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83Review of Jonathan Cohen, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3). 2010.A review of Cohen's *The Red and the Real*
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672This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments is a kind of "evolutionary debunking argument". Some of the material of this was incorporated into “Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?” and "How Does Color Experience Represent the World?"
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388What are the contents of experiencesPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 483-507. 2009.I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
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522Intentionalism and perceptual presencePhilosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 495-541. 2007.H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
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1292A Simple View of ConsciousnessIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism, Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66. 2009.Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |