Uwe A. Meixner

I argue (1) that it is not philosophically significant whether causation is linguistically represented by a predicate or by a sentence connective; (2) that there is no philosophically significant distinction between event- and states-of-affairs-causation; (3) that there is indeed a philosophically significant distinction between agent- and event-causation, and that event-causation must be regarded as an analog of agent-causation. Developing this point, I argue that event-causation's being in the image of agent-causation requires, mainly, (a) that the cause is temporally prior to the effect, (b) that the cause necessitates (is sufficient with necessity) for the effect. Causal necessity is explained as a derivative of nomological necessity, and finally, via a definition of the causal sentence connective, the logic of event-causation is shown to be a part of temporal modal logic.

Ontologically minimal truth law semantics are provided for various branches of formal logic (classical propositional logic, S5 modal propositional logic, intuitionistic propositional logic, classical elementary predicate logic, free logic, and elementary arithmetic). For all of them logical validity/truth is defined in an ontologically minimal way, that is, not via truth value assignments or interpretations. Semantical soundness and completeness are proved (in an ontologically minimal way) for a calculus of classical elementary predicate logic

With the emergence of modern physics a conflict became apparent between the Principle of Sufficient Cause and the Principle of Physical Causal Closure. Though these principles are not logically incompatible, they could no longer be considered to be both true; one of them had to be false. The present paper makes use of this seldom noticed conflict to argue on the basis of considerations of comparative rationality for the truth of causal statements that have at least some degree of philosophico-theological relevance and can be taken to indicate ( not prove) the existence of God. The paper’s comparatively modest aim is to establish belief in the existence of God as a rational metaphysical option, not as a rational obligation. In its final section, enriched causal considerations lead to an indication ( not proof) of God as that which guarantees the unified continuance of the physical world.

This article provides an explication of the concept "imputation". On the one hand, this explication takes account of the common meaning of the concept and its generally intended range of application. On the other hand, it also provides a definition of the meaning of "y is to be imputed to x", which is precise and fruitful . The adequacy of this definition of "imputation" is justified in detail, in the light of the standards for explications. Since the concept "imputation" is a highly complex notion, its explication in turn involves an explication, an analysis, or at least a clarification of each of the many concepts that constitute it: event, event causality, agent , realization, action, agent causality, personhood, knowledge of what one is doing, etc. Competing interpretations of some of these concepts are considered and they are evaluated in comparison to the interpretation here preferred. To the extent possible, a justification is given for the use of the two concepts most central to imputation - causal necessity and realization - since they clearly cannot be understood as "empirical" concepts. The role freedom and volition play for imputation is also explained. Differentiations are drawn between imputation in a general and legal sense, between purely causal imputation and imputation in its full sense, between participatory and non-participatory imputation, and between simple imputation and imputation to a certain extent or degree. Dieser Aufsatz enthält eine Explikation des Zurechnungsbegriffes, d.h. eine einerseits die vorfindliche Bedeutung und die intendierte Anwendung respektierende, aber andererseits auch präzise , fruchtbare Bedeutungsneufestlegung für "y ist x zuzurechnen". Ihre Adäquatheit im Hinblick auf die eben angesprochenen Explikationesziele und - leitlinien wird ausführlich gerechtfertigt. Da es sich beim Zurechnungsbegriff um einen höchst komplexen Begriff handelt, involviert seine Explikation die Explikation, die Analyse oder wenigstens die Klarstellung jedes der vielen Begriffe, die in seine Konstitution eingehen: des Begriffes des Ereignisses, der Ereigniskausalität, des Agens, des Realmachens, der Handlung, der Agenskausalität, der Person, des Wissens um das, was man tut etc. Für einige dieser Begriffe gibt es konkurrierende Interpretationen, die gegen die favorisierte Interpretation abgewogen werden. Die zwei für Zurechnung zentralsten Begriffe - die der kausalen Notwendigkeit und der des Realmachens - erhalten - soweit wie möglich - eine Rechtfertigung ihres Gebrauchs, da sie sich gewiß nicht als "empirische" Begriffe auffassen lassen. Welche Rolle Freiheit und Willentlichkeit für Zurechnung spielen, wird abgeklärt. Es wird unterschieden zwischen rechtlicher und eigentlicher Zurechnung, rein kausaler Zurechnung und Zurechnung im vollen Sinn, partizipatorischer und nichtpartizipatorischer Zurechnung, außerdem zwischen einfacher Zurechnung und Zurechnung in einem gewissen Grade

This book is intended as a comprehensive defense of psycho-physical dualism. It gives answers to the question of what dualism may consist in, and inquires into the broadly cultural motivation behind accepting dualism or its opponent physicalism. Arguments for dualism, among them strengthened versions of the famous classical arguments, are presented and defended against objections. Moreover, the various general objections to dualism are criticized in detail, for example, the allegation that dualism is of an anti-scientific nature. The book issues into developing the outlines of a dualistic theory of consciousness and agency. The theory outlined is not only compatible with science but actually connects with it. It offers a unified perspective on the phenomenon of conscious life and may serve as a basis for a general ethics regarding all conscious living beings.

This chapter offers a version of Cartesian dualism that draws on the resources of a Husserlian account of intentionality. For example, it argues that 'I can locate myself at the point in space from which I am looking at the world (my 'center of perspective')'. It relies on empirical phenomenology to show that this location that does not correspond to my body or any part of it. Phantom sensations provide confirming evidence. Next, the chapter uses the example of blurred (versus sharp) vision to provide evidence of qualitative properties that cannot be instantiated within the physical world. Finally, it argues that the self's endurance through calls for explanation in terms of patterns of psychophysical causation or interaction.

Until quite recently, mind-body dualism has been regarded with deep suspicion by both philosophers and scientists. This has largely been due to the widespread identification of dualism in general with one particular version of it: the interactionist substance dualism of Réné Descartes. This traditional form of dualism has, ever since its first formulation in the seventeenth century, attracted numerous philosophical objections and is now almost universally rejected in scientific circles as empirically inadequate. During the last few years, however, renewed attention has begun to be paid to the dualistic point of view, as a result of increasing discontent with the prevailing materialism and reductionism of contemporary scientific and philosophical thought. Awareness has grown that dualism need not be restricted to its traditional form and that other varieties of dualism are not subject to the difficulties commonly raised against Descartes' own version of it. Interest in these alternative versions of dualism is growing fast today, because it seems that they are capable of capturing deep-seated philosophical intuitions, while also being fully consistent with the methodological assumptions and empirical findings of modern scientific work on the human mind and brain. The object of this book is to provide philosophers, scientists, their students, and the wider general public with an up-to-date overview of current developments in dualistic conceptions of the mind in contemporary philosophy and science.

The paper expounds the sense in which Husserl was not a psychophysical dualist – but also the sense in which he was a psychophysical dualist after all. On the one hand, it takes into account Husserl’s critical statements regarding “dualism,” on the other hand it closely considers Husserl’s understanding of the intentionality of phenomenal experiences. It is shown that Husserl’s writings contain several argumentations that can be interpreted as arguments for psychophysical dualism . It is argued that Husserl’s dualism – the result of phenomenological insights, though not called “dualism” by Husserl himself – is to a high degree defensible and can hold its own in the confrontation with physicalism