John Kleinig

J L Austin has left a firm imprint on much contemporary philosophy. Not surprisingly, however, his published papers and lectures have provoked strongly contrasting responses, some seeing in them the refinement of certain philosophical techniques and the introduction of new standards of care, others the final degeneration of linguistic philosophy into verbal hair-splitting. Whatever the response, his writings were bound to attract the attention of formal linguists, and the last decade has seen a significant number of contributions by the latter—notably Ziff, Katz and Fodor—appearing in the philosophical booklists. To these is now added this collection by Vendler, comprising an introductory essay attempting to justify the relevance of structural linguistics to philosophical argument, and six others in which the data of linguistics is applied to major philosophical issues. Their point, however, as Vendler is quick to note, ‘is not to offer impeccable solutions for a few problems, but to show that the more or less sophisticated data provided by structural linguistics can be used in philosophical arguments’. Earlier versions of four of these essays have been published previously, and in the case of the first two of these, before Vendler’s acquaintance with transformational analysis. The remaining three have been written for this volume.

The material for this book was originally presented as the Stanton Lectures in the Philosophy of Religion at Cambridge in 1963. Its argument operates on a number of levels. Superficially, though explicitly, it is a defence of Wittgenstein and his followers against two charges, first, of ignoring the larger questions of epistemology discussed by their predecessors, and second, of removing philosophy from any concern with the practical issues of life. On another level it gives a commentary on the standard epistemological problems in the philosophy of religion. On yet another level it is an exercise in the philosophy of philosophy.

The “blue wall of silence” -- the rule that police officers will not testify against each other -- has its roots in an important associational virtue, loyalty, which, in the context of friendship and familial relations, is of central importance. This article seeks to distinguish the worthy roots of the “blue wall” from its frequent corruption in the covering up of serious criminality, and attempts to offer criteria for determining when to testify and when to respond in other ways to the flaws of fellow officers.

Rather than treating them as discrete and incommensurable ideas, we sketch some connections between human flourishing and human dignity, and link them to human rights. We contend that the metaphor of flourishing provides an illuminating aspirational framework for thinking about human development and obligations, and that the idea of human dignity is a critical element within that discussion. We conclude with some suggestions as to how these conceptions of human dignity and human flourishing might underpin and inform appeals to human rights