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157Moral Dilemmas and VaguenessActa Analytica 28 (2): 207-222. 2013.In this paper we point out some interesting structural similarities between vagueness and moral dilemmas as well as between some of the proposed solutions to both problems. Moral dilemma involves a situation with opposed obligations that cannot all be satisfied. Transvaluationism as an approach to vagueness makes three claims concerning the nature of vagueness: (1) it involves incompatibility between mutually unsatisfiable requirements, (2) the underlying requirements retain their normative powe…Read more
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Franz Brentano, A Philosopher of the Past and with a Future, Interview with Wilhelm BaumgartnerActa Analytica 8 43-52. 1993.
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Spindel Conference 2001 Origins: The Common Sources of the Analytic and Phenomenological TraditionsUniversity of Memphis. 2002.
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Abundant Truth in an Austere WorldIn Patrick Greenough & Michael Patrick Lynch (eds.), Truth and realism, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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The Turning Points of the New Phenomenological Era (Analecta Husserliana, XXXIV)Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1992.
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Phenomenology of IntentionalityIn Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano, Editions Rodopi. 2013.
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65Intentionality of Phenomenology in BrentanoSouthern Journal of Philosophy 40 (S1): 231-267. 2002.Phenomenology is intrinsically intentional for Brentano. Qualitative conscious experiences are individuated by their phenomenal space. Examples concerning the phenomenal take account of both experiential and physical spaces. As directedness at an object and reflexive directedness of the act at itself come interwoven, there is the intrinsic phenomenology of intentionality. Both intentionality of phenomenology and phenomenology of intentionality present the wholes with mutually pervading and only …Read more
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11Existence monism trumps priority monismIn Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 51--76. 2011.Existence monism is defended against priority monism. Schaffer's arguments for priority monism and against pluralism are reviewed, such as the argument from gunk. The whole does not require parts. Ontological vagueness is impossible. If ordinary objects are in the right ontology then they are vague. So ordinary objects are not included in the right ontology; and hence thought and talk about them cannot be accommodated via fully ontological vindication. Partially ontological vindication is not vi…Read more
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196Transglobal evidentialism-reliabilismActa Analytica 22 (4): 281-300. 2007.We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account…Read more
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48Sensation According to Meinong and VeberGrazer Philosophische Studien 50 (1): 573-590. 1995.Following some preliminary intuitions, a view attributing a specific level to sensation in a two levels model of mind is promoted. Some opinions deny the specificity of sensation by claiming either that it is physical or again by implying that it is completely cognitive. Meinong's definition of sensation as a simple perceptual representation originating from peripheric stimulation is reconstructed. France Veber's promotion of the hitting function with its attachment to sensation is derived from …Read more
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21Meinongian theory of moral judgmentsIn Alfred Schramm (ed.), Meinongian Issues in Contemporary Italian Philosophy, De Gruyter. pp. 93-122. 2005.
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19Haller and Brentano's EmpiricismIn Keith Lehrer & Johann Christian Marek (eds.), Austrian Philosophy Past and Present: Essays in Honor of Rudolf Haller, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55-69. 1997.
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112The epistemic relevance of morphological contentActa Analytica 25 (2): 155-173. 2010.Morphological content is information that is implicitly embodied in the standing structure of a cognitive system and is automatically accommodated during cognitive processing without first becoming explicit in consciousness. We maintain that much belief-formation in human cognition is essentially morphological : i.e., it draws heavily on large amounts of morphological content, and must do so in order to tractably accommodate the holistic evidential relevance of background information possessed b…Read more
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91Justification in ContextActa Analytica 20 (9): 91-104. 2005.The general drive in epistemology is to deliver necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge with the use of exceptionless general epistemic principles. There is another way, however, to approach the phenomenon of knowledge – by particularistic beautiful patterns. David Lewis in his paper „Elusive Knowledge” provides a nice contextual epistemology. We also think that contextualism is the right way to go and that the epistemic context plays an important role in our endeavors to gain knowledg…Read more
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90Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance ErrorsActa Analytica 28 (2): 161-177. 2013.The semantic blindness objection to contextualism challenges the view that there is no incompatibility between (i) denials of external-world knowledge in contexts where radical-deception scenarios are salient, and (ii) affirmations of external-world knowledge in contexts where such scenarios are not salient. Contextualism allegedly attributes a gross and implausible form of semantic incompetence in the use of the concept of knowledge to people who are otherwise quite competent in its use; this b…Read more
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12Sensation According to Meinong and VeberGrazer Philosophische Studien 50 (1): 573-590. 1995.Following some preliminary intuitions, a view attributing a specific level to sensation in a two levels model of mind is promoted. Some opinions deny the specificity of sensation by claiming either that it is physical or again by implying that it is completely cognitive. Meinong's definition of sensation as a simple perceptual representation originating from peripheric stimulation is reconstructed. France Veber's promotion of the hitting function with its attachment to sensation is derived from …Read more