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474High-level perception, representation, and analogy:A critique of artificial intelligence methodologyJournal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intellige 4 (3). 1992.High-level perception--”the process of making sense of complex data at an abstract, conceptual level--”is fundamental to human cognition. Through high-level perception, chaotic environmen- tal stimuli are organized into the mental representations that are used throughout cognitive pro- cessing. Much work in traditional artificial intelligence has ignored the process of high-level perception, by starting with hand-coded representations. In this paper, we argue that this dis- missal of perceptual …Read more
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505Subsymbolic computation and the chinese roomIn John Dinsmore (ed.), The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap, Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 25--48. 1992.More than a decade ago, philosopher John Searle started a long-running controversy with his paper “Minds, Brains, and Programs” (Searle, 1980a), an attack on the ambitious claims of artificial intelligence (AI). With his now famous _Chinese Room_ argument, Searle claimed to show that despite the best efforts of AI researchers, a computer could never recreate such vital properties of human mentality as intentionality, subjectivity, and understanding. The AI research program is based on the underl…Read more
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335(1a) If Prince Albert Victor killed those people, he is Jack the Ripper (and Jack the Ripper killed those people). (1b) If Prince Albert Victor had killed those people, Jack the Ripper wouldn't have (and Prince Albert wouldn't have been Jack the Ripper).
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424Frontloading and Fregean sense: Reply to Neta, Schroeter and StanleyAnalysis 74 (4): 676-697. 2014.
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1016Revisability and Conceptual Change in "Two Dogmas of Empiricism"Journal of Philosophy 108 (8): 387-415. 2011.W.V. Quine’s article “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is one of the most influential works in 20thcentury philosophy. The article is cast most explicitly as an argument against logical empiricists such as Carnap, arguing against the analytic/synthetic distinction that they appeal to along with their verificationism. But the article has been read much more broadly as an attack on the notion..
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1435The representational character of experienceIn Brian Leiter (ed.), The future for philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 153--181. 2004.This chapter analyzes aspects of the relationship between consciousness and intentionality. It focuses on the phenomenal character and the intentional content of perceptual states, canvassing various possible relations among them. It argues that there is a good case for a sort of representationalism, although this may not take the form that its advocates often suggest. By mapping out some of the landscape, the chapter tries to open up territory for different and promising forms of representation…Read more
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236Here the extension of a sentence token is a truth-value, the extension of a name is an individual, and so on. Scenarios are most often understood as centered possible worlds – i.e. ordered triples of worlds, individuals, and times - although they may also be understood in other ways.
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1045Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean AccountNoûs 45 (4): 595-639. 2011.When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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New York UniversityDepartment of Philosophy
Center For Mind, Brain And ConsciousnessUniversity Professor
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
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