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227Norms, history, and the mentalIn D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind, Cambridge University Press. pp. 87-104. 2001.Many people think the mind evolved. Some of them think it had to evolve. They think the mind not only has a history, but a history essential to its very existence.
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: MetaphysicsBowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1999.
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86Mental causationThink 3 (7): 7-16. 2004.When we explain someone's behaviour, we do so by appealing to their mental states – their beliefs, desires, and so on. But, as Fred Dretske explains below, materialists have a hard time explaining how our mental states could have any effect on our behaviour.
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23Richard Rorty., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (review)International Studies in Philosophy 14 (1): 96-98. 1982.
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52The Likelihood of KnowledgeReview of Metaphysics 42 (3): 632-632. 1989.This is a competent review and critique of contemporary theories of knowledge and justification. With the exception of memory, truth and the a priori, most of the standard subjects are discussed: certainty, incorrigibility, perception, the given, rationality, and scepticism. There are a few new technical wrinkles, but no real surprises. The book's strength lies, instead, in its solid, sensible treatment of most topics.
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4The epistemology of painIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Mit Press. pp. 3-20. 2005.
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3Information-theoretic SemanticsIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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4Putting information to workIn Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition, University of British Columbia Press. 1990.
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181Reply to LopesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2): 455-460. 2000.There is a terminological matter that should be settled before getting down to business. Lopes himself is not confused about this, but a reader—especially one who doesn't pay much attention to footnotes —might easily be.
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306Externalism and Modest ContextualismErkenntnis 61 (2-3): 173-186. 2004.Externalism about knowledge commits one to a modest form of contextualism: whether one knows depends (or may depend) on circumstances (context) of which one has no knowledge. Such modest contextualism requires the rejection of the KK Principle (If S knows that P, then S knows that S knows that P) - something most people would want to reject anyway - but it does not require (though it is compatible with) a rejection of closure. Radical contextualism, on the other hand, goes a step farther and rel…Read more
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2Minds, Machines and Meaning in Philosophy and Technology II. Information Technology and Computers in Theory and PracticeBoston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 90 97-109. 1986.
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119A MisrepresentationIn Alvin I. Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Mit Press. pp. 297. 1993.
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234Machines and the mentalProceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 59 (1): 23-33. 1985.
