psychologie betrachten werden muss, das diese Wissenschaft grundlegend von der Physik unterscheidet und deshalb auch die Möglichkeit von strenge psycho‐physischen Gesetzen ausschliesst. Philosophische und empirische Argumente werden vorgelegt urn zu zeigen, dass Davidson die Rolle von Rationalitätserwägungen in der Psychologie überschätzt. Es gibt keine apriorischen Gründe dafür, dass mentale Zustände nicht nach und nach in ein deterministisches Netzwerk von Gesetzen eingefügt werden könnten

It is nowadays a dominant opinion in a number of disciplines (anthropology, genetics, psychology, philosophy of science) that the taxonomy of human races does not make much biological sense. My aim is to challenge the arguments that are usually thought to invalidate the biological concept of race. I will try to show that the way “race” was defined by biologists several decades ago (by Dobzhansky and others) is in no way discredited by conceptual criticisms that are now fashionable and widely regarded as cogent. These criticisms often arbitrarily burden the biological category of race with some implausible connotations, which then opens the path for a quick eliminative move. However, when properly understood, the biological notion of race proves remarkably resistant to these deconstructive attempts. Moreover, by analyzing statements of some leading contemporary scholars who support social constructivism about race, I hope to demonstrate that their eliminativist views are actually in conflict with what the best contemporary science tells us about human genetic variation.

Many Western intellectuals, especially those in humanities and social sciences, think that it can be easily shown that the persistent and massive opposition to same-sex marriage is rationally indefensible and that it is merely a result of prejudice or religious fanaticism. But a more detailed analysis of some of these widely accepted arguments against the conservative position reveals that these arguments are in fact based on logical fallacies and serious distortions of conservative criticisms of homosexual marriage. It is concluded that philosophers ought to resist the pressure of political correctness and that they should approach the debate with a more open mind than before.

To operationalize the methodological assessment of evolutionary psychology, three requirements are proposed that, if satisfied, would show that a hypothesis is not a just-so story: (1) theoretical entrenchment (i.e., that the hypothesis under consideration is a consequence of a more fundamental theory that is empirically well-confirmed across a very wide range of phenomena), (2) predictive success (i.e., that the hypothesis generates concrete predictions that make it testable and eventually to a certain extent corroborated), and (3) failure of rival explanations (i.e., that crucial and successful predictions attributed to the hypothesis in question cannot be derived from alternative hypotheses). The author argues that the hypothesis about evolutionary sex differences in human jealousy satisfies all three requirements. Key Words: evolutionary psychology • adaptationism • philosophy of science • testability.