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1761The metaphysics of the social worldRoutledge & Kegan Paul. 1985.A careful elaboration and defence of holism in the philosophy of the social sciences, with regard both to particulars and properties. The last chapter addresses the issue of the irreducibility of holistic explanation in the social sciences.
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7A Reply to Professor Haji on Posthumous PredicationGrazer Philosophische Studien 38 (1): 195-199. 1990.
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28Explanation in the Social Sciences: Singular Explanation and the Social SciencesRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27 95-117. 1990.Are explanations in the social sciences fundamentally different from explanations in the natural sciences? Many philosophers think that they are, and I call such philosophers ‘difference theorists’. Many difference theorists locate that difference in the alleged fact that only in the natural sciences does explanation essentially include laws.
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6Agency, Causation and FreedomIn E. Barker (ed.), LSE On Freedom, Lse Books. pp. 16. 1995.Book synopsis: The London School of Economics and Political Science has embraced the full range of the social sciences and its related disciplines. Contributors to this book were invited to write on the subject of freedom. The volume is an exemplary reflection of the variety, the individuality, the different interests, and the range of assumptions found in the scholars of the LSE. The authors come from varied backgrounds - linguistics, mathematics, computer science, sociology, geography, economi…Read more
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40Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Five QuestionsIn D. Rios & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: Five Questions, Automatic Press. 2008.Book synopsis: Philosophy of the Social Sciences: 5 Questions is a collection of original contributions from a distinguished score of the world’s most prominent and influential scholars in the field. They deal with questions such as what drew them towards the area; how they view their own contribution, and what the future of the social sciences looks like
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1098The Physical Action Theory of TryingMethode 4 (6). 2015.Metaphysically speaking, just what is trying? There appear to be two options: to place it on the side of the mind or on the side of the world. Volitionists, who think that to try is to engage in a mental act, perhaps identical to willing and perhaps not, take the mind-side option. The second, or world-side option identifies trying to do something with one of the more basic actions by which one tries to do that thing. The trying is then said to be identical with the physical action. -/- After car…Read more
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24Marx, Necessity and ScienceRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 14 39-56. 1982.Among the very many questions we might wish to ask of any particular science, two of them concern the nature of the objects of the science and the character of the laws which describe the behaviour of those objects. What I wish to do is to raise those two questions about historical materialism. That is, I want to ask what it is that one studies in Capital for example, and in what ways of behaving does the nomic or lawlike behaviour of those objects consist. Both are ontological questions of a so…Read more
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16Cambridge ActionsIn Tim O'Connor & Constantine Sandis (eds.), Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Blackwell-wiley. 2010.Book synopsis: A Companion to the Philosophy of Action offers a comprehensive overview of the issues and problems central to the philosophy of action. The first volume to survey the entire field of philosophy of action (the central issues and processes relating to human actions) Brings together specially commissioned chapters from international experts Discusses a range of ideas and doctrines, including rationality, free will and determinism, virtuous action, criminal responsibility, Attribution…Read more
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142Lewis and the Problem of Causal SufficiencyAnalysis 41 (1): 38-41. 1980.Lewis' counterfactual account of deterministic causation has no way in which to represent causal sufficiency. In the case in which the cause and effect actually occur, the conditional, c box-arrow e is trivially true, equivalent to the material conditional. Yet in deterministic causation, one needs a notion of causal sufficiency that is stronger than that.
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7Three Theories of ActionIn J. Hintikka & R. Tuomela (eds.), Contemporary Action Theory, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1997.Book synopsis: Contemporary Action Theory, Volume I is concerned with topics in philosophical action theory such as reasons and causes of action, intentions, freedom of will and of action, omissions and norms in legal and ethical contexts, as well as activity, passivity and competence from medical points of view. Cognitive trying, freedom of the will and agent causation are challenges in the discussion on computers in action. The Volume consists of contributions by leading experts in the field w…Read more
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118Social wholes and partsMind 92 (366): 219-238. 1983.To what extend can genuinely mereological considerations apply to talk of wholes and parts in discussions of the relationship between individual persons and the social groups, etc. to which they belong?
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Articles on realism and relativismIn J. Urmson & J. Ree (eds.), The Concise Encyclopedia of Western Philosophy, Harper Collins. 1989.general discussion of relativism and of realism
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73Epistemological empiricism: The duality of beliefs and experiences reconsideredThe Monist 59 (July): 392-403. 1976.The empiricist theory of epistemological warrant is not without its attractions. If our beliefs are to be more than “hypothetical”, if they are to be beliefs about our world, then surely at some point our beliefs must be warranted by and anchored to the world by our experience. If our beliefs were not so anchored by our experience, then—to switch metaphors now with C.I. Lewis—“… the whole system of such would provide no better assurance of anything in it than that which attaches to the contents …Read more
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1193Disjunctive theories of perception and actionIn Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 227--243. 2008.A comparison of disjunctive theories of action and perception. The development of a theory of action that warrants the name, a disjunctive theory. On this theory, there is an exclusive disjunction: either an action or an event (in one sense). It follows that in that sense basic actions do not have events intrinsic to them.
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Birkbeck, University of LondonDepartment of PhilosophyEmeritus Professor, Honorary Research Fellow
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Social Science |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Social Science |