Vojin Rakic

:Several lines of reasoning have been employed to both approve and disapprove two of Nicholas Agar’s positions: his argument that the creation of postpersons is imaginable and possible and his inductive argument disfavoring the creation of postpersons. This article discusses a number of these lines of reasoning, arguing that1)The creation of postpersons is imaginable if they are envisaged as morally enhanced beings.2)The creation of postpersons is justified, subject to the condition that we create morally enhanced postpersons.The reason given for the first point is that it is possible to imagine postpersons who are morally enhanced, provided that we consider moral enhancement as an augmented inclination to act in line with how we believe we ought to act. There are two reasons offered for the second point: the first indicates probability, and the second offers proof. That is, if we assume that the higher moral status of postpersons implies their enhanced morality, we can conclude, inductively, that postpersons will not be inclined to annihilate mere persons. For if mere persons have moral inhibitions against obliterating some species of a lower moral status than their own, morally enhanced postpersons will be even less likely to do the same to mere persons. In fact, they might consider it their moral duty to preserve those beings who enabled them to come into existence. Moreover, even if morally enhanced postpersons decide to annihilate mere persons, we can conclude, deductively, that such a decision is by necessity a morally superior stance to the wish of mere persons to continue to exist.

U ovom radu posveticemo paznju pitanju pravde, posebno u medjunarodnim odnosima. U tom kontekstu, dacemo kratak pregled postojecih teorija medjunarodne pravde. Potom cemo se okrenuti pitanju sta pravda zapravo jeste. Pokazacemo ubedljivost tvrdnje da je ona zasnovana na ideji slobode. Nasu poziciju pokusacemo da branimo uz pomoc Kantove i Dojlove argumentacije. Zakljucicemo da postoje ubedljivi argumenti u prilog tezi da je nas istorijski razvoj obelezen postupnom ekspanzijom slobode i pravde. Povrh toga, imamo snazne razloge da tezimo liberalnom internacionalizmu zasnovanom na ideji postepenog priblizavanja covecanstva odredjenom obliku svetske drzave, a koji mo_e biti najbolji garant pravde u medjunarodnim odnosima.

It will be argued that the values of liberalism and peace are essential elements of the moral identity of Europe, as well as universal moral values. They will be contrasted to Europe’s history of warfare. An essential point of reference for the moral identity of Europe is going to be sought in Kant’s notions of the “ethical commonwealth” and “perpetual peace”. The link between this identity and cosmopolitanism will be established. In addition to that, the moral superiority of cosmopolitanism vis-à-vis its alternatives will be asserted on the basis of the concept of the “normative will”. This concept is going to be situated in the framework of four paradigmatic formulations of cosmopolitanism. The primary conclusion will be that a pre-condition for the preservation of the moral identity of Europe is a redefinition of the concept of “being European” in the direction of increasing cultural inclusiveness. In other words, Europe is to reformulate its cultural underpinnings in order to preserve its moral identity