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89Vision and consciousness—introductionIn S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & David Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, Mit Press. pp. 3--123. 1999.
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761Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of CredenceMind 120 (479): 587-635. 2011.The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
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323Ramsey + Moore = GodAnalysis 67 (2): 170-172. 2007.Frank Ramsey (1931) wrote: If two people are arguing 'if p will q?' and both are in doubt as to p, they are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. We can say that they are fixing their degrees of belief in q given p. Let us take the first sentence the way it is often taken, as proposing the following test for the acceptability of an indicative conditional: ‘If p then q’ is acceptable to a subject S iff, were S to accept p and consider q, S would ac…Read more
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424The Singularity: A Reply to CommentatorsJournal of Consciousness Studies (7-8): 141-167. 2012.I would like to thank the authors of the 26 contributions to this symposium on my article “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. I learned a great deal from the reading their commentaries. Some of the commentaries engaged my article in detail, while others developed ideas about the singularity in other directions. In this reply I will concentrate mainly on those in the first group, with occasional comments on those in the second. A singularity (or an intelligence explosion) is a rapid incr…Read more
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2934Does conceivability entail possibilityIn Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200. 2002.There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim , from there to a modal claim , and from there to a metaphysical claim.
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985Perception and the fall from EdenIn Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125. 2006.In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory.
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New York UniversityDepartment of Philosophy
Center For Mind, Brain And ConsciousnessUniversity Professor
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
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