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Fred Dretske
(1932 - 2013)

Last affiliation: Duke University
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 More details
  • Duke University
    Department of Philosophy
    Researcher
Durham, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Mind
  • All publications (193)
  •  1200
    Chris Hill’s consciousness (review)
    Philosophical Studies 161 (3): 497-502. 2012.
    Chris Hill’s consciousness Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9812-4 Authors Fred Dretske, 212 Selkirk, Durham, NC 27707, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
    Philosophy of Consciousness
  •  337
    The intentionality of cognitive states
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1): 281-294. 1980.
    Intentionality, Misc
  •  1
    Knowledge: Sanford and Cohen
    In Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and his critics, Blackwell. pp. 185--96. 1991.
  •  277
    Psychological vs. biological explanations of behavior
    Behavior and Philosophy 32 (1): 167-177. 2004.
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts can be structuring ca…Read more
    Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts can be structuring causes of behavior even though biological events trigger the behavior.
    Explanatory Role of Content
  •  24
    The Case Against Closure
    In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 13--25. 2013.
    Closure of Knowledge
  • Información, computación y cognición
    Agora 29 (2): 113-120. 2010.
  •  705
    Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain't in the head, where are qualia?
    Philosophical Issues 7 143-158. 1996.
    Internalism and Externalism about ExperienceFunctionalism and QualiaEliminativism about Qualia
  • Burge on mentalistic explanations, or why I am still epiphobic
    In Martin Hahn & Björn T. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Mit Press. 2003.
  •  549
    Seeing And Knowing
    University Of Chicago Press. 1969.
    Perception and Knowledge, MiscEpistemological Sources
  •  1638
    Epistemic operators
    Journal of Philosophy 67 (24): 1007-1023. 1970.
    Closure of KnowledgeExplanation, MiscEpistemic Contextualism and InvariantismLogical Connectives, Mi…Read more
    Closure of KnowledgeExplanation, MiscEpistemic Contextualism and InvariantismLogical Connectives, MiscDoxastic and Epistemic Logic
  •  200
    Ziring ziderata
    Mind 75 (298): 211-223. 1966.
    Theories of Desire, MiscSense-Datum Theories
  •  675
    Naturalizing the Mind
    MIT Press. 1995.
    In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...
    Representationalism
  •  27
    Animal Minds
    Philosophic Exchange 31 (1). 2001.
    One particular form of the problem of other minds is the problem of animal, non-human minds. Do dogs feel pride? Are cats ever embarrassed? Do ants feel anything when you step on them? In order to answer these questions, we must first ask and answer the question of what minds are supposed to do. Only then can we answer the question of animal minds.
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