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901Marxism and materialism: a study in Marxist theory of knowledgeHumanities Press. 1977.Argument that Marx has a realist ontology and a correspondence theory of truth. His views are compared to both Hegel's and Kant's. This interpretation departs from more Hegelian, 'idealist' interpretations that often rely on misunderstanding some of the work of the early Marx. There is also a discussion and partial defence of Lenin's Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.
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138Karl MarxIn Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Cambridge University Press. pp. 65-79. 1999.Although it was, until recently, unfashionable in certain circles to say this, Marx was not a philosopher in any interesting sense. He was a social theorist. As social theory, I am thinking primarily of two areas : the methodology of social inquiry, and its metaphysical presuppositions, and normative philosophy
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100A counterfactual theory of causal explanationNoûs 28 (4): 465-481. 1994.An analysis of causal explanation, using counterfactuals and omitting laws or lawlike generalisations.
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40Explanation in the Social Sciences: Singular Explanation and the Social SciencesRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 95-117. 1990.Are explanations in the social sciences fundamentally different from explanations in the natural sciences? Many philosophers think that they are, and I call such philosophers ‘difference theorists’. Many difference theorists locate that difference in the alleged fact that only in the natural sciences does explanation essentially include laws.
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13Social properties and Structuration TheoryIn Tim May & Malcolm Williams (eds.), Knowing the social world, Open University Press. 1998.Book synopsis: What is the relationship between philosophy, social theory and empirical research? In what ways can we claim to 'know' the social world? What properties does the social world possess and what are their implications? This ground-breaking and multi-disciplinary book brings together a distinguished team of leading thinkers to discuss issues surrounding and informing questions such as: what is the 'social', in what ways can we 'know' it, and how can our findings be validated? These is…Read more
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119Explaining Contrastive FactsAnalysis 47 (1): 35-37. 1987.Are explanations contrastive? I argue that any contrastive argument and can be reduced to a non-contrastive one, and hence a theory of explanation need not treat them as an additional kind of explanation.
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100Philosophy of the Social SciencesIn A. GraylingOxford University Press (ed.), Philosophy: A Guide Through the Subject vol. 2, . 1998.Book synopsis: This is the first volume of a two-volume introduction to and guide through philosophy. It is intended to orientate, assist, and stimulate the reader at every stage in the study of the subject. Eleven extended essays have been specially commissioned from leading philosophers; each surveys a major area of the subject and offers an accessible but sophisticated account of the main debates. An extended introduction maps out the philosophical terrain and explains how the different subje…Read more
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32Philosophy of Economics By C. Dyke Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981, 184 + viii pp., £5.15Philosophy 56 (218): 582-. 1981.review of Philosophy of Economics by C. Dyke
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83Mental Overpopulation and the Problem of ActionJournal of Philosophical Research 20 111-124. 1995.
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3177Positive and Natural Law RevisitedModern Schoolman 49 (4): 295-317. 1972.The article argues that the famous debate on natural and positive law between Lon Fuller and HLA Hart rests on a dispute about whether or not that something is a law provides on its own a prima facie reason for doing something.
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3Book review of Marx Wartofsky, 'Feuerbach' (review)Mind 88 (1): 602-604. 1979.Book review of Marx Wartofsky, 'Feuerbach'
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LECOURT, D. "Marxism and Epistemology: Bachelard, Canguilhem, Foucault". Translated by B. Brewster (review)Mind 87 (n/a): 153. 1978.
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47II*—Social Properties and their BasisProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 85 (1): 23-46. 1985.David-Hillel Ruben; II*—Social Properties and their Basis, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 85, Issue 1, 1 June 1985, Pages 23–46, https://doi.or.
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528The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for ActionIn J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action, Bradford. 2010.Is the thought that having a reason for action can also be the cause of the action for which it is the reason coherent? This is an attempt to say exactly what is involved in such a thought, with special reference to the case of con-reasons, reasons that count against the action the agent eventually choses.
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11Epistemological EmpiricismThe Monist 59 (3): 392-403. 1976.The empiricist theory of epistemological warrant is not without its attractions. If our beliefs are to be more than “hypothetical”, if they are to be beliefs about our world, then surely at some point our beliefs must be warranted by and anchored to the world by our experience. If our beliefs were not so anchored by our experience, then—to switch metaphors now with C.I. Lewis—“… the whole system of such would provide no better assurance of anything in it than that which attaches to the contents …Read more
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Birkbeck, University of LondonDepartment of PhilosophyEmeritus Professor, Honorary Research Fellow
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Social Science |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Social Science |