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1Phenomenal belief and phenomenal conceptsIn Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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124Grasping phenomenal propertiesIn Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford University Press. 2006.1 Grasping Properties I will present an argument for property dualism. The argument employs a distinction between having a concept of a property and grasping a property via a concept. If you grasp a property P via a concept C, then C is a concept of P. But the reverse does not hold: you may have a concept of a property without grasping that property via any concept. If you grasp a property, then your cognitive relation to that property is more intimate then if you just have some concept or other…Read more
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1Chisholm on personal identity and the attribution of experiencesIn Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm, Open Court. 1997.
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138The Notion of a Conscious Subject and its Phenomenological Basis in Prereflexive Self-awarenessRivista di Filosofia 104 (3): 485-504. 2013.
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5Pseudonormal vision and color qualiaIn Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & David J. Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness III, Mit Press. 1999.
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1Is the naturalization of qualitative experience possible or sensible?In Martin Carrier & Peter K. Machamer (eds.), Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science, and the Mind, Pittsburgh University Press. 1997.
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460Dualist emergentismIn Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2007.
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354What Mary couldn't know: Belief about phenomenal statesIn Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. pp. 219--41. 1995.
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183The Argument for Subject Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity DefendedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3): 702-714. 2013.In my argument for subject body dualism criticized by Ludwig I use the locution of a genuine and factual difference between two possibilities. Ludwig distinguishes three interpretations of this locution. According to his analysis the argument does not go through on any of these interpretations. In my response I agree that the argument is unsuccessful if ‘factual difference’ is understood in the first way. The second reading—according to a plausible understanding—cannot be used for the argument e…Read more
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90Phenomenal character and the transparency of experienceIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia, Mit Press. pp. 309--324. 2008.
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167Doings and subject causationErkenntnis 67 (2). 2007.In the center of this paper is a phenomenological claim: we experience ourselves in our own doings and we experience others when we perceive them in their doings as active in the sense of being a cause of the corresponding physical event. These experiences are fundamental to the way we view ourselves and others. It is therefore desirable for any philosophical theory to be compatible with the content of these experiences and thus to avoid the attribution of radical and permanent error to human ex…Read more
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97Thinking without language. A phenomenological argument for its possibility and existenceGrazer Philosophische Studien 81 (1): 55-75. 2010.The view is defended that the mere lack of language in a creature does not justify doubts about its capacity for genuine and complex thinking. Thinking is understood as a mental occurrent activity that belongs to phenomenal consciousness. Specific kinds of thinking are characterized by active or passive attending to the contents present to the subject, by the thinking being goal-directed, guided by standards of rationality or other standards of adequacy, and finally by being a case of critical r…Read more
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41La nozione di soggetto cosciente e la sua base fenomenologica nell'autocoscienza preriflessivaRivista di Filosofia 104 (3): 485-504. 2013.
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116Freedom and the Phenomenology of AgencyErkenntnis 83 (1): 61-87. 2018.Free action and microphysical determination are incompatible but this is so only in virtue of a genuine conflict between microphysical determination with any active behavior. I introduce active behavior as the veridicality condition of agentive experiences and of perceptual experiences and argue that these veridicality conditions are fulfilled in many everyday cases of human and non-human behavior and that they imply the incompatibility of active behavior with microphysical determination. The ma…Read more
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51Zur Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von empirischen BeziehungenZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 52 (2). 1998.In dem Artikel wird die These vertreten, daß unser Begriff transtemporaler, personaler Identität keine Reduktion auf empirische Beziehungen zuläßt und auch eine Revision zugunsten eines reduzierbaren Begriffs personaler Identität mit tief verwurzelten begrifflichen Besonderheiten unseres Denkens in Konflikt geriete. Diese nicht-reduktionistische Auffassung sollte aber, so wird in dem Artikel argumentiert, mit einer These der nomologischen Abhängigkeit transtemporaler, personaler Identität von üb…Read more
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1An argument from transtemporal identity for subject-body dualismIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2009.
Lugano, Ticino, Switzerland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |