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Adam Pautz

Brown University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    73
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    • Topics
  •  Recommended
    1
  •  Events
    13
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    54

 More details
  • Brown University
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
New York University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2004
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Mind
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Metaphysics
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy of Mind
  • All publications (73)
  •  210
    What is my evidence that here is a cup? Comments on Susanna Schellenberg
    Philosophical Studies 173 (4): 915-927. 2016.
    This paper is about Susanna Schellenberg's view on the explanatory role of perceptual experience. I raise a basic question about what the argument for her view might be. Then I develop two new problem cases: one involving “seamless transitions” between perception and hallucination and another involving the graded character of perceptual evidence and justification
    Aspects of ConsciousnessPerceptual Evidence
  •  168
    Perception
    Routledge. 2020.
    Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the p…Read more
    Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the perennial and recent work on the problem. Adam Pautz examines four of the most important theories of perception: the sense datum view; the internal physical state view; the representational view; and naïve realism, assessing each in turn. He also discusses the relationship between perception and the physical world and the issue of whether reality is as it appears. Useful examples are included throughout the book to illustrate the puzzles of perception, including hallucinations, illusions, the laws of appearance, blindsight, and neuroscientific explanations of our experience of pain, smell and color. The book covers both traditional philosophical arguments and more recent empirical arguments deriving from research in psychophysics and neuroscience. The addition of chapter summaries, suggestions for further reading and a glossary of terms make Perception essential reading for anyone studying the topic in detail, as well as for students of philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology and metaphysics.
    Philosophy of Perception, General
  •  1378
    Can disjunctivists explain our access to the sensible world?
    Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 384-433. 2011.
    Develops an empirical argument against naive realism-disjunctivism: if naive realists accept "internal dependence", then they cannot explain the evolution of perceptual success. Also presents a puzzle about our knowledge of universals.
    Disjunctivism
  •  2398
    Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge)
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. 2018.
    In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.
    Sense-Datum TheoriesNaive and Direct Realism
  •  1189
    The Interdependence of Phenomenology and Intentionality
    The Monist 91 (2): 250-272. 2008.
    I address the question of whether phenomenology is "prior to" all intentionality. I also sketch a version of David Lewis's interpretationism in which phenomenal intentionality plays the role of source intentionality.
    Phenomenal Intentionality
  •  1654
    The real trouble for phenomenal externalists: New empirical evidence (with reply by Klein&Hilbert)
    In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, Springer Studies in Brain and Mind. pp. 237-298. 2013.
    Consciousness and Materialism, MiscInternalism and Externalism about ExperienceNaturalizing Mental C…Read more
    Consciousness and Materialism, MiscInternalism and Externalism about ExperienceNaturalizing Mental Content, Misc
  •  937
    Colour, philosophical perspectives
    In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 144-149. 2009.
    An overview of the main positions on colour.
    Theories of Color, Misc
  •  120
    Review of Jonathan Cohen, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3). 2010.
    A review of Cohen's *The Red and the Real*
    Color
  •  1252
    Color Eliminativism (2006 Manuscript)
    This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments is a kind of "evolutionary debunking argument". Some of the material of this was incorporated into “Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?” and "How Does Color Experience Represent the World?"
    Color Irrealism
  •  1293
    Propositions and Properties
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2): 478-486. 2016.
    Structured PropositionsPropositions as Simple
  •  585
    What are the contents of experiences
    Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 483-507. 2009.
    I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
  •  602
    Intentionalism and perceptual presence
    Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 495-541. 2007.
    H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
    Intentionalist Theories of Perception
  •  2240
    A Simple View of Consciousness
    In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism, Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66. 2010.
    Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
    Consciousness and IntentionalityNaturalizing Mental ContentPhenomenal IntentionalityOther Anti-Mater…Read more
    Consciousness and IntentionalityNaturalizing Mental ContentPhenomenal IntentionalityOther Anti-Materialist Arguments
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