•  326
    Can the physicalist explain colour structure in terms of colour experience?1
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4). 2006.
    Physicalism about colour is the thesis that colours are identical with response-independent, physical properties of objects. I endorse the Argument from Structure against Physicalism about colour. The argument states that Physicalism cannot accommodate certain obvious facts about colour structure: for instance, that red is a unitary colour while purple is a binary colour, and that blue resembles purple more than green. I provide a detailed formulation of the argument. According to the most popul…Read more
  •  68
    An argument against Armstrong's analysis of the resemblance of universals
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (1). 1997.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  712
    Why explain visual experience in terms of content?
    In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World, Oxford University Press. pp. 254--309. 2010.
  •  1248
    Does Phenomenology Ground Mental Content?
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford University Press. pp. 194-234. 2013.
    I develop several new arguments against claims about "cognitive phenomenology" and its alleged role in grounding thought content. My arguments concern "absent cognitive qualia cases", "altered cognitive qualia cases", and "disembodied cognitive qualia cases". However, at the end, I sketch a positive theory of the role of phenomenology in grounding content, drawing on David Lewis's work on intentionality. I suggest that within Lewis's theory the subject's total evidence plays the central role in …Read more
  •  108
    Consciousness * by Christopher hill
    Analysis 71 (2): 393-397. 2011.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
  •  368
    These are some responses to an early version of Johnston's paper "The Personite Problem" (now published in Nous).