-
C'è Posto Per La Causalità Mentale Nel Mondo Fisico?Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 23 (2): 216. 2005.
-
238The chinese room argument: Consciousness and understandingIn Matjaz Gams, M. Paprzycki & X. Wu (eds.), Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right?, Ios Press. pp. 43--231. 1997.In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn a language but finds…Read more
-
625Reconsidering the Logic of EmotionPhilosophia 41 (3): 787-794. 2013.It is customarily assumed that propositional attitudes present two independent components: a propositional component and a psychological component, in the form of an attitude. These two components are caught by means of two different methods: propositions by some model theoretic theory, psychological attitudes by making appeal to their functional or psychological role. Some authors have seek a convergence by individuating propositions by Functional role semantics. In this paper I show that when …Read more
-
296Tropes and Mental CausationDocumenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 18 587-600. 2007.The paper argues that tropes cannot be used to solve the mind-body problem, as advocated by David Robb in some paper
-
214Emergence: Laws and Properties: Comments on NoordhofIn Graham Macdonald & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Emergence in Mind, Oxford University Press. pp. 100. 2010.The paper discusses Noordhof' point on emergence, by arguing against an emergentist view of properties
-
324Theory of mind and the ontology of beliefIl Cannocchiale 2 (May-August): 145-156. 1997.In this paper I discuss the problem of animals' beliefs and the ontology associated with the idea of having non propositional content. It is argue that the beliefs of mute animals mainly serve an explanatory purpose
-
43Scientific Essentialism and the MentalRivista di Filosofia 103 (2): 201-226. 2012.The major objection for including mental properties, and laws, within the domain of scientific essentialism concerns phenomenal properties, and such an objection is often raised via the intuition that zombies are conceivable. However, if these properties can be individuated in terms of roles and establish nomological relations, zombies are not possible because they would be nomologically identical to us but property different, an independence that essentialism denies. If there are not nomologica…Read more
-
944Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body IdentityIn Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa. Epistemology and Methodology of Science., Springer. pp. 119-127. 2010.In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
-
797In defence of non-conceptual contentAxiomathes 18 (1): 117-126. 2008.In recent times, Evans’ idea that mental states could have non-conceptual contents has been attacked. McDowell (Mind and World, 1994) and Brewer (Perception and reason, 1999) have both argued that that notion does not have any epistemological role because notions such as justification or evidential support, that might relate mental contents to each other, must be framed in conceptual terms. On his side, Brewer has argued that instead of non-conceptual content we should consider demonstrative con…Read more
-
537Consciousness and understanding in the chinese roomInformatica 19 653-56. 1995.In this paper I submit that the “Chinese room” argument rests on the assumption that understanding a sentence necessarily implies being conscious of its content. However, this assumption can be challenged by showing that two notions of consciousness come into play, one to be found in AI, the other in Searle’s argument, and that the former is an essential condition for the notion used by Searle. If Searle discards the first, he not only has trouble explaining how we can learn a language but finds…Read more
-
566The Beliefs of Mute AnimalsIn Mario De Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 2007.In this paper I argue that it is possible to attribute beliefs and other intentional states to mute animals. This kind of attribution is substantial, in that it does allow for some minimal form of co-referential failure.
Università degli Studi di Genova
PhD, 1995
L'Aquila, Italy
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Cognitive Sciences |
Philosophy of Language |