-
830Why Do Female Students Leave Philosophy? The Story from SydneyHypatia 30 (2): 467-474. 2015.The anglophone philosophy profession has a well-known problem with gender equity. A sig-nificant aspect of the problem is the fact that there are simply so many more male philoso-phers than female philosophers among students and faculty alike. The problem is at its stark-est at the faculty level, where only 22% - 24% of philosophers are female in the United States (Van Camp 2014), the United Kingdom (Beebee & Saul 2011) and Australia (Goddard 2008).<1> While this is a result of the percentage of…Read more
-
1222Future-Bias and Practical ReasonPhilosophers' Imprint 15. 2015.Nearly everyone prefers pain to be in the past rather than the future. This seems like a rationally permissible preference. But I argue that appearances are misleading, and that future-biased preferences are in fact irrational. My argument appeals to trade-offs between hedonic experiences and other goods. I argue that we are rationally required to adopt an exchange rate between a hedonic experience and another type of good that stays fixed, regardless of whether the hedonic experience is in the …Read more
-
437No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on 'Rape-by-deception'Yale Jaw Journal Online 123 321-333. 2013.
-
830Rational Numbers: A Non‐Consequentialist Explanation Of Why You Should Save The Many And Not The FewPhilosophical Quarterly 63 (252): 413-427. 2013.You ought to save a larger group of people rather than a distinct smaller group of people, all else equal. A consequentialist may say that you ought to do so because this produces the most good. If a non-consequentialist rejects this explanation, what alternative can he or she give? This essay defends the following explanation, as a solution to the so-called numbers problem. Its two parts can be roughly summarised as follows. First, you are morally required to want the survival of each stranger …Read more
-
93Altruism and Ambition in the Dynamic Moral LifeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4): 716-729. 2017.Some people are such impressive altruists that they seem to us to already be doing more than enough. And yet they see themselves as compelled to do even more. Can our view be reconciled with theirs? Can a moderate view of beneficence's demands be made consistent with a requirement to be ambitiously altruistic? I argue that a reconciliation is possible if we adopt a dynamic view of beneficence, which addresses the pattern that our altruism is required to take over time. This frees up theoretical …Read more
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |
PhilPapers Editorships
Rights in Applied Ethics |
Rights |