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706The real trouble for phenomenal externalists: New empirical evidence (with reply by Klein&Hilbert)In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, Springer. pp. 237-298. 2013.
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479Colour, philosophical perspectivesIn Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Wilken & Tim Bayne (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 144-149. 2009.An overview of the main positions on colour.
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83Review of Jonathan Cohen, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3). 2010.A review of Cohen's *The Red and the Real*
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682This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments is a kind of "evolutionary debunking argument". Some of the material of this was incorporated into “Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?” and "How Does Color Experience Represent the World?"
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395What are the contents of experiencesPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 483-507. 2009.I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |