Antonio Perez

How can we understand prehistoric lithic objects? What meaning should we give them and what view should we adopt to claim access to their significance? How can we reduce and clarify our biases? This article is a proposal to introduce Peircian semiotics to review lithic objects. For a long time, these were apprehended as types, sometimes within evolutionary lineages; however, in this research, knapped stone objects will be perceived through a semio-pragmatic grid and reviewed as signs. The proposed approach is a new way of accessing the fields of technical phenomena of prehistoric communities. This new perception aims at a quest for objectivity, by clarifying the affective, analytical and interpretative a priori as an answer to the sometimes very personal view of the prehistorian on lithic objects. Charles Sanders Peirce’s logical theory of signs or semiotics is contextualized within an ‘artisanal’ reading of prehistoric tools as initiated by Éric Boëda and further developed by Michel Lepot. Through this phaneroscopic/phenomenological vision, the technical object, now a sign-object, is placed in action (semiosis) within a system of signs. This new trajectory is positioned both as a methodological tool and as an innovative milestone in the construction of a more logical episteme in Prehistory, taking lithics both as signs of past human activity and of archaeological representations.

El fenómeno turístico es uno de los elementos más importantes en relación a los vectores de cambio social. Como objetivo se plantea un análisis bibliométrico-descriptivo sobre el turismo activo y su relación con las prácticas deportivas mediante el estudio de la producción académica en Scopus. Las conclusiones ofrecen un perfilado de los intereses de investigación, temas, tópicos y elementos distintivos de los artículos centrados en esta línea de investigación, resaltando que existen publicaciones muy diversas sobre el tema de la relación entre turismo activo y deporte, donde se contemplan distintos eventos deportivos como oferta turística en una gran variedad geográfica.

Se hace un análisis comparativo de los conceptos de ciencia, maestro y discípulo tal como aparecen en el De Magistro de san Agustín y en la cuestión 11, "De Magistro", de la disputación De Veritate de santo Tomás de Aquino. La ciencia agustiniana de las verdades inteligibles y eternas se adquiere por una visión mental del entendimiento y la razón y supone la buena voluntad del sujeto ; la tomista consiste más bien en el conjunto de formas inteligibles adquiridas a partir de un proceso deductivo, lógico-necesario, que se inicia con los primeros principios y axiomas evidentes. Para Agustín, hay sólo un maestro de las verdades inteligibles que se encuentra en el interior de cada alma racional y que se manifiesta sólo al hombre interior o aquel en el que domina la buena voluntad. Para Tomás de Aquino, existen dos maestros: uno principal e interior, que es Dios, y otro secundario y externo, pero también maestro, el cual ayuda al discípulo a adquirir la habilidad y el hábito de deducir verdades a partir de los primeros principios y axiomas evidentes y con él el número de formas inteligibles. Para Agustín todos somos discípulos del único maestro de la Verdad que es Cristo y seremos buenos o malos discípulos de acuerdo con la buena o mala voluntad que lo domine. Para Tomás de Aquino, el discípulo posee a medias las nociones o verdades que va a aprender, es decir, en sus primeros principios o axiomas evidentes y adquirirá con la ayuda importante del maestro a adquirir la habilidad y el hábito de deducir y desplegar las nociones y verdades encerradas en los primeros principios y axiomas evidentes

Para Enrique de Gante, la materia prima, en contra de la opinión de Tomás de Aquino y de Egidio Romano, es algo sustancial con una esencia propia distinta de la forma y con un ser esencial propio que proviene directamente de Dios. De la forma recibe el ser en acto en el compuesto sustancial. De hecho, para Enrique de Gante la materia en toda sustancia compuesta posee un triple ser: el ser simplemente en cuanto criatura, el ser capaz de recibir formas que proviene de su esencia, y el ser en acto proveniente de la forma. Por medio de una intervención milagrosa de Dios, que diera al ser esencial una subsistencia suficiente, la materia prima podría existir sin forma alguna. La materia, aun siendo simple, encierra en su esencia una doble razón: la razón de sustancia y la razón de relación . La materia en sí misma no encierra ninguna fuerza activa o razón seminal capaz de trasmutarse en formas; las razones seminales, como fuerza activa, se encuentran encerradas en la forma del agente que prepara la materia previa informada e introduce en ella una nueva forma sustancial

En los textos del Comentario a la Física de Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino se esfuerza en destacar la distinción entre materia prima y privación. La materia prima es el sujeto del cambio sustancial; la privación es la carencia de forma que afecta a un sujeto de cambio, ya sea éste una sustancia natural ya sea la materia prima. Ambos son no-entes, es decir ambos están fuera del ámbito del ser formal o del ser en acto. Pero, mientras la materia prima es en potencia, la privación simplemente no-es. La materia prima posee una confusa entidad ubicada entre el ser en acto o ser formal y el no-ser; abarca al ámbito del ser en potencia. La privación simplemente no es y, en consecuencia, es solo un ente de razón, elaborado por la mente humana con fundamento en la realidad. La materia prima con su ser en potencia es el fundamento ontológico del incesante cambio en el universo y de la esencial temporalidad de toda sustancia individual.Thomas Aquinas in the text of his Commentary to Aristotle´s Physics tries to point out the distinction between prime matter and privation. Prime matter is the subject of any substantial change; privation is the lack of a form affecting a subject of change, either a natural substance or prime matter. Both -prime matter and privation- are non-beings, that is, both are outside the scope of formal being or of being in act. But, if prime matter is in potency, privation simply is not. Prime matter owns a confused entity, located in between being in act or formal being and non-being; it belongs to the sphere of being in potency. Privation simply is not and, so, it is only a being of reason, built by human intellect with basement in reality. Prime matter with its being in potency is the ontological background of continuous change in the world and of the essential temporality of any individual substance

Duns Scotus, following the saying that "without the phantasma there is no sensible knowledge and without the intelligible species there is no intellection", argues for the need of an active intellect in order to explain the transit from the particular to the universal knowledge. The universal knowledge from experience takes place in two different moments: first, the active intellect, as the main effective cause, together with the common nature in the phantasma, as the co-effective cause, produce the intelligible species, that is, the indeterminate universal in act or the metaphysical universal; second, the passive intellect, as the main effective cause, and the intelligibible species, as the effective instrumental cause, produce the intellection, that is, the full universal or the logic universal, that is a universal concept and name. The full universal or logical universal, is only a concept and a name that can be said of many individuals. It is a second intention that refers, immediately, to the first intention or intelligible species and, indirectly, to the phantasma, the representative of the physical individual.

This essay proves that Duns Scotus did not undestand rightly Henry of Ghent’s doctrine on prime matter. In fact, of the three beings Doctor Solidus gives to prime matter, Duns Scotus discovers only the two last ones, that is the essential being and the formal being in act. Besides, he makes Henry of Ghent saying that prime matter can exist alone, without form, due to the fact that it receives directly from God the subsistent being per se, a being that is not analogous to the being in act of form. In that case, prime matter would exist or would be in act without owning the being in act, which is contradictory.

Duns Escoto, en razón del modo como las potencias activas actúan, distingue entre las potencias naturales y la voluntad. Las potencias naturales actúan determinada y necesariamente, cuando se cumplen las condiciones para hacerlo; la voluntad es indeterminada y se auto-determina a actuar. Por indeterminada, la voluntad puede querer actos contrarios y objetos contrarios, es decir, puede querer A y-A y elige uno de los dos por si misma, se auto-determina, sin que nada exterior a ella la determine. La voluntad humana puede querer objetos contrarios con actos volitivos distintos y en tiempos distintos, debido a su imperfección y mutabilidad. La voluntad divina puede querer, con un único acto volitivo, objetos contrarios v.g. puede, al mismo tiempo, querer A y -A. En base a esta libertad de Dios, todo lo creado -orden físico o moral- es radicalmente contingente, es decir, es así pero puede ser de otra manera y/o dejar de ser. Por la potencia ordenada, Dios conserva el orden físico o moral establecido; por la potencia absoluta, Dios puede revocar ese orden y establecer, incluso temporalmente, otro distinto. El conocimiento divino de todo lo creado no puede ser un conocimiento necesario en el sentido de que sea imposible que A (que será) pueda no ser. Consecuencia de la contingencia radical de las acciones divinas es que 'un predestinado puede condenarse'

Habermas shares with Kant the commitment to the posible, the ideal and duty to be moral, and with Hegel, the critique of the abstract carácter of kantian possibility and ought-be, as well as the realistic attention to the conditions of the really posible and the ideal. In this paper I intend to show that the confluence of such motifs, Kantian and Hegelian, in Habermas’ thought allows us to detect the keys to a conception of what should be and the ideal that does justice to the two essential features of what is really posible: the refence to the future and to conditions embedded in the real.

Communicative acts of some women are perpetuating the dominance that DTM have over both women and OTM. Some women use language in a disdainful manner to reprimand oppressed men’s behavior in daily life situations, the same behavior that such women would not reproach to DTM. But NAM are reacting to this. This article analyzes the communicative acts employed in all these situations, both those produced by women and DTM, as well as NAM’s communicative acts in response to those offenses. Data was collected using communicative daily life stories of give women and three men with diverse profiles and different levels of participation in women’s and men’s movements. Findings highlight, from the transformative dimension of the communicative methodology, that the use of language of desire in NAM’s reactions is effective not only to make justice with men who have never executed violence on women, but also to undermine the attractiveness of both DTM’s behavior and the comments of some women on such behavior. These findings complement previous research on preventive socialization of gender violence by broadening scientific knowledge on NAM’s communicative acts that prevent and eradicate gender-based violence. Further research ought to broaden the evidence of how some women who defend feminist values sometimes do not support and even tease or reprimand men who practice these values; moreover, an important line could analyze the way people talk about men with NAM attitudes to hold back reprimands in comparison to how people talk about men who follow a DTM model.

La materia prima existe desde siempre y es en potencia, es decir, tiene un ser que está en disposición de ser después en acto No puede existir sola sin la forma, pero es en sí misma una sustancia. Es la causa inmediata de todo cambio sustancial en el universo. El ser de la materia no parece identificarse con su potencia sino que e ser de la materia es una sustancia que posee una potencia múltiple de recibir fonnas y de convertirse sucesivamente en acto. La materia es sujeto de potencias o posibilidades que se convertirán necesariamente después en seres actuales. Existe entre lo posible y lo actual una relación necesaria por la que lo posible se convertirá necesariamente en acto y lo actual en posible. Existen dos especies de materia distintas: la materia sensible y la celeste con caracteristicas esencialmente distintas.Prime matter —materia prima— is ftom ever but is in potence, that is, it has a being with disposition to become later in act. It does not exist without form, but it is in itself substance. it is the immediate cause of any substancial change. Being of matter is not identifíed with its potence because its being is a substance that has a multiple potence to receive forms and become later in act. Matter is subject of potences or possibilities that will necessarily become actual beings. There is a necessary relation between possibility and actuality by which everything possible will necessarily becomes actual and everything actual comes necessariiy ftom possible. There are two different specific matters: sensible matter and heavenly matter with essentially differentcharacteristics

A vontade humana, em razão da sua indeterminação e da sua capacidade interna de produzir atos volitivos contrários e de querer objetos contrários, é aquilo que nos distingue como seres humanos em relação à natureza e nos faz semelhantes a Deus. A vontade divina, por ser infinitamente perfeita, pode, com um único ato volitivo, querer simultaneamente e produzir objetos contrários (a e -a). Portanto, Deus, no mesmo instante da eternidade, pôde, com a sua potência absoluta, ter querido a e/ou -a, o que implica que pôde ter querido este mundo e/ou outro e outros mundos, que são lógica e realmente possíveis. Esta potência divina para, com um único ato volitivo, querer objetos contrários é a causa da contingência radical de todos os entes criados. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Vontade. Dndeterminação. Contingência. Vontade divina. Mundos possíveis. ABSTRACT Human will, because of its indetermination and internal capacity for producing contrary volitive acts e for willing contrary objects, is that which makes us different from nature and similar to God. The divine will, since it is infinitely perfect, with a sole volitive act can will simultaneously and produce contrary objects (a and -a). Therefore, God could have willed in the same instant of eternity, with his absolute potency, a and/or -a, what implies that he could have willed this world and/or another and other worlds, which are logically and really possible. This divine potency for willing, with a sole volitive act, contrary objects is the cause of the radical contingency of all created beings. KEY WORDS – Will. Indetermination. Contingency. Divine will. Possible worlds

The purpose of this essay is to underline Heidegger’s intellectual interest and deep relation to Duns Scotus’ modern and close to life thought. At the same time, it is pointed out that Scotus’ fundamental ideas such as haecceity, the cognoscibility of the individual, possibility and contingency, impossibility of thinking without naming, will be retaken and transformed into Heidegger’s parental ideas such as Dasein, Dasein as possibility and project, being as something unveiled, identity of knowledge and language. KEY WORDS – History of Philosophy. Duns Scotus. Heidegger. Transformation of Concepts