•  619
    When pains are mental objects
    Philosophical Studies 115 (1): 33-53. 2003.
    In Why pains are not mental objects Guy Douglasrightly argues that pains are modes rather than objects ofperceptions or sensations. In this paper I try to go a stepfurther and argue that there are circumstances when pains canbecome objects even while they remain modes of experience.By analysing cases of extreme pain as presented by Scarry,Sartre, Wiesel, Grahek and Wall, I attempt to show thatintense physical pain may evolve into a force that, likeimagination, can make our most intense state of …Read more
  •  95
    Nietzsche and Neurology
    Nietzsche Studien 32 (1): 124-141. 2003.
    In this paper Nietzsche's physiology of pain is critically related to recent theories of neurology of pain. Nietzsche offers no encompassing notion of a neurology of pain like the well-known theories of, for instance, Melzack and Wall do. But, as will be shown, Nietzsche's notion of physiology offers a productive connection with contemporary neurology, particularly with Wall's newest notion of the neurology of pain. Thus I shall not discuss Nietzsche's view on science in general, but the possibl…Read more
  •  86
    The Place of Philosophy in Africa
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4): 502-520. 2016.
    Recently there has been a strong movement towards reflections about the “geography of reason,” especially among philosophers who deal with postcolonial thinking. There is also a renewed interest among different schools of thought, both analytical and continental, in the ways our “life world,” or “embodiment,” or “situated cognition,” shape our minds and eventually the philosophy we do. As a result, we have seen some recent publications on the nature and import of the concept of “place” by author…Read more
  •  50
    Editorial note
    South African Journal of Philosophy 29 (2): 61-61. 2010.