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Tobias Hansson Wahlberg

Lund University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    32
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  •  Events
    2
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    18

 More details
  • Lund University
    Department of Philosophy
    Regular Faculty
Lund University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2009
Homepage
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Social Ontology, Misc
Philosophy of Social Science
Theories of Causation
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Physical Science
  • All publications (32)
  •  19
    On Griffith’s Simple Picture of Social Truths
    Analysis. forthcoming.
  •  10
    The Endurance/perdurance Controversy is No Storm in a Teacup
    Global Philosophy 24 (4): 463-482. 2014.
    Several philosophers have maintained in recent years that the endurance/perdurance debate is merely verbal: these prima facie distinct theories of objects’ persistence are in fact metaphysically equivalent, they claim. The present paper challenges this view. Three proposed translation schemes (those set forth by Miller in Erkenntnis 62:91–117, 2005, McCall and Lowe in Noûs 40:570–578, 2006, and Hirsch in Metametaphysics—new essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, …Read more
    Several philosophers have maintained in recent years that the endurance/perdurance debate is merely verbal: these prima facie distinct theories of objects’ persistence are in fact metaphysically equivalent, they claim. The present paper challenges this view. Three proposed translation schemes (those set forth by Miller in Erkenntnis 62:91–117, 2005, McCall and Lowe in Noûs 40:570–578, 2006, and Hirsch in Metametaphysics—new essays on the foundations of ontology. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) are examined; all are shown to be faulty. In the process, constructive reasons for regarding the debate as a substantive one are provided. It is also suggested that the theories may have differing practical implications.
  •  8
    Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?
    Global Philosophy 21 (4): 507-529. 2011.
    This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-…Read more
    This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed.
  •  2
    Names Introduced with the Help of Unsatisfied Sortal Predicates: Reply to Aranyosi
    Global Philosophy 20 (4): 511-514. 2010.
    In this paper I answer Aranyosi’s (Axiomathes 19(2):223–224, 2009) criticism of my “Is Phosphorus Hesperus?” (Axiomathes 19(1):101–102, 2009).
  •  19
    The Problem(s) of Change Revisited
    Dialectica 61 (2): 265-274. 2007.
    Two recurrent arguments levelled against the view that enduring objects survive change are examined within the framework of the B-theory of time: the argument from Leibniz's Law and the argument from Instantiation of Incompatible Properties. Both arguments are shown to be question-begging and hence unsuccessful.
  •  238
    Is There Backward Generation in the Institutional Realm?
    Metaphysics 8 (1): 16-31. 2025.
    Over the last decade it has been pointed out by several philosophers that not all Status Function Declarations are synchronic: some such declarations are directed toward the absolute past. Such Status Function Declarations are perplexing if one is an ontic realist with respect to institutional properties and states of affairs. If successful, such Status Function Declarations seem to change the absolute past; at the very least, they seem to involve some form of absolute backward generation. Both …Read more
    Over the last decade it has been pointed out by several philosophers that not all Status Function Declarations are synchronic: some such declarations are directed toward the absolute past. Such Status Function Declarations are perplexing if one is an ontic realist with respect to institutional properties and states of affairs. If successful, such Status Function Declarations seem to change the absolute past; at the very least, they seem to involve some form of absolute backward generation. Both consequences look problematic: the notions that the absolute past can change and that there is absolute backward generation are both regularly accused of being contradictory or entailing implausible metaphysics. In this paper, I argue that both issues can be avoided if the ‘results’ of absolutely backward-directed declarations are analysed in terms of mere Cambridge changes realised in B-time. A key upshot of the account is that ‘institutional properties’ are neither identifiable nor perfectly correlated with enablements and constraints, contrary to what is sometimes argued in the literature.
    TruthmakersSocial OntologyOntology of Specific DomainsProperty Nominalism
  •  242
    Towards a Deflationary Truthmakers Account of Social Groups
    Erkenntnis 90 (1): 349-366. 2025.
    I outline a deflationary truthmakers account of social groups. Potentially, the approach allows us to say, with traditional ontological individualists, that there are only pluralities of individuals out there, ontologically speaking, but that there are nevertheless colloquial and social-scientific truths about social groups. If tenable, this kind of theory has the virtue of being both ontologically parsimonious and compatible with ordinary and social-scientific discourse—a virtue which the stock…Read more
    I outline a deflationary truthmakers account of social groups. Potentially, the approach allows us to say, with traditional ontological individualists, that there are only pluralities of individuals out there, ontologically speaking, but that there are nevertheless colloquial and social-scientific truths about social groups. If tenable, this kind of theory has the virtue of being both ontologically parsimonious and compatible with ordinary and social-scientific discourse—a virtue which the stock reductive / ontological dependence accounts of social groups arguably lack.
    TruthmakersSocial GroupsApproaches to Social Ontology, MiscSocial Ontology, MiscQuantification and O…Read more
    TruthmakersSocial GroupsApproaches to Social Ontology, MiscSocial Ontology, MiscQuantification and OntologyTheories of Causation, MiscDomain OntologyGrounding and Anchoring in Social OntologyOntology of Social Domains, MiscRealism and Anti-Realism, Misc
  •  1632
    Dissolving McTaggart's Paradox
    In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday, De Gruyter. pp. 240-258. 2013.
    McTaggart's ArgumentTime and ChangeThe Passage of Time, MiscA-Theories of TimeTemporal Eliminativism
  •  639
    Vad är en grupp?
    Svensk Filosofi. 2023.
    Social GroupsTruthmakersOntology of Social Domains, Misc
  •  999
    The Truth about Social Entities
    In Andrés Garcia, Mattias Gunnemyr & Jakob Werkmäster (eds.), Value, Morality & Social Reality: Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 483-497. 2023.
    Social Ontology, MiscInstitutionsOntology of Social Domains, MiscExistenceRealism and Anti-Realism, …Read more
    Social Ontology, MiscInstitutionsOntology of Social Domains, MiscExistenceRealism and Anti-Realism, MiscQuantification and OntologyTheories of Causation, MiscApproaches to Social Ontology, MiscTruthmakers
  •  205
    Sparse Causation and Mere Abundant Causation
    Philosophical Studies 179 (11): 3259-3280. 2022.
    Setting off from a familiar distinction in the philosophy of properties, this paper introduces a tripartite distinction between sparse causation, abundant causation and mere abundant causation. It is argued that the contrast between sparse and mere abundant causation allows us to resolve notorious philosophical issues having to do with negative causation, causation involving institutional properties and physical macro-causation in a way that is unified, intuitive and in line with scientific doct…Read more
    Setting off from a familiar distinction in the philosophy of properties, this paper introduces a tripartite distinction between sparse causation, abundant causation and mere abundant causation. It is argued that the contrast between sparse and mere abundant causation allows us to resolve notorious philosophical issues having to do with negative causation, causation involving institutional properties and physical macro-causation in a way that is unified, intuitive and in line with scientific doctrines and practices.
    Property NominalismCausation by AbsencesDownward CausationCounterfactual Theories of CausationCausal…Read more
    Property NominalismCausation by AbsencesDownward CausationCounterfactual Theories of CausationCausal RelataVarieties of Causation, MiscCausal OverdeterminationProcess Theories of CausationTheories of Causation, MiscOntology of Social Domains, Misc
  •  584
    Are there any Institutional Facts?
    In Robin Stenwall & Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (eds.), Maurinian Truths : Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday, Department of Philosophy, Lund University. pp. 83-88. 2019.
    Ontology of Social Domains, Misc
  •  288
    Why the social sciences are irreducible
    Synthese 196 (12): 4961-4987. 2019.
    It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token–token identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals, but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type–type identities between social and individua…Read more
    It is often claimed that the social sciences cannot be reduced to a lower-level individualistic science. The standard argument for this position is the Fodorian multiple realizability argument. Its defenders endorse token–token identities between “higher-level” social objects and pluralities/sums of “lower-level” individuals, but they maintain that the properties expressed by social science predicates are often multiply realizable, entailing that type–type identities between social and individualistic properties are ruled out. In this paper I argue that the multiple realizability argument for explanatory holism is unsound. The social sciences are indeed irreducible, but the principled reason for this is that the required token–token identifications cannot in general be carried through. In consequence, paradigmatic social science predicates cannot be taken to apply to the objects quantified over in the lower-level sciences. The result is that typical social science predicates cannot even be held to be co-extensive with individualistic predicates, which means type–type identifications are ruled out too. Multiple realizability has nothing to do with this failure of co-extensiveness, because the relevant social science predicates are not multiply realized in the sense intended by the explanatory holists, a sense which presupposes reductive token–token identifications.
    Reduction in Social Science
  •  282
    The creation of institutional reality, special theory of relativity, and mere Cambridge change
    Synthese 198 (6): 5835-5860. 2021.
    Saying so can make it so, J. L. Austin taught us long ago. Famously, John Searle has developed this Austinian insight in an account of the construction of institutional reality. Searle maintains that so-called Status Function Declarations, allegedly having a “double direction of fit”, synchronically create worldly institutional facts, corresponding to the propositional content of the declarations. I argue that Searle’s account of the making of institutional reality is in tension with the special…Read more
    Saying so can make it so, J. L. Austin taught us long ago. Famously, John Searle has developed this Austinian insight in an account of the construction of institutional reality. Searle maintains that so-called Status Function Declarations, allegedly having a “double direction of fit”, synchronically create worldly institutional facts, corresponding to the propositional content of the declarations. I argue that Searle’s account of the making of institutional reality is in tension with the special theory of relativity—irrespective of whether the account is interpreted as involving causal generation or non-causal grounding of worldly institutional facts—and should be replaced by a more modest theory which interprets the results of Status Function Declarations in terms of mere Cambridge change and institutional truth. I end the paper by indicating the import of this more modest theory for theorizing about the causal potency of institutional phenomena generated by declarations.
    Ontological RealismOntology of Social DomainsTruthmakersSocial Sciences, MiscConstitutive Rules in S…Read more
    Ontological RealismOntology of Social DomainsTruthmakersSocial Sciences, MiscConstitutive Rules in Social OntologyGrounding and Anchoring in Social OntologySocial ConstructionSpeech ActsSpecial Relativity, MiscTheories of Causation, Misc
  •  1286
    Maurinian Truths : Essays in Honour of Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th Birthday (edited book)
    with Robin Stenwall
    Department of Philosophy, Lund University. 2019.
    This book is in honour of Professor Anna-Sofia Maurin on her 50th birthday. It consists of eighteen essays on metaphysical issues written by Swedish and international scholars.
    Metaphysics, General WorksMetaphysics, Misc
  •  165
    Active Powers and Passive Powers – Do Causal Interactions Require Both?
    Philosophia 47 (5): 1603-1612. 2019.
    Many powers metaphysicians postulate both active and passive powers, understood as distinct kinds of intrinsic causal properties of objects. I argue that the category of passive power is superfluous. I also offer a diagnosis of how philosophers are misled to postulate passive powers.
    Conditional AnalysesPowersDispositions and Powers, MiscTheories of Causation, Misc
  •  303
    Causal powers and social ontology
    Synthese 197 (3): 1357-1377. 2020.
    Over the last few decades, philosophers and social scientists have applied the so-called powers ontology to the social domain. I argue that this application is highly problematic: many of the alleged powers in the social realm violate the intrinsicality condition, and those that can be coherently taken to be intrinsic to their bearers are arguably causally redundant. I end the paper by offering a diagnosis of why philosophers and social scientists have been tempted to think that there are powers…Read more
    Over the last few decades, philosophers and social scientists have applied the so-called powers ontology to the social domain. I argue that this application is highly problematic: many of the alleged powers in the social realm violate the intrinsicality condition, and those that can be coherently taken to be intrinsic to their bearers are arguably causally redundant. I end the paper by offering a diagnosis of why philosophers and social scientists have been tempted to think that there are powers in social realm.
    EmergencePowersReductive ExplanationReduction in Social ScienceInterlevel Metaphysics, MiscCausal Re…Read more
    EmergencePowersReductive ExplanationReduction in Social ScienceInterlevel Metaphysics, MiscCausal Realism
  •  364
    4-D Objects and Disposition Ascriptions
    Philosophical Papers 38 (1): 35-72. 2009.
    Disposition ascription has been discussed a good deal over the last few decades, as has the revisionary metaphysical view of ordinary, persisting objects known as 'fourdimensionalism'. However, philosophers have not merged these topics and asked whether four-dimensional objects can be proper subjects of dispositional predicates. This paper seeks to remedy this oversight. It argues that, by and large, four-dimensional objects are not suited to take dispositional predicates
    Three- and Four-DimensionalismDispositional and Categorical PropertiesPerduranceConditional AnalysesRead more
    Three- and Four-DimensionalismDispositional and Categorical PropertiesPerduranceConditional AnalysesContingent IdentityPowers
  •  394
    Can Persistence be a Matter of Convention?
    Axiomathes 21 (4): 507-529. 2011.
    This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-…Read more
    This paper asks whether persistence can be a matter of convention. It argues that in a rather unexciting de dicto sense persistence is indeed a matter of convention, but it rejects the notion that persistence can be a matter of convention in a more substantial de re sense. However, scenarios can be imagined that appear to involve conventional persistence of the latter kind. Since there are strong reasons for thinking that such conventionality is impossible, it is desirable that our metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence be able to account for such scenarios in terms of conventions of the first kind. Later parts of the article therefore investigate whether three of the currently most influential metaphysical-cum-semantic theories of persistence—the endurance theory, the stage theory, and the perdurance theory—can do this. Fortunately, for them, it turns out that all can, though some philosophers have disputed this. However, when we ask how they account for a typical case of “conventional persistence” some problematic features of the theories—having to do with reference, persistence conditions, how they relate, and the epistemology of persistence—are revealed
    Three- and Four-DimensionalismContingent IdentityThe Necessity of IdentityVague IdentityOntological …Read more
    Three- and Four-DimensionalismContingent IdentityThe Necessity of IdentityVague IdentityOntological Conventionalism and RelativismScience, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  249
    Too Many Dispositional Properties
    SATS 7 (2): 37-42. 2006.
    This paper identifies an overdetermination problem faced by the non-reductive dispositional property account of disposition ascriptions. Two possible responses to the problem are evaluated and both are shown to have serious drawbacks. Finally it is noted that the traditional conditional analysis of disposition ascriptions escapes the original difficulty.
    Dispositional and Categorical PropertiesConditional AnalysesCausal RealismCausal OverdeterminationPo…Read more
    Dispositional and Categorical PropertiesConditional AnalysesCausal RealismCausal OverdeterminationPowers
  •  269
    Names introduced with the help of unsatisfied sortal predicates
    Axiomathes 20 (4): 511-514. 2010.
    In this paper I answer Aranyosi’s (Axiomathes 19(2):223–224, 2009) criticism of my “Is Phosphorus Hesperus?” (Axiomathes 19(1):101–102, 2009).
    EnduranceAspects of Reference, MiscPerduranceThree- and Four-DimensionalismMereology, MiscNames
  •  387
    Elder-Vass on the Causal Power of Social Structures
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (6): 774-791. 2014.
    In this review essay, I examine the central tenets of sociologist Dave Elder-Vass’s recent contribution to social ontology, as put forth in his book The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. Elder-Vass takes issue with ontological individualists and maintains that social structures exist and have causal powers in their own right. I argue that he fails to establish his main theses: he shows neither that social structures have causal powers “in their own right” (in an…Read more
    In this review essay, I examine the central tenets of sociologist Dave Elder-Vass’s recent contribution to social ontology, as put forth in his book The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. Elder-Vass takes issue with ontological individualists and maintains that social structures exist and have causal powers in their own right. I argue that he fails to establish his main theses: he shows neither that social structures have causal powers “in their own right” (in any sense of this expression) nor that they exist
    PowersMereology, MiscPhilosophy of Sociology, MiscDownward CausationEmergence, MiscPhilosophy of Soc…Read more
    PowersMereology, MiscPhilosophy of Sociology, MiscDownward CausationEmergence, MiscPhilosophy of Social Science, Miscellaneous
  •  263
    Endurance Per Se in B-time
    Metaphysica 10 (2): 175-183. 2009.
    Three arguments for the conclusion that objects cannot endure in B-time even if they remain intrinsically unchanged are examined: Carter and Hestevolds enduring-objects-as-universals argument (American Philosophical Quarterly 31(4):269-283, 1994) and Barker and Dowe's paradox 1 and paradox 2 (Analysis 63(2):106-114, 2003, Analysis 65(1):69-74, 2005). All three are shown to fail.
    B-Theories of TimeMereologyThree- and Four-DimensionalismEnduranceEternalism
  •  305
    The problem(s) of change revisited
    Dialectica 61 (2). 2007.
    Two recurrent arguments levelled against the view that enduring objects survive change are examined within the framework of the B-theory of time: the argument from Leibniz's Law and the argument from Instantiation of Incompatible Properties. Both arguments are shown to be question-begging and hence unsuccessful.
    EnduranceEternalismThree- and Four-DimensionalismTime and ChangeB-Theories of Time
  •  372
    The Tenseless Copula in Temporal Predication
    Erkenntnis 72 (2): 267-280. 2010.
    In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “a is F at t”, where “a” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “F” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “t” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated as a sentence operator, I argue: that if “at t” is thought of as being associated with “a” or “F”, then…Read more
    In this paper I explore how the tenseless copula is to be interpreted in sentences of the form “a is F at t”, where “a” denotes a persisting, changeable object, “F” stands for a prima facie intrinsic property and “t” for a B-time. I argue that the interpretation of the copula depends on the logical role assigned to the time clause. Having rejected the idea that the time clause is to be treated as a sentence operator, I argue: that if “at t” is thought of as being associated with “a” or “F”, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly read as an “is” simpliciter; and that if “at t” is treated as being associated with the copula, then the tenseless copula is most plausibly understood as expressing a disjunction of tensed copulas. I end the paper by explaining the importance of the issue. I indicate the ramifications interpretation of the tenseless copula has for the so-called problem of temporary intrinsics
    Three- and Four-DimensionalismPredicates, MiscTemporal ExpressionsStage TheoryEnduranceB-Theories of…Read more
    Three- and Four-DimensionalismPredicates, MiscTemporal ExpressionsStage TheoryEnduranceB-Theories of TimeTime and Change
  •  382
    Is Phosphorus Hesperus?
    Axiomathes 19 (1): 101-102. 2009.
    It is argued that philosophers who adopt the perdurance theory of persistence and who subscribe to the principle of Unrestricted Mereological Composition (UMC) are in a position to regard “Phosphorus is Hesperus” as false.
    PerduranceThree- and Four-DimensionalismScience, Logic, and MathematicsPhilosophy of Linguistics
  •  286
    Meso-level Objects, Powers, and Simultaneous Causation
    Metaphysica 18 (1): 107-125. 2017.
    I argue that Mumford and Anjum’s recent theory of simultaneous causation among powerful meso-level objects is problematic in several respects: it is based on a false dichotomy, it is incompatible with standard meso-level physics, it is explanatory deficient, and it threatens to render the powers metaphysics incoherent. Powers theorists are advised, therefore, to adopt a purely sequential conception of causation.
    Causal RealismDispositions and Powers, MiscThe Direction of TimePowersThe Direction of Causation
  •  366
    Causally Redundant Social Objects: Rejoinder to Elder-Vass
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (6): 798-809. 2014.
    In Elder-Vass’s response to my critical discussion of his social ontology, it is maintained (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts, (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts, and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification. In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elde…Read more
    In Elder-Vass’s response to my critical discussion of his social ontology, it is maintained (1) that a social object is not identical with but is merely composed of its suitably interrelated parts, (2) that a social object is necessarily indistinguishable in terms of its causal capacities from its interrelated parts, and (3) that ontological individualism lacks an adequate ontological justification. In this reply, I argue that in view of (1) the so-called redescription principle defended by Elder-Vass ought to be reformulated and renamed; that the conjunction of (1) and (2) renders social objects causally redundant; and that ontological individualism can be coherently formulated and theoretically justified within Elder-Vass’s own metaphysics of objects with causal powers
    Causal OverdeterminationSupervenient CausationPowersConcepts of EmergenceMereology, MiscPhilosophy o…Read more
    Causal OverdeterminationSupervenient CausationPowersConcepts of EmergenceMereology, MiscPhilosophy of Social Science, MiscellaneousApproaches to Social Ontology, Misc
  •  432
    Can I be an Instantaneous Stage and yet Persist Through Time?
    Metaphysica 9 (2): 235-239. 2008.
    An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz's Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged ide…Read more
    An alternative to the standard endurance/perdurance accounts of persistence has recently been developed: the stage theory (Sider, T. Four-Dimensionalism: an Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001; Hawley, K. How Things Persist. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). According to this theory, a persisting object is identical with an instantaneous stage (temporal part). On the basis of Leibniz's Law, I argue that stage theorists either have to deny the alleged identity (i.e., give up their central thesis) or hold that stages are both instantaneous and continuants. I subsequently show that, although stage theory is flexible enough to accommodate the latter claim, the cost for accommodating it is an excessive proliferation of persistence concepts
    Stage TheoryCoincident ObjectsPersonal Identity, MiscOccasional IdentityContingent Identity
  •  342
    The Endurance/Perdurance Controversy is No Storm in a Teacup
    Axiomathes 24 (4): 463-482. 2014.
    Several philosophers have maintained in recent years that the endurance/perdurance debate is merely verbal: these prima facie distinct theories of objects’ persistence are in fact metaphysically equivalent, they claim. The present paper challenges this view. Three proposed translation schemes are examined; all are shown to be faulty. In the process, constructive reasons for regarding the debate as a substantive one are provided. It is also suggested that the theories may have differing practical…Read more
    Several philosophers have maintained in recent years that the endurance/perdurance debate is merely verbal: these prima facie distinct theories of objects’ persistence are in fact metaphysically equivalent, they claim. The present paper challenges this view. Three proposed translation schemes are examined; all are shown to be faulty. In the process, constructive reasons for regarding the debate as a substantive one are provided. It is also suggested that the theories may have differing practical implications
    Ontological Conventionalism and RelativismPerduranceThree- and Four-DimensionalismEnduranceOntologic…Read more
    Ontological Conventionalism and RelativismPerduranceThree- and Four-DimensionalismEnduranceOntological DisagreementMetaphilosophy
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