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976Do theories of consciousness rest on a mistake?Philosophical Issues 20 (1): 333-367. 2010.Using empirical research on pain, sound and taste, I argue against the combination of intentionalism about consciousness and a broadly ‘tracking’ psychosemantics of the kind defended by Fodor, Dretske, Hill, Neander, Stalnaker, Tye and others. Then I develop problems with Kriegel and Prinz's attempt to combine a Dretskean psychosemantics with the view that sensible properties are Shoemakerian response-dependent properties. Finally, I develop in detail my own 'primitivist' view of sensory intenti…Read more
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921An argument against Fregean that-clause semanticsPhilosophical Studies 138 (3). 2008.I develop a problem for the Fregean Reference Shift analysis of that-clause reference. The problem is discussed by Stephen Schiffer in his recent book The Things We Mean (2003). Either the defender of the Fregean Reference Shift analysis must count certain counterintuitive inferences as valid, or else he must reject a plausible Exportation rule. I consider several responses. I find that the best response relies on a Kaplan-inspired analysis of quantified belief reports. But I argue that this res…Read more
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215What is my evidence that here is a cup? Comments on Susanna SchellenbergPhilosophical Studies 173 (4): 915-927. 2016.This paper is about Susanna Schellenberg's view on the explanatory role of perceptual experience. I raise a basic question about what the argument for her view might be. Then I develop two new problem cases: one involving “seamless transitions” between perception and hallucination and another involving the graded character of perceptual evidence and justification
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406PerceptionRoutledge. 2021.Perception is one of the most pervasive and puzzling problems in philosophy, generating a great deal of attention and controversy in philosophy of mind, psychology and metaphysics. If perceptual illusion and hallucination are possible, how can perception be what it intuitively seems to be, a direct and immediate access to reality? How can perception be both internally dependent and externally directed? Perception is an outstanding introduction to this fundamental topic, covering both the p…Read more
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1424Can disjunctivists explain our access to the sensible world?Philosophical Issues 21 (1): 384-433. 2011.Develops an empirical argument against naive realism-disjunctivism: if naive realists accept "internal dependence", then they cannot explain the evolution of perceptual success. Also presents a puzzle about our knowledge of universals.
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2459Experiences are Representations: An Empirical Argument (forthcoming Routledge)In Bence Nanay (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception, Routledge. 2018.In this paper, I do a few things. I develop a (largely) empirical argument against naïve realism (Campbell, Martin, others) and for representationalism. I answer Papineau’s recent paper “Against Representationalism (about Experience)”. And I develop a new puzzle for representationalists.
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1224The Interdependence of Phenomenology and IntentionalityThe Monist 91 (2): 250-272. 2008.I address the question of whether phenomenology is "prior to" all intentionality. I also sketch a version of David Lewis's interpretationism in which phenomenal intentionality plays the role of source intentionality.
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1705The real trouble for phenomenal externalists: New empirical evidence (with reply by Klein&Hilbert)In Richard Brown (ed.), Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience, Springer Studies in Brain and Mind. pp. 237-298. 2013.
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988Colour, philosophical perspectivesIn Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness, Oxford University Press. pp. 144-149. 2009.An overview of the main positions on colour.
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122Review of Jonathan Cohen, The Red and the Real: An Essay on Color Ontology (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (3). 2010.A review of Cohen's *The Red and the Real*
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1329This paper (from 2006) is now defunct. I argue against "realist primitivism". One of my arguments is a kind of "evolutionary debunking argument". Some of the material of this was incorporated into “Can Disjunctivists Explain Our Access to the Sensible World?” and "How Does Color Experience Represent the World?"
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605What are the contents of experiencesPhilosophical Quarterly 59 (236): 483-507. 2009.I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
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619Intentionalism and perceptual presencePhilosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 495-541. 2007.H. H. Price (1932) held that experience is essentially presentational. According to Price, when one has an experience of a tomato, nothing can be more certain than that there is something of which one is aware. Price claimed that the same applies to hallucination. In general, whenever one has a visual experience, there is something of which one is aware, according to Price. Call this thesis Item-Awareness
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2308A Simple View of ConsciousnessIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The waning of materialism, Oxford University Press. pp. 25--66. 2010.Phenomenal intentionality is irreducible. Empirical investigation shows it is internally-dependent. So our usual externalist (causal, etc.) theories do not apply here. Internalist views of phenomenal intentionality (e. g. interpretationism) also fail. The resulting primitivist view avoids Papineau's worry that terms for consciousness are highly indeterminate: since conscious properties are extremely natural (despite having unnatural supervenience bases) they are 'reference magnets'.
Areas of Specialization
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Metaphysics |
| Philosophy of Language |
| Philosophy of Mind |