John Kleinig

Utilizing a contractualist framework for understanding the basis and limits for the use of force by police, this article offers five limiting principles—respect for status as moral agents, proportionality, minimum force necessary, ends likely to be accomplished, and appropriate motivation—and then discusses uses of force that violate or risk violating those principles. These include, but are not limited to, unseemly invasions, strip searches, perp walks, handcuffing practices, post-chase apprehensions, contempt-of-cop arrests, overuse of intermediate force measures, coerced confessions, profiling, stop and frisk practices, and the administration of street justice.

Criticisms of how police exercise their authority are neither new nor uncommon. Police officers have considerable power, and they often must draw on that power in complex and pressing circumstances. This collection of essays by fifteen leading specialists in ethics and criminal justice examines the nature of police discretion and its many varieties. The essays explore the kinds of judgment calls police officers frequently must make: When should they get involved? Whom should they watch? What constitutes a 'disturbance of the peace'? What resources should be devoted to a situation? Does social welfare take precedence over law enforcement? Under what conditions, if any, may police officers engage in selective enforcement of the law? Each essay or pair of essays is followed by a response, making Handled with Discretion an excellent text for stimulating discussion in the classroom

The material for this book was originally presented as the Stanton Lectures in the Philosophy of Religion at Cambridge in 1963. Its argument operates on a number of levels. Superficially, though explicitly, it is a defence of Wittgenstein and his followers against two charges, first, of ignoring the larger questions of epistemology discussed by their predecessors, and second, of removing philosophy from any concern with the practical issues of life. On another level it gives a commentary on the standard epistemological problems in the philosophy of religion. On yet another level it is an exercise in the philosophy of philosophy.

The various essays in this volume explore the development of ideas of corruption, employing a range of disciplinary approaches. Although we are accustomed to think of corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain, corruption has its deeper roots in the idea of a standard that has been eroded. That standard, however, need not be construed idealistically: much of what is asserted to be corruption takes the form of a departure from conventional standards. In inveighing against corruption, therefore, it is necessary first to examine the presumptions that underlie its imputation. As well as exploring the ethical issues that must be confronted in identifying corruption, the authors also address some of the ethical issues that challenge attempts to root out corruption.