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David Chalmers

New York University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    218
    • Most Recent
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    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    2
  •  Events
    53
  •  News and Updates
    166
  •  Philosophical Views

 More details
  • New York University
    Department of Philosophy
    Center For Mind, Brain And Consciousness
    University Professor
Indiana University, Bloomington
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1993
Email (login required)
Homepage
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphilosophy
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
Philosophy of Computing and Information
2 more
PhilPapers Editorships
Two-Dimensional Semantics
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Consciousness
Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous
Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works
The Concept of Consciousness
Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc
Explaining Consciousness?
What is it Like?
Subjectivity and Consciousness
The Explanatory Gap
`Hard' and `Easy' Problems
Cognitive Closure
Conceptual Analysis and A Priori Entailment
Explaining Consciousness, Misc
Consciousness and Materialism
The Knowledge Argument
Zombies and the Conceivability Argument
Kripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism
Arguments from Disembodiment
Other Anti-Materialist Arguments
Consciousness and Materialism, Misc
Mind-Body Problem, General
Extended Cognition
Two-Dimensionalism about Content
The Singularity
21 more
  • All publications (218)
  •  1034
    Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
    Mind 120 (479): 587-635. 2011.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
    Frege's PuzzleFregean Theories of Attitude AscriptionsSubjective Probability, MiscStructured Proposi…Read more
    Frege's PuzzleFregean Theories of Attitude AscriptionsSubjective Probability, MiscStructured PropositionsPropositions as Sets of WorldsThe Role of PropositionsFrege: Sinn and Bedeutung, Misc
  •  1357
    Strong and weak emergence
    In Philip Clayton & Paul Davies (eds.), The re-emergence of emergence: the emergentist hypothesis from science to religion, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    The term ‘emergence’ often causes_ _confusion in science and philosophy, as it is used to express at least_ _two quite different concepts. We can label these concepts _strong_ _emergence_ and _weak emergence_. Both of these concepts are important, but it is vital to keep them separate.
    Concepts of Emergence
  •  213
    Précis of The Character of Consciousness
    Philosophical Studies 167 (3): 747-748. 2014.
    Philosophy of Consciousness
  •  1
    Varieties of Emergence
    In Philip Clayton & Paul Davies (eds.), The re-emergence of emergence: the emergentist hypothesis from science to religion, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    Emergence
  •  3942
    Does conceivability entail possibility
    In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 145--200. 2002.
    There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim, from there to a modal claim, and from there to a metaphysical claim.
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentConceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityEpistemic Possibi…Read more
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentConceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityEpistemic PossibilityEpistemology of Imagination
  •  212
    On "consciousness and the philosophers"
    . 1997.
    John Searle's review of my book The Conscious Mind appeared in the March 6, 1997 edition of the New York Review of Books. I replied in a letter printed in their May 15, 1997 edition, and Searle's response appeared simultaneously. I set up this web page so that interested people can see my reply to Searle in turn, and to give access to other relevant materials.
    Philosophy of Consciousness, Misc
  •  540
    The Singularity: A Reply to Commentators
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 141-167. 2012.
    I would like to thank the authors of the 26 contributions to this symposium on my article “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. I learned a great deal from the reading their commentaries. Some of the commentaries engaged my article in detail, while others developed ideas about the singularity in other directions. In this reply I will concentrate mainly on those in the first group, with occasional comments on those in the second. A singularity (or an intelligence explosion) is a rapid incr…Read more
    I would like to thank the authors of the 26 contributions to this symposium on my article “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. I learned a great deal from the reading their commentaries. Some of the commentaries engaged my article in detail, while others developed ideas about the singularity in other directions. In this reply I will concentrate mainly on those in the first group, with occasional comments on those in the second. A singularity (or an intelligence explosion) is a rapid increase in intelligence to superintelligence (intelligence of far greater than human levels), as each generation of intelligent systems creates more intelligent systems in turn. The target article argues that we should take the possibility of a singularity seriously, and argues that there will be superintelligent systems within centuries unless certain specific defeating conditions obtain.
    Philosophy of ConsciousnessThe SingularityTranshumanism
  •  482
    A taxonomy of cognitive jokes
    This is just a beginning categorization. I claim no 'objective correctness' for it. And of course the categories can be fluid, and the same joke can be a member of more than one category (and perhaps it will be funnier if it is). But thinking about the jokes which I can recall from the Humour Weekend, most seem to fall squarely into one or another category, indicating that perhaps this is a useful way of dividing jokes. It seems to me that the "causes of humour" in all 4 classes are different, c…Read more
    This is just a beginning categorization. I claim no 'objective correctness' for it. And of course the categories can be fluid, and the same joke can be a member of more than one category (and perhaps it will be funnier if it is). But thinking about the jokes which I can recall from the Humour Weekend, most seem to fall squarely into one or another category, indicating that perhaps this is a useful way of dividing jokes. It seems to me that the "causes of humour" in all 4 classes are different, coming from different parts of the brain.
    Humour
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