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Die Metaphysik von Ereignis und SubstanzPolylog. 2001.Uwe Meixners Essay stellt in gedrängter Form die Hauptgedanken seines 1997 publizierten großen systematischen Entwurfes “Ereignis und Substanz” vor, der neben einer Ontologie im engeren Sinn auch eine Bewusstseinstheorie, eine philosophische Gotteslehre und eine Theodizee beinhaltet. Im vorliegenden Beitrag erläutert er seinen Begriff von Substanz, der eng mit seiner Sicht von Kausalität zusammenhängt und vertritt dabei den radikalen Standpunkt, dass Ereigniskausalität auf Agenskausalität, die v…Read more
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51The rationality of (a form of) relative identity (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2). 2005.
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6Chapter I: On ImaginingIn Defending Husserl: A Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company Versus Phenomenology, De Gruyter. pp. 1-89. 2014.
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156New perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causationJournal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1): 17-38. 2008.The paper provides new perspectives for a dualistic conception of mental causation by putting causation that originates in a nonphysical self into an evolutionary perspective. Nonphysical causation of this type - free agency -, together with nonphysical consciousness, is regarded as being not only compatible with physics, but also as having a natural place in nature. It is described how free agency can work, on the basis of the brain, and how it can be compatible with the result of the Libet-exp…Read more
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Materialism does not save the phenomena and the alternative which doesIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2009.This chapter offers a version of Cartesian dualism that draws on the resources of a Husserlian account of intentionality. For example, it argues that 'I can locate myself at the point in space from which I am looking at the world (my 'center of perspective')'. It relies on empirical phenomenology to show that this location that does not correspond to my body or any part of it. Phantom sensations provide confirming evidence. Next, the chapter uses the example of blurred (versus sharp) vision to p…Read more
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7The Emergence of Rational SoulsIn Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in science and philosophy, Routledge. pp. 6--163. 2010.
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45A Cosmo-Ontological Argument for the Existence of a First Cause–perhaps GodIn Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), Ontological Proofs Today, Ontos Verlag. pp. 50--193. 2012.
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Husserls DualismusE-Journal Philosophie der Psychologie 9. 2007.The paper expounds the sense in which Husserl was not a psychophysical dualist – but also the sense in which he was a psychophysical dualist after all. On the one hand, it takes into account Husserl’s critical statements regarding “dualism,” on the other hand it closely considers Husserl’s understanding of the intentionality of phenomenal experiences. It is shown that Husserl’s writings contain several argumentations that can be interpreted as arguments for psychophysical dualism . It is argued …Read more
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14Review: The Rationality of (A Form of) Relative Identity (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2). 2005.
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6Essential Conceptions of EventsPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 76 183-194. 2000.
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49Parmenides und die Logik der ExistenzGrazer Philosophische Studien 47 (1): 59-75. 1994.Es wird gezeigt, daß sich Parmenides' Argument gegen Veränderung und Vielheit aus den Fragmenten seines Lehrgedichts so rekonstruieren läßt, daß es entweder formal korrekt wird, oder aber seine Prämisse,,Seiendes ist, Nichtseiendes ist nicht" evidentermaßen richtig ist. Beides zugleich ist nicht zu haben. Es wird plausibel gemacht, daß die Rekonstruktionen in Parmenides' Sinn sind. Betrachtet man sein Argument als formal korrekt, so stellt es, wenn wir das Zeugnis der Erfahrung akzeptieren, eine…Read more
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28Descartes' Argument für den psycho-physischen Dualismus im Lichte der modal-epistemischen LogikGrazer Philosophische Studien 35 (1): 83-101. 1989.Der cartesische DuaUsmus besteht nicht in der Behauptung, daß die Person und ihr Körper voneinander verschieden sind, sondern in der stärkeren Behauptung, daß sie beide ohne den anderen existieren können. Können ist dabei in einem außerordentlich schwachen Sinn zu nehmen, nämlich im Sinne der analytischen Möglichkeit. Descartes' Argument für diese Behauptung in der 6. Meditation ist im Rahmen der modal-epistemischen Logik als logisch korrektes Argument präzisierbar; daneben auch sein mit dem ers…Read more
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3Ontologically Minimal Semantics for Intuitionistic LogicIn Julian Nida-Rümelin & Georg Meggle (eds.), Analyomen 2, Volume I: Logic, Epistemology, Philosophy of Science, De Gruyter. pp. 124-130. 1997.
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Metaphysics in the Post-Metaphysical Age: Papers of the 22nd International Wittgenstein Symposium (edited book)Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. 1999.
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32An Ontology of Intensional EntitiesIn Werner Stelzner (ed.), Philosophie Und Logik: Frege-Kolloquien 1989 Und 1991, De Gruyter. pp. 226-228. 1993.
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1Index of other quoted authorsIn Defending Husserl: A Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company Versus Phenomenology, De Gruyter. pp. 507-512. 2014.
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15Truth against Reason, and Reason against TruthIn Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 173-184. 2016.
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72An alternative semantics for modal predicate-logicErkenntnis 37 (3). 1992.The semantical framework is fundamentally intensional: neither possible worlds nor sets as basic entities, but rather, besides individuals, propositions, properties and relations (in intension). Logical truth is defined in terms of logical form (without mentioning this notion) without employing sets of models and the concept of truth in a model. Truth itself is explicitly defined (without recursion); the truth-conditions for the logical constants of the object-language become theorems derivable …Read more
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24The Theory of Ontic ModalitiesOntos Verlag. 2006.This book presents a comprehensive, non-model-theoretic theory of ontic necessity and possibility within a formal (and formalised) ontology consisting of states of affairs, properties, and individuals.
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8Chapter II: On Knowing the Inward Mental LifeIn Defending Husserl: A Plea in the Case of Wittgenstein & Company Versus Phenomenology, De Gruyter. pp. 103-225. 2014.
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1Naturale Psyche: Husserl über die Seele als NaturobjektIn Verena Mayer, Christopher Erhard, Marisa Scherini & Uwe Meixner (eds.), Die Aktualität Husserls, Karl Alber. 2011.
Areas of Interest
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Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |