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134Karl MarxIn A. O'Hear (ed.), German Philosophy Since Kant, Cambridge University Press. pp. 65-79. 2000.Book synopsis: This collection of essays from the Royal Institute of Philosophy shows the connections and interrelations between the analytic and hermeneutic strains in German philosophy since Kant, partly to challenge the idea that there are two separate, non-communicating traditions. The distinguished contributors include David-Hillel Ruben on Marx, Robert Solomon writing on Nietzsche, Michael Inwood on Heidegger, P. M. S. Hacker on Frege and Wittgenstein, Christopher Janaway on Schopenhauer, …Read more
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123Trying in Some WayAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4): 719-733. 2013.Does 'Person P tried to A' entail that there is some particular, whether a mental act or a brain state or whatever, that is a trying? Most discussions of trying assume that this entailment holds. There is no good reason for holding that this is a valid inference. In particular, I examine one 'Davidsonian' argument that might be used to justify the validity of such an inference and argue that the argument is not sound. See: http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/IxsuPqt7rvdzqMxpFiTv/full
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119Explaining Contrastive FactsAnalysis 47 (1): 35-37. 1987.Are explanations contrastive? I argue that any contrastive argument and can be reduced to a non-contrastive one, and hence a theory of explanation need not treat them as an additional kind of explanation.
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118Social wholes and partsMind 92 (366): 219-238. 1983.To what extend can genuinely mereological considerations apply to talk of wholes and parts in discussions of the relationship between individual persons and the social groups, etc. to which they belong?
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116The active and the passive: David -Hillel RubenAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1): 229-246. 1997.How to draw the distinction between activity and passivity? Whatever that might be, the causal theory of action cannot give the right answer, as it offers an essentially passive account of human action.
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112Action and Its ExplanationOxford University Press. 2003.Book synopsis: David-Hillel Ruben's new book pursues some novel and unusual standpoints in the philosophy of action. He rejects, for example, the most widely held view about how to count actions, and argues for what he calls a 'prolific theory' of act individuation. He also describes and argues against the two leading theories of the nature of action, the causal theory and the agent causal theory. The causal theory cannot account for skilled activity, nor for mental action. The agent causalist t…Read more
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100A counterfactual theory of causal explanationNoûs 28 (4): 465-481. 1994.An analysis of causal explanation, using counterfactuals and omitting laws or lawlike generalisations.
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100Philosophy of the Social SciencesIn A. GraylingOxford University Press (ed.), Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject vol. 2, . 1998.Book synopsis: This is the first volume of a two-volume introduction to and guide through philosophy. It is intended to orientate, assist, and stimulate the reader at every stage in the study of the subject. Eleven extended essays have been specially commissioned from leading philosophers; each surveys a major area of the subject and offers an accessible but sophisticated account of the main debates. An extended introduction maps out the philosophical terrain and explains how the different subje…Read more
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86One-particularism in the theory of actionPhilosophical Studies 175 (11): 2677-2694. 2018.In this paper, I intend to introduce what I think is a novel proposal in the metaphysics of action: one-particularism. In order to do so, I must first explain two ideas: a concept in the semantics of English that many philosophers of action take to be of great importance in action theory, causative alternation; and the idea of an intrinsic event. By attempting to understand the role that intrinsic events are meant to play in action theory, I then introduce my proposal. Getting clear on what is a…Read more
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83Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of ActionJournal of Philosophical Research 20 111-124. 1995.
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73Epistemological empiricism: The duality of beliefs and experiences reconsideredThe Monist 59 (July): 392-403. 1976.The empiricist theory of epistemological warrant is not without its attractions. If our beliefs are to be more than “hypothetical”, if they are to be beliefs about our world, then surely at some point our beliefs must be warranted by and anchored to the world by our experience. If our beliefs were not so anchored by our experience, then—to switch metaphors now with C.I. Lewis—“… the whole system of such would provide no better assurance of anything in it than that which attaches to the contents …Read more
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60Responses to Critics of The Construction of Social RealityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2): 449-458. 1997.
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57The Ontology of ExplanationIn Fred D'Agostino & I. C. Jarvie (eds.), Freedom and Rationality, Reidel. pp. 67--85. 1989.In an explanation, what does the explaining and what gets explained? What are the relata of the explanation relation? Candidates include: people, events, facts, sentences, statements, and propositions.
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55ACHINSTEIN, PETER [1983]: The Nature of Explanation. Oxford University Press. ix+385 pp. (ISBN 0-19-503215-2) (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37 (3): 377-384. 1986.
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52Issues in Marxist Philosophy. Vol. I. Dialectics and Method. Vol. 2. Materialism. Vol. 3. Epistemology, Science, Ideology (review)Philosophical Review 91 (4): 632-637. 1982.
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49Collocation and ConstitutionMetaphysica 22 (2): 251-261. 2021.Many philosophers accept the view that, when one object constitutes a second, the two objects can be entirely in the same place at the same time. But what of two objects such that neither constitutes the other? Can they be collocated? If there can be such a pair of objects, they would have to share the same material constituents. To show that there are two collocated objects and not just one object at a specific time and place, one has to show that one of the objects has some property that the o…Read more
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49Actions and Their PartsIn Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy: Metaphysics, . pp. 73-80. 1999.Do all actions have parts, and, if so, are their parts also actions? If they have parts, are there basic parts of actions which themselves have no further parts?
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47II*—Social Properties and their BasisProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85 (1): 23-46. 1985.David-Hillel Ruben; II*—Social Properties and their Basis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 85, Issue 1, 1 June 1985, Pages 23–46, https://doi.or.
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44Realism in the Social SciencesIn Hilary Lawson & Lisa Appignanesi (eds.), Dismantling Truth, Weidenfeld. 1989.To what extend do the standard tests for realism, say in the philosophy of mind, apply to the social sciences?
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41Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social SciencePhilosophical Review 102 (1): 120. 1993.
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40Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Five QuestionsIn D. Rios & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Five Questions, Automatic Press. 2008.Book synopsis: Philosophy of the Social Sciences: 5 Questions is a collection of original contributions from a distinguished score of the world’s most prominent and influential scholars in the field. They deal with questions such as what drew them towards the area; how they view their own contribution, and what the future of the social sciences looks like
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40Explanation in the Social Sciences: Singular Explanation and the Social SciencesRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 95-117. 1990.Are explanations in the social sciences fundamentally different from explanations in the natural sciences? Many philosophers think that they are, and I call such philosophers ‘difference theorists’. Many difference theorists locate that difference in the alleged fact that only in the natural sciences does explanation essentially include laws.
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37II_– _David-Hillel RubenAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1): 229-246. 1997.One of the essential distinctions in action theory is that between activity and passivity. I address this distinction in this article.
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36Singular explanation and the social sciencesMidwest Studies in Philosophy 15 (1): 130-149. 1990.
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Birkbeck, University of LondonDepartment of PhilosophyEmeritus Professor, Honorary Research Fellow
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Social Science |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Social Science |