•  1322
    The puzzle of conscious experience
    Scientific American 273 (6): 80-86. 1995.
    Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.
  •  992
    Materialism and the metaphysics of modality
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2): 473-96. 1999.
    This appeared in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:473-93, as a response to four papers in a symposium on my book The Conscious Mind. Most of it should be comprehensible without having read the papers in question. This paper is for an audience of philosophers and so is relatively technical. It will probably also help to have read some of the book. The papers I’m responding to are: Chris Hill & Brian McLaughlin, There are fewer things in reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers’ philosoph…Read more
  •  663
    This is a reply to commentaries on my book, The Character of Consciousness, by Benj Hellie, Christopher Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel. The reply to Hellie focuses on issues about acquaintance and transparency. The reply to Peacocke focuses on externalism about spatial experience. The reply to Siegel focuses on whether there can be Frege cases in perceptual experience.
  •  1072
    Is experience ubiquitous?
    In Zoltan Torey (ed.), The conscious mind, The Mit Press. 2014.
  •  1450
    Strong and weak emergence
    In Philip Clayton & Paul Davies (eds.), The re-emergence of emergence: the emergentist hypothesis from science to religion, Oxford University Press. 2006.
    The term ‘emergence’ often causes_ _confusion in science and philosophy, as it is used to express at least_ _two quite different concepts. We can label these concepts _strong_ _emergence_ and _weak emergence_. Both of these concepts are important, but it is vital to keep them separate.
  •  1077
    Frege’s Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
    Mind 120 (479): 587-635. 2011.
    The objects of credence are the entities to which credences are assigned for the purposes of a successful theory of credence. I use cases akin to Frege's puzzle to argue against referentialism about credence : the view that objects of credence are determined by the objects and properties at which one's credence is directed. I go on to develop a non-referential account of the objects of credence in terms of sets of epistemically possible scenarios.
  •  213
    Précis of The Character of Consciousness
    Philosophical Studies 167 (3): 747-748. 2014.
  •  1
    Varieties of Emergence
    In Philip Clayton & Paul Davies (eds.), The re-emergence of emergence: the emergentist hypothesis from science to religion, Oxford University Press. 2006.
  •  4114
    Does conceivability entail possibility
    In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 145--200. 2002.
    There is a long tradition in philosophy of using a priori methods to draw conclusions about what is possible and what is necessary, and often in turn to draw conclusions about matters of substantive metaphysics. Arguments like this typically have three steps: first an epistemic claim, from there to a modal claim, and from there to a metaphysical claim.
  •  549
    The Singularity: A Reply to Commentators
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 141-167. 2012.
    I would like to thank the authors of the 26 contributions to this symposium on my article “The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis”. I learned a great deal from the reading their commentaries. Some of the commentaries engaged my article in detail, while others developed ideas about the singularity in other directions. In this reply I will concentrate mainly on those in the first group, with occasional comments on those in the second. A singularity (or an intelligence explosion) is a rapid incr…Read more
  •  488
    This is just a beginning categorization. I claim no 'objective correctness' for it. And of course the categories can be fluid, and the same joke can be a member of more than one category (and perhaps it will be funnier if it is). But thinking about the jokes which I can recall from the Humour Weekend, most seem to fall squarely into one or another category, indicating that perhaps this is a useful way of dividing jokes. It seems to me that the "causes of humour" in all 4 classes are different, c…Read more
  •  212
    John Searle's review of my book The Conscious Mind appeared in the March 6, 1997 edition of the New York Review of Books. I replied in a letter printed in their May 15, 1997 edition, and Searle's response appeared simultaneously. I set up this web page so that interested people can see my reply to Searle in turn, and to give access to other relevant materials.