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180Phenomenal presence and perceptual awareness: A subjectivist account of perceptual openness to the world1Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 352-383. 2011.
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De-re-versus de-dicto-Bewertungen der Existenz von Personen: eine anomalie der Ex-post-facto-Beurteilung von EntscheidungenConceptus: Zeitschrift Fur Philosophie 26 (68-69): 97-105. 1992.
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31What about the emergence of consciousness deserves puzzlement?In Antonella Corradini & Timothy O'Connor (eds.), Emergence in science and philosophy, Routledge. pp. 6--149. 2010.
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221Self-AwarenessReview of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1): 55-82. 2017.Is a subject who undergoes an experience necessarily aware of undergoing the experience? According to the view here developed, a positive answer to this question should be accepted if ‘awareness’ is understood in a specific way, - in the sense of what will be called ‘primitive awareness’. Primitive awareness of being experientially presented with something involves, furthermore, being pre-reflectively aware of oneself as an experiencing subject. An argument is developed for the claims that pre-r…Read more
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1Phenomenal belief and phenomenal conceptsIn Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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124Grasping phenomenal propertiesIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is more intimate then if you just have some concept or other…Read more
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1Chisholm on personal identity and the attribution of experiencesIn Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Open Court. 1997.
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138The Notion of a Conscious Subject and its Phenomenological Basis in Prereflexive Self-awarenessRivista di Filosofia 104 (3): 485-504. 2013.
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5Pseudonormal vision and color qualiaIn Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III, Mit Press. 1999.
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1Is the naturalization of qualitative experience possible or sensible?In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, Pittsburgh University Press. 1997.
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478Dualist emergentismIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2007.
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359What Mary couldn't know: Belief about phenomenal statesIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219--41. 1995.
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185The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity DefendedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 702-714. 2013.In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument e…Read more
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91Phenomenal character and the transparency of experienceIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 309--324. 2008.
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170Doings and subject causationErkenntnis 67 (2). 2007.In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent error to human ex…Read more
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99Thinking without language. A phenomenological argument for its possibility and existenceGrazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1): 55-75. 2010.The view is defended that the mere lack of language in a creature does not justify doubts about its capacity for genuine and complex thinking. Thinking is understood as a mental occurrent activity that belongs to phenomenal consciousness. Specific kinds of thinking are characterized by active or passive attending to the contents present to the subject, by the thinking being goal-directed, guided by standards of rationality or other standards of adequacy, and finally by being a case of critical r…Read more
Lugano, Ticino, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |