profile picture

David Chalmers

New York University
 More details
  •  425
    On the search for the neural correlate of consciousness
    In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & Alwyn Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates, Mit Press. pp. 2--219. 1998.
    *[[This paper appears in _Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates_ (S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, and A.Scott, eds), published with MIT Press in 1998. It is a transcript of my talk at the second Tucson conference in April 1996, lightly edited to include the contents of overheads and to exclude some diversions with a consciousness meter. A more in-depth argument for some of the claims in this paper can be found in Chapter 6 of my book _The Conscious Mind_ (Chal…Read more
    Consciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational Issues
  •  365
    The two-envelope paradox: A complete analysis?
    A wealthy eccentric places two envelopes in front of you. She tells you that both envelopes contain money, and that one contains twice as much as the other, but she does not tell you which is which. You are allowed to choose one envelope, and to keep all the money you find inside.
    Two-Envelope Paradox
  •  2694
    Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation
    with Frank Jackson
    Philosophical Review 110 (3): 315-61. 2001.
    Is conceptual analysis required for reductive explanation? If there is no a priori entailment from microphysical truths to phenomenal truths, does reductive explanation of the phenomenal fail? We say yes. Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker say no.
    Semantic TheoriesConceptual AnalysisConceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment
  •  959
    Materialism and the metaphysics of modality
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 473-96. 1999.
    This appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-93, as a response to four papers in a symposium on my book The Conscious Mind. Most of it should be comprehensible without having read the papers in question. This paper is for an audience of philosophers and so is relatively technical. It will probably also help to have read some of the book. The papers I’m responding to are: Chris Hill & Brian McLaughlin, There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers’ philosoph…Read more
    Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
  •  1262
    The puzzle of conscious experience
    Scientific American 273 (6): 80-86. 1995.
    Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.
    `Hard' and `Easy' ProblemsConscious and Unconscious Memory
  •  130
    A matrix enquanto hipótese metafísica
    Critica. 2004.