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Uwe A. Meixner

Universität Augsburg
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  •  Publications
    161
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 More details
  • Universität Augsburg
    Institut für Philosophie
    Regular Faculty
Universität Regensburg
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1986
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Action
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Religion
1 more
  • All publications (161)
  • On Some Realisms Most Realists Dont't Like
    Metaphysica 1 (2). 2000.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyRealism and Anti-Realism
  •  17
    Chapter III: On Intending
    In Defending Husserl: A Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company Versus Phenomenology, De Gruyter. pp. 247-350. 2014.
  •  202
    New perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1): 17-38. 2008.
    The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the Libet-exp…Read more
    The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the Libet-experiment. The necessary condition for the existence of free agency is that the physical macro-world is indeterministic to a degree that is relevant for living beings, that is, for their survival and well-being. From an evolutionary point of view, and on the basis of the facts of consciousness, it is more likely than not that this condition is in fact fulfilled.
    AgencyFree Will and Neuroscience
  •  27
    Appendix to Chapter IV: The German originals of the quotations from Husserl and Wittgenstein in Chapter IV, and remarks on matters of translation
    In Defending Husserl: A Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company Versus Phenomenology, De Gruyter. pp. 483-492. 2014.
    20th Century German PhilosophyAustrian Philosophy
  •  48
    The Theory of Ontic Modalities
    Ontos Verlag. 2006.
    This book presents a comprehensive, non-model-theoretic theory of ontic necessity and possibility within a formal (and formalised) ontology consisting of states of affairs, properties, and individuals.
    Ontology
  • Axiomatic Formal Ontology
    Studia Logica 64 (1): 137-140. 1997.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic
  •  118
    Laws of Nature—A Skeptical View
    In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature's Principles, Springer. pp. 229--238. 2005.
    Laws of Nature, Misc
  •  40
    Truth against Reason, and Reason against Truth
    In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 173-184. 2014.
  •  45
    Husserl’s Classical Conception of Intentionality – and Its Enemies
    In Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock (ed.), Husserl and Analytic Philosophy, De Gruyter. pp. 55-86. 2016.
    Husserl: Intentionality, MiscHusserl and Analytic Philosophers
  •  25
    Physik und Metaphysik
    In Christian Tapp & Christof Breitsameter (eds.), Theologie und Naturwissenschaften, De Gruyter. pp. 157-184. 2014.
  • Die Metaphysik von Ereignis und Substanz
    Polylog. 2001.
    Uwe Meixners Essay stellt in gedrängter Form die Hauptgedanken seines 1997 publizierten großen systematischen Entwurfes “Ereignis und Substanz” vor, der neben einer Ontologie im engeren Sinn auch eine Bewusstseinstheorie, eine philosophische Gotteslehre und eine Theodizee beinhaltet. Im vorliegenden Beitrag erläutert er seinen Begriff von Substanz, der eng mit seiner Sicht von Kausalität zusammenhängt und vertritt dabei den radikalen Standpunkt, dass Ereigniskausalität auf Agenskausalität, die v…Read more
    Uwe Meixners Essay stellt in gedrängter Form die Hauptgedanken seines 1997 publizierten großen systematischen Entwurfes “Ereignis und Substanz” vor, der neben einer Ontologie im engeren Sinn auch eine Bewusstseinstheorie, eine philosophische Gotteslehre und eine Theodizee beinhaltet. Im vorliegenden Beitrag erläutert er seinen Begriff von Substanz, der eng mit seiner Sicht von Kausalität zusammenhängt und vertritt dabei den radikalen Standpunkt, dass Ereigniskausalität auf Agenskausalität, die von transzendenten Substanzen als Realisationssubjekten getragen werde, reduziert werden könne. Dieser monadische Ansatz wird dann zu einem “eingeschränkten metaphysischen Pluralismus” weiterentwickelt, dessen zentrale These darin besteht, dass das Wirklichmachen – in Meixners Worten die “Realitätsmitteilung an die Welt” – bei einer einzigen Zentralsubstanz liege. Eine Idee, die vor allem aus der Perspektive der modernen japanischen und der chinesischen Philosophie auf Interesse gestoßen ist.
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