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1661. I think that by emphasizing theoretical spaces of representations, Andy has put his finger on an issue that is key to connectionism's success, and whose investigation will be a key determinant of the field's further progress. I also think that if we look at representational spaces in the right way, we can see that they are deeply related to classical phenomenon of systematicity in representation. I want to argue that the key to understanding representational spaces, and in particular their ab…Read more
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156This paper explores how an evolutionary process can produce systems that learn. A general framework for the evolution of learning is outlined, and is applied to the task of evolving mechanisms suitable for supervised learning in single-layer neural networks. Dynamic properties of a network’s information-processing capacity are encoded genetically, and these properties are subjected to selective pressure based on their success in producing adaptive behavior in diverse environments. As a result of…Read more
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143Review of Journal of Consciousness Studies (review)Times Literary Supplement. 1994.How does conscious experience emerge from a physical basis? At a first glance, this is the question about the mind that most needs answering. So it is curious that those who study the mind professionally have often avoided the question entirely. In psychology, the cognitive revolution did not make consciousness respectable: most cognitive psychologists have stuck to subjects such as learning, memory, and perception instead. Neuroscientists have been known to speculate on the topic, but usually o…Read more
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140A piece of iMeThe Philosophers' Magazine 43 41-49. 2008.The radical view, the view we’re kind of pushing, is that the iPhone can be seen literally as a part of my mind. I actually remember things: in virtue of this information being in the iPhone, it is part of my memory. The iPhone isn’t just a tool for my cognition, it’s part of my cognition
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102Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates (edited book)MIT Press. 1999.The first two conferences and books have become touchstones for the field. This volume presents a selection of invited papers from the third conference.
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98Response to SearleNew York Review of Books 44 (8). 1997.In my book _The Conscious Mind_ , I deny a number of claims that John Searle finds "obvious", and I make some claims that he finds "absurd". But if the mind/body problem has taught us anything, it is that nothing about consciousness is obvious, and that one person's obvious truth is another person's absurdity. So instead of throwing around this sort of language, it is best to examine the claims themselves and the arguments that I give for them, to see whether Searle says anything of substance th…Read more
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95Color—introductionIn S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & David Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, Mit Press. pp. 3--49. 1999.
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91Vision and consciousness—introductionIn S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak & David Chalmers (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Iii: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, Mit Press. pp. 3--123. 1999.
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43Availability: The cognitive basis of experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1): 148-149. 1997.Although A-consciousness and P-consciousness are conceptually distinct, a refined notion of A-consciousness makes it plausible that the two are empirically inseparable. I suggest that the notion of direct availability for global control can play a central role here, and draw out some consequences.
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41Uploading: A Philosophical AnalysisIn Russell Blackford & Damien Broderick (eds.), Intelligence Unbound, Wiley. 2014-08-11.This chapter describes three relatively specific forms such as destructive uploading, gradual uploading, and nondestructive uploading. Neuroscience is gradually discovering various neural correlates of consciousness, but this research program largely takes the existence of consciousness for granted. It presents an argument for the pessimistic view and an argument for the optimistic view, both of which run parallel to related arguments that can be given concerning teletransportation. Cryonic tech…Read more
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40Consciousness and its Place in NatureIn Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind, Blackwell. 2003.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction1 The Problem Arguments Against Materialism Type‐A Materialism Type‐B Materialism15 The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Type‐B Materialism Type‐C Materialism Interlude Type‐D Dualism Type‐E Dualism Type‐F Monism Conclusions.
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38'TT Ontology, the Hard Problem of Experience,-*'-*'Free Will, and Agency'In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & Alwyn Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates, Mit Press. pp. 2--79. 1998.
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25Reply to Mulhauser's review of The Conscious MindPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness. 1997.First, I should clarify the notion of "taking consciousness seriously", which serves as a premise in my work. Mulhauser characterizes this as the assumption that no cognitive theory of consciousness will suffice. The latter assumption would indeed beg some crucial questions, but it is not the assumption that I make. I make an assumption about the problem of consciousness, not about any solution. To quote (p. xii): Throughout the book, I have assumed that consciousness exists, and that to redefin…Read more
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24The SingularityIn Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence, Wiley. 2016.This chapter provides a rich philosophical discussion of superintelligence, a widely discussed piece that has encouraged philosophers of mind to take transhumanism, mind uploading, and the singularity more seriously. It starts with the argument for a singularity: is there good reason to believe that there will be an intelligence explosion? Next, the chapter considers how to negotiate the singularity: if it is possible that there will be a singularity, how can we maximize the chances of a good ou…Read more
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23The Matrix as MetaphysicsIn Susan Schneider (ed.), Science Fiction and Philosophy: From Time Travel to Superintelligence, Wiley. 2016.In this chapter, the author says that the standard view of brain‐in‐a‐vat scenario is endorsed by the people who created The Matrix. The author argues that the hypothesis that he is envatted is not a skeptical hypothesis, but a metaphysical hypothesis. That is, it is a hypothesis about the underlying nature of reality. According to the author, the Matrix Hypothesis is equivalent to a version of the following three‐part Metaphysical Hypothesis. First, physical processes are fundamentally computat…Read more
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14Adelaide Festival of Ideas session, Brookman Hall, 1:45pm, Sunday 10 July, 2005. Chaired by Peter Goldsworthy.
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12Peter McLaren: Revolutionary Critical PedagogueEducational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5): 764-770. 2005.
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8Adelaide Festival of Ideas session, Bonython Hall, 2:30pm, Saturday 9 July, 2005. Chaired by Ian Henschke.
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5A Peer Group Assessment of a Radical Pedagogical ActivistEducational Philosophy and Theory 37 (5): 761-764. 2005.
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3Toward a Theory of ConsciousnessDissertation, Indiana University. 1993.This work is a study of the place of conscious experience in the natural order. In the first part, I examine the prospects for a reductive explanation of consciousness of the kind that has proved successful for other natural phenomena. I develop a systematic framework centered on the notion of supervenience for dealing with the metaphysical and explanatory issues involved, and apply this framework to consciousness. I give a number of arguments to the conclusion that consciousness is not logicall…Read more
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2Perception and the fall from EdenIn Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125. 2006.In the Garden of Eden, we had unmediated contact with the world. We were directly acquainted with objects in the world and with their properties. Objects were simply presented to us without causal mediation, and properties were revealed to us in their true intrinsic glory
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1Varieties of EmergenceIn Philip Clayton & Paul Davies (eds.), The re-emergence of emergence: the emergentist hypothesis from science to religion, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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New York UniversityDepartment of Philosophy
Center For Mind, Brain And ConsciousnessUniversity Professor
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
PhilPapers Editorships
21 more