Michael Veber

The paradox of dogmatism is an argument to the effect that any subject who knows that P can thereby know that any counterevidence is misleading and, therefore, the subject ought to ignore that counterevidence. Regulative epistemology is the effort to develop principles to guide inquiry. The paradox of dogmatism is not typically understood as a regulative problem. But that is an illuminating way to view it. Understood that way, this paper offers a solution grounded in an epistemic policy of “following the argument wherever it leads.”

Epistemology: What it is and Why You Should Care tackles the question undergraduates often ask when they first confront any subject: “Who cares?!” Michael Veber argues that epistemology is often invisible yet essential to our lives. He shows how controversial assumptions about knowledge and inquiry are fundamental and pervasive, shaping even our simplest efforts to understand the world. Geared to those with no background in epistemology or philosophy, the book's accessible, conversational style brings epistemology to life through vivid examples, including murder mysteries, FBI surveillance operations, Nazis, and flat Earthers. By the final chapter, readers will grasp the most fundamental problems and concepts in epistemology and see how their own thinking fits within them. And they will have fun doing it. This book speaks to anyone curious about the nature, limits, and value of knowledge.

A common justification for no platforming on university campuses contends that it is immoral to discuss and debate certain “problematic” points of view. The conventional line of response from campus free speech advocates denies this contention. This article offers an unconventional answer to the moral no platformer. I concede that it is immoral to publicly discuss and debate certain points of view. But I advocate doing it anyway. The argument appeals to the notion of admirable immorality and a traditional conception of what a university is.

In Bias: A Philosophical Study, Thomas Kelly offers a response to epistemological skepticism grounded in his account of bias. According to Kelly, the classic argument for skepticism is best understood as an attempt to show that our commonsense beliefs are biased against the skeptic. Kelly grants that this is true but argues that biased beliefs can still be knowledge. I offer two objections. First, if we are applying Kelly’s theory of bias to skepticism, it is best to think of the skeptic’s challenge to be that our anti-skeptical beliefs are based on what we know to be biased reasons. Kelly has not shown that this sort of bias is compatible with knowledge. Second, Kelly’s approach to the problem of skepticism is an example of what I have called “unambitious epistemology.” And, for that reason, it is not a satisfactory answer to skepticism.

Remarks in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty present a view according to which all knowledge rests on commitments to things we do not know. In his usual manner, Wittgenstein does not present a clearly defined set of premises designed to support this view. Instead, the reasons emerge along with the view through a series of often cryptic remarks. But this does not prevent us from critically assessing the position (or positions) one finds in the work. This paper attempts to do that in the form of a philosophical dialogue. The challenges to Wittgenstein’s view raised here center on: the extent to which hinge commitments can plausibly be regarded as rules of a language-game rather than rationally assessable propositions, mutual support versus bottom up notions of justification, the subject and context relativity of hinge commitments, the difference between justification and persuasion, whether propositions of the form p is hinge are themselves hinge, and the general viability of Wittgenstein’s view as an alternative to epistemological skepticism and Moorean anti-skepticism.

Sextus Empiricus offers an underappreciated and under-discussed version of dream-based skepticism. Most philosophers interested in dreams and skepticism focus on the question of how you know you are not currently dreaming. Sextus points out that our waking experiences and dreams often conflict. And, the challenge goes, what reason do you have to trust the one over the other? This question presupposes that dreams and waking experiences are distinguishable. Thus the kinds of responses typically offered against dream-based skepticism do not apply. And if we accept an idea upheld by one camp in the contemporary debate over the epistemology of disagreement, Sextus’ challenge is difficult to answer. A G.E. Moore-inspired response to the problem is also proposed and explored. It is argued that Sextus’ version of the problem reveals a certain limitation in that sort of approach to skeptical problems.

Recent theories of the a priori were explained, evaluated and rejected. The author then discussed the ramifications of this with respect to the questions of the nature of a priori justification and intuition, justification versus metajustification and skepticism about the a priori. It was concluded that intuition is inevitable in a theory of the a priori, that the concept of intuition is not hopelessly unclear, that justification does not require metajustification, and that while a metajustification of the a priori may not be possible, this does not entail skepticism

Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED) is the view that rational support for paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge that P comes from seeing that P – a state that is both factive and reflectively accessible. ED has the consequence that if I see that there is a barn before me, I can thereby be in a position to know that I am not in fake barn country. It is argued that this is a problem. The problem is distinct from familiar complaints about Neo-Mooreanism and easy knowledge. Potential ways of avoiding this problem are proposed. It is argued that they do not succeed. There is a way out of ED's fake barn problem but many will likely find it inhospitable.

Several subjects are fully convinced that they are brains in vats whose experiences are hallucinatory. They confront a ‘skeptic’ who raises the possibility that they are not brains in vats who lack and hallucinate hands but ‘brains in skulls’ who have hands and see them. Familiar responses to skepticism are offered in support of the claim that the subjects know they do not have hands. The philosophical significance of this looking-glass approach to skepticism is also discussed. It is suggested that these familiar responses to skepticism do not achieve anything because, if we begin from the assumption that we are brains in vats, we can employ those same responses to skepticism to support the claim that we know we do not have hands. One interlocutor argues that things are not so dismal. The main conversation is framed by a discussion among night watchmen at some sort of skepticism laboratory.

Sorensen raises the issue of whether it is logically possible to fake Munchausen's syndrome by way of a fictional exchange between a physician and an insurance company. In this paper, it is shown that it is possible to fake Munchausen's syndrome and to fake faking Munchausen's syndrome. The implications of this on deeper philosophical issues such as Lewis' puzzle of iterated pretence and “internalist” versus “externalist” accounts of faking are discussed. An externalist account of faking is defended and offered as a solution to Lewis' puzzle as it arises in this context

The conclusive reasons view of knowledge entails the “abominable conjunction” that I know that I have hands but I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. The argument from abomination takes this as a reason to reject the view. This paper aims to buttress the argument from abomination by adding a new sort to this list: the logical abominations. These include: “I know that argument is sound and that sound arguments have true conclusions but I don’t know whether the conclusion of that argument is true”. Two standard replies to the argument from abomination are raised. It is argued that the logical abominations open new holes in both

The mooronic solution to the surprise quiz paradox says students know there will be a surprise quiz one day this week but they lose this knowledge on the penultimate day. This is because ‘there will be a surprise quiz one day this week’ then becomes an instance of Moore's paradox. This view has surprising consequences. Furthermore, even though the surprise quiz announcement becomes an instance of Moore's paradox on the penultimate day, this does not prevent the students from knowing the quiz is coming. I conclude that the first stage of the paradoxical argument succeeds and the mooronic solution fails