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172Doings and subject causationErkenntnis 67 (2). 2007.In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent error to human ex…Read more
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100Thinking without language. A phenomenological argument for its possibility and existenceGrazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1): 55-75. 2010.The view is defended that the mere lack of language in a creature does not justify doubts about its capacity for genuine and complex thinking. Thinking is understood as a mental occurrent activity that belongs to phenomenal consciousness. Specific kinds of thinking are characterized by active or passive attending to the contents present to the subject, by the thinking being goal-directed, guided by standards of rationality or other standards of adequacy, and finally by being a case of critical r…Read more
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43La nozione di soggetto cosciente e la sua base fenomenologica nell'autocoscienza preriflessivaRivista di Filosofia 104 (3): 485-504. 2013.
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119Freedom and the Phenomenology of AgencyErkenntnis 83 (1): 61-87. 2018.Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences and of perceptual experiences and argue that these veridicality conditions are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The ma…Read more
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1An argument from transtemporal identity for subject-body dualismIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism, Oxford University Press. 2010.
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51Zur Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von empirischen BeziehungenZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 52 (2). 1998.In dem Artikel wird die These vertreten, daß unser Begriff transtemporaler, personaler Identität keine Reduktion auf empirische Beziehungen zuläßt und auch eine Revision zugunsten eines reduzierbaren Begriffs personaler Identität mit tief verwurzelten begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres Denkens in Konflikt geriete. Diese nicht-reduktionistische Auffassung sollte aber, so wird in dem Artikel argumentiert, mit einer These der nomologischen Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von üb…Read more
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The character of color predicates: A phenomenalist viewIn M. Anduschus, Albert Newen & Wolfgang Kunne (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, Csli Press. 1997.
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1Phenomenal essentialism: A problem for identity theoristsIn Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Reality: From Descartes to the Present, Mentis. 2004.
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64Intrinsic phenomenal properties in color science: A reply to Peter RossConsciousness and Cognition 8 (4): 571-574. 1999.
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52I discuss three puzzles of probability theory which seem connected with problems of direct reference and rigid designation. The resolution of at least one of them requires referential use of definite descriptions in probability statements. I argue that contrary to common opinion all these puzzles are in a way still unsolved: They seem to exemplify cases in which a change of probabilities is rationally required, even though any specific change presupposes unjustified assumptions.
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36Buchkritik Subjektivität. Wissen von innenDeutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58 (6): 1001-1005. 2010.
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Zur Frage der Übertragbarkeit intentionaler Begriffe auf physische ZuständeEthik Und Sozialwissenschaften 3 (4): 484. 1992.
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193The experience property frame work: a misleading paradigmSynthese 195 (8): 3361-3387. 2018.According to the experience property framework qualia are properties of experiences the subject undergoing the experience is aware of. A phenomenological argument against this framework is developed and a few mistakes invited by the framework are described. An alternative to the framework, the framework of experiential properties is presented and defended as preferable. It is argued that the choice between these two frameworks makes a substantial difference for theoretical purposes.
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181Phenomenal presence and perceptual awareness: A subjectivist account of perceptual openness to the world1Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 352-383. 2011.
Lugano, Ticino, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |