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959Materialism and the metaphysics of modalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 473-96. 1999.This appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-93, as a response to four papers in a symposium on my book The Conscious Mind. Most of it should be comprehensible without having read the papers in question. This paper is for an audience of philosophers and so is relatively technical. It will probably also help to have read some of the book. The papers I’m responding to are: Chris Hill & Brian McLaughlin, There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers’ philosoph…Read more
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1262The puzzle of conscious experienceScientific American 273 (6): 80-86. 1995.Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.
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620The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and SiegelAnalysis 73 (2): 345-368. 2013.This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.
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1033Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of CredenceMind 120 (479): 587-635. 2011.The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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1357Strong and weak emergenceIn Philip Clayton & Paul Davies (eds.), The re-emergence of emergence: the emergentist hypothesis from science to religion, Oxford University Press. 2006.The term ‘emergence’ often causes_ _confusion in science and philosophy, as it is used to express at least_ _two quite different concepts. We can label these concepts _strong_ _emergence_ and _weak emergence_. Both of these concepts are important, but it is vital to keep them separate.
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New York UniversityDepartment of Philosophy
Center For Mind, Brain And ConsciousnessUniversity Professor
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Mind |
| Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
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