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2Grasping phenomenal propertiesIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is more intimate then if you just have some concept or other…Read more
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What Mary Couldn’t Know: Belief About Phenomenal StatesIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.
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65La nature individuelle non-descriptive des êtres conscientsRÉPHA, revue étudiante de philosophie analytique 8 11-33. 2014.
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24Reddish Green: A Challenge for Modal Claims about Phenomenal StructurePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2). 2009.We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We discuss whe…Read more
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12Phänomenales Bewusstsein und Subjekte von ErfahrungIn Detlev Ganten, Volker Gerhardt & Julian Nida-Rümelin (eds.), Funktionen des Bewusstseins, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 39-62. 2008.
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129IntroductionDialectica 60 (3): 209-222. 2006.In November 2003, the University of Fribourg hosted a symposium on the ontology of colors. The invited participants included Justin Broackes, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Larry Hardin, Joe Levine and Barry Maund. The points of view presented by the participants in their thought-provoking papers were highly divergent. The presentation of each paper was followed by a long and intense discussion. Despite the divergence of the views proposed, the discussion during the symposium was highly focus…Read more
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Colours and shapesIn Fiona Macpherson & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), Phenomenal Presence, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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The Phenomenology of Self-Awareness and the Nature of Conscious Subjects (edited book)Routledge. forthcoming.
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16On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 51-73. 1998.The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief---about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated---as usual---using the locution of ‘knowing what it’s like’ but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why ‘knowing what it's like’ does not serve the purposes of tho…Read more
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20On belief about experiences: An epistemological distinction applied to the knowledge argument against physicalismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 51-73. 1998.The article introduces two kinds of belief-phenomenal belief and nonphenomenal belief-about color experiences and examines under what conditions the distinction can be extended to belief about other kinds of mental states. A thesis of the paper is that the so-called Knowledge Argument should not be formulated-as usual-using the locution of `knowing what it's like' but instead using the concept of phenomenal belief and explains why `knowing what it's like' does not serve the purposes of those who…Read more
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6Transtemporale Identität bewusstseinsfähiger WesenDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 56 (4): 513-534. 2008.Unser natürliches Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität bewusstseinsfähiger Wesen unterscheidet sich grundlegend von unserem Verständnis der transtemporalen Identität von Dingen, die wir nicht für bewusstseinsfähig halten. Der Unterschied beruht letztlich auf begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres selbstbezogenen Denkens. Wir haben ein von Kriterien der transtemporalen Identität freies Verständnis der eigenen transtemporalen Identität und diese Kriterienfreiheit überträgt sich auf unsere Gedan…Read more
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143The Illusion of IllusionismJournal of Consciousness Studies 23 (11-12): 160-171. 2016.A central thesis of Frankish's argument for illusionism is the claim that illusionism is possibly true. This is what the realist about phenomenal consciousness must deny. Frankish's argument for that premise is based on a widely shared understanding of phenomenal consciousness as being a matter of certain events instantiating special properties. I argue that the illusionist's reasoning is difficult to avoid if one accepts this common account. A positive argument for the thesis that the mere poss…Read more
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13Transparency of experience and the perceptual model of phenomenal awarenessPhilosophical Perspectives 21 (1). 2007.
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58Realism about Identity and Individuality of Conscious BeingsIn Katharina Neges, Josef Mitterer, Sebastian Kletzl & Christian Kanzian (eds.), Realism - Relativism - Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, De Gruyter. pp. 279-292. 2017.
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123A Puzzle About ColorsDialectica 60 (3): 321-336. 2006.I propose a description of one aspect of the philosophical problem about the ontology of colors by formulating and motivating six plausible premises that seem to be hard to deny in isolation but that are jointly incoherent. I briefly sketch a solution and comment on the views presented in this volume from the perspective of the puzzle.
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12I discuss three puzzles of probability theory which seem connected with problems of direct reference and rigid designation. The resolution of at least one of them requires referential use of definite descriptions in probability statements. I argue that contrary to common opinion all these puzzles are in a way still unsolved: They seem to exemplify cases in which a change of probabilities is rationally required, even though any specific change presupposes unjustified assumptions.
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Zur Frage der Übertragbarkeit intentionaler Begriffe auf physische ZuständeEthik Und Sozialwissenschaften 3 (4): 484. 1992.
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4Buchkritik Subjektivität. Wissen von innenDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6): 1001-1005. 2010.
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191The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigmSynthese 195 (8): 3361-3387. 2018.According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties is presented and defended as preferable. It is argued that the choice between these two frameworks makes a substantial difference for theoretical purposes.
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7Phenomenal presence and perceptual awareness: A subjectivist account of perceptual openness to the world1Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 352-383. 2011.
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De-re-versus de-dicto-Bewertungen der Existenz von Personen: eine anomalie der Ex-post-facto-Beurteilung von EntscheidungenConceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 26 (68-69): 97-105. 1992.
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31What about the emergence of consciousness deserves puzzlement?In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in science and philosophy, Routledge. pp. 6--149. 2010.
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224Self-AwarenessReview of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1): 55-82. 2017.Is a subject who undergoes an experience necessarily aware of undergoing the experience? According to the view here developed, a positive answer to this question should be accepted if ‘awareness’ is understood in a specific way, - in the sense of what will be called ‘primitive awareness’. Primitive awareness of being experientially presented with something involves, furthermore, being pre-reflectively aware of oneself as an experiencing subject. An argument is developed for the claims that pre-r…Read more
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1Phenomenal belief and phenomenal conceptsIn Manuel García-Carpintero & Josep Macià (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 2006.
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124Grasping phenomenal propertiesIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is more intimate then if you just have some concept or other…Read more
Lugano, Ticino, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |