John Kleinig

The various essays in this volume explore the development of ideas of corruption, employing a range of disciplinary approaches. Although we are accustomed to think of corruption as the misuse of public office for private gain, corruption has its deeper roots in the idea of a standard that has been eroded. That standard, however, need not be construed idealistically: much of what is asserted to be corruption takes the form of a departure from conventional standards. In inveighing against corruption, therefore, it is necessary first to examine the presumptions that underlie its imputation. As well as exploring the ethical issues that must be confronted in identifying corruption, the authors also address some of the ethical issues that challenge attempts to root out corruption.

J L Austin has left a firm imprint on much contemporary philosophy. Not surprisingly, however, his published papers and lectures have provoked strongly contrasting responses, some seeing in them the refinement of certain philosophical techniques and the introduction of new standards of care, others the final degeneration of linguistic philosophy into verbal hair-splitting. Whatever the response, his writings were bound to attract the attention of formal linguists, and the last decade has seen a significant number of contributions by the latter—notably Ziff, Katz and Fodor—appearing in the philosophical booklists. To these is now added this collection by Vendler, comprising an introductory essay attempting to justify the relevance of structural linguistics to philosophical argument, and six others in which the data of linguistics is applied to major philosophical issues. Their point, however, as Vendler is quick to note, ‘is not to offer impeccable solutions for a few problems, but to show that the more or less sophisticated data provided by structural linguistics can be used in philosophical arguments’. Earlier versions of four of these essays have been published previously, and in the case of the first two of these, before Vendler’s acquaintance with transformational analysis. The remaining three have been written for this volume.

The “blue wall of silence” -- the rule that police officers will not testify against each other -- has its roots in an important associational virtue, loyalty, which, in the context of friendship and familial relations, is of central importance. This article seeks to distinguish the worthy roots of the “blue wall” from its frequent corruption in the covering up of serious criminality, and attempts to offer criteria for determining when to testify and when to respond in other ways to the flaws of fellow officers.

This volume was initiated to meet the challenges of the increasing contemporary trend to "treat" substance users (in the broadest sense of this concept), whether in institutional settings, ambulatory programs, or even controlled environments such as prisons. Although several essays concentrate more particularly on some of the ethico-moral problems encountered by juridico-moral interventions--problems relating to criminalization, decriminalization, legalization, and interdiction--the main focus is on broadly medical or therapeutic responses to drug use, and in particular on problems encountered within the domain of drug user counseling. Codes of ethics for drug user counselors can be found as an appendix.

We would not be far wide of the mark if we suggested that the prevailing social ideology is structured round the presumption that interpersonal and political relationships ought to be, and for the most part are, based on the mutual consent of the parties involved. Liberal democratic theory has secured for consent a crucial role in the justification of political obligation and authority. In law, the maximvolenti non fit injuria,to the one who consents no wrong is done, constitutes a defence in cases where one person invades the interests of another. In the bioethical field, there is a preoccupation with the formulation of a standard of ‘informed consent’ in patient-doctor and subject-researcher relationships. And in the broader domain of ethical theory there is an influential view that consensual acts do not differ in moral quality from selfregarding behaviour.

Rather than treating them as discrete and incommensurable ideas, we sketch some connections between human flourishing and human dignity, and link them to human rights. We contend that the metaphor of flourishing provides an illuminating aspirational framework for thinking about human development and obligations, and that the idea of human dignity is a critical element within that discussion. We conclude with some suggestions as to how these conceptions of human dignity and human flourishing might underpin and inform appeals to human rights