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409The Burdens of Morality: Why Act‐Consequentialism Demands Too LittleThought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1): 82-85. 2016.A classic objection to act-consequentialism is that it is overdemanding: it requires agents to bear too many costs for the sake of promoting the impersonal good. I develop the complementary objection that act-consequentialism is underdemanding: it fails to acknowledge that agents have moral reasons to bear certain costs themselves, even when it would be impersonally better for others to bear these costs.
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1212Agent-neutral deontologyPhilosophical Studies 163 (2): 527-537. 2013.According to the “Textbook View,” there is an extensional dispute between consequentialists and deontologists, in virtue of the fact that only the latter defend “agent-relative” principles—principles that require an agent to have a special concern with making sure that she does not perform certain types of action. I argue that, contra the Textbook View, there are agent-neutral versions of deontology. I also argue that there need be no extensional disagreement between the deontologist and consequ…Read more
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619Female Under-Representation Among Philosophy Majors: A Map of the Hypotheses and a Survey of the EvidenceFeminist Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1): 1-30. 2015.Why is there female under-representation among philosophy majors? We survey the hypotheses that have been proposed so far, grouping similar hypotheses together. We then propose a chronological taxonomy that distinguishes hypotheses according to the stage in undergraduates’ careers at which the hypotheses predict an increase in female under-representation. We then survey the empirical evidence for and against various hypotheses. We end by suggesting future avenues for research.
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15526Sex, Lies, and ConsentEthics 123 (4): 717-744. 2013.How wrong is it to deceive someone into sex by lying, say, about one's profession? The answer is seriously wrong when the liar's actual profession would be a deal breaker for the victim of the deception: this deception vitiates the victim's sexual consent, and it is seriously wrong to have sex with someone while lacking his or her consent.
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1389Vague ValuePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2): 352-372. 2013.You are morally permitted to save your friend at the expense of a few strangers, but not at the expense of very many. However, there seems no number of strangers that marks a precise upper bound here. Consequently, there are borderline cases of groups at the expense of which you are permitted to save your friend. This essay discusses the question of what explains ethical vagueness like this, arguing that there are interesting metaethical consequences of various explanations
Areas of Specialization
| Normative Ethics |
| Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
| Meta-Ethics |
| Normative Ethics |
| Social and Political Philosophy |
PhilPapers Editorships
| Rights in Applied Ethics |
| Rights |