Didier Dubois

The aim of this paper is to propose a formal approach to reasoning about desires, understood as logical propositions which we would be pleased to make true, also acknowledging the fact that desire is a matter of degree. It is first shown that, at the static level, desires should satisfy certain principles that differ from those to which beliefs obey. In this sense, from a static perspective, the logic of desires is different from the logic of beliefs. While the accumulation of beliefs tend to reduce the remaining possible worlds they point at, the accumulation of desires tends to increase the set of states of affairs tentatively considered as satisfactory. Indeed beliefs are expected to be closed under conjunctions, while, in the positive view of desires developed here, one can argue that endorsing \ as a desire means to desire \ and to desire \. However, desiring \ and \ at the same time is not usually regarded as rational, since it does not make much sense to desire one thing and its contrary at the same time. Thus when a new desire is added to the set of desires of an agent, a revision process may be necessary. Just as belief revision relies on an epistemic entrenchment relation, desire revision is based on a hedonic entrenchment relation satisfying other properties, due to the different natures of belief and desire. While epistemic entrenchment relations are known to be qualitative necessity relations, hedonic relations obeying a set of reasonable postulates correspond to another set-function in possibility theory, called guaranteed possibility, that drive well-behaved desire revision operations. Then the general framework of possibilistic logic provides a syntactic setting for encoding desire change. The paper also insists that desires should be carefully distinguished from goals.

This paper presents and discusses several methods for reasoning from inconsistent knowledge bases. A so-called argued consequence relation, taking into account the existence of consistent arguments in favour of a conclusion and the absence of consistent arguments in favour of its contrary, is particularly investigated. Flat knowledge bases, i.e., without any priority between their elements, are studied under different inconsistency-tolerant consequence relations, namely the so-called argumentative, free, universal, existential, cardinality-based, and paraconsistent consequence relations. The syntax-sensitivity of these consequence relations is studied. A companion paper is devoted to the case where priorities exist between the pieces of information in the knowledge base.

Fuzzy Sets, Logics and Reasoning about Knowledge reports recent results concerning the genuinely logical aspects of fuzzy sets in relation to algebraic considerations, knowledge representation and commonsense reasoning. It takes a state-of-the-art look at multiple-valued and fuzzy set-based logics, in an artificial intelligence perspective. The papers, all of which are written by leading contributors in their respective fields, are grouped into four sections. The first section presents a panorama of many-valued logics in connection with fuzzy sets. The second explores algebraic foundations, with an emphasis on MV algebras. The third is devoted to approximate reasoning methods and similarity-based reasoning. The fourth explores connections between fuzzy knowledge representation, especially possibilistic logic and prioritized knowledge bases. Readership: Scholars and graduate students in logic, algebra, knowledge representation, and formal aspects of artificial intelligence.

The fields of similarity and preference are still broadening due to the exploration of new fields of application. This is caused by the strong impact of vagueness, imprecision, uncertainty and dominance on human and agent information, communication, planning, decision, action, and control as well as by the technical progress of the information technology itself. The topics treated in this book are of interest to computer scientists, statisticians, operations researchers, experts in AI, cognitive psychologists and economists.