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623Can disjunctivists explain our access to the sensible world?Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 384-433. 2011.Develops an empirical argument against naive realism-disjunctivism: if naive realists accept "internal dependence", then they cannot explain the evolution of perceptual success. Also presents a puzzle about our knowledge of universals.
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1644Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge)In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. 2016.In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.
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665The Interdependence of Phenomenology and IntentionalityThe Monist 91 (2): 250-272. 2008.I address the question of whether phenomenology is "prior to" all intentionality. I also sketch a version of David Lewis's interpretationism in which phenomenal intentionality plays the role of source intentionality.
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702The real trouble for phenomenal externalists: New empirical evidence (with reply by Klein&Hilbert)In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, Springer. pp. 237-298. 2013.
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477Colour, philosophical perspectivesIn Axel Cleeremans, Patrick Wilken & Tim Bayne (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 144-149. 2009.An overview of the main positions on colour.
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83Review of Jonathan Cohen, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3). 2010.A review of Cohen's *The Red and the Real*
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |